AN ANALYSIS OF SUPERPOWER POLITICAL-MILITARY INTERACTION

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ABSTRACT

In the 1970s, interacting political and military decisions by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States probably will dominate world politics much as have interacting Soviet and American decisions since World War II. What are the dynamics of superpower interaction? How much is it dependent on nuclear weapons systems? What does a "triangle" of nuclear superpowers portend for world peace and security?

To obtain tentative answers to these questions, this inquiry is based on two premises: first, that as any nation's technology and weapons systems change, so do its attitudes, foreign policies, and tactics. Second, that trends in Soviet-American interaction over the past twenty-five nuclear years can be discerned.

The trends in Soviet-American interaction are used as a basis of comparison for Chinese interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union. Although China's debut as a nuclear power is recent, the analysis attempts to locate preliminary evidence that could support a view that Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-U.S. behavior as China's nuclear arsenal increases might begin to parallel the trends previously discerned.

Soviet-American interaction is treated briefly on the assumption that it is well understood. Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interactions since 1964 are subjected to detailed analysis in two lengthy case studies. An analog has been developed for the case study analysis and is employed to structure the interactions and view them from several perspectives.

Evidence from the case studies indicates that the superpowers may be able to avoid an apocalyptic nuclear exchange, given a persistent measure of prudence, reflection, and restraint. But the contending nature of their goals and the varying tactics used to achieve them indicates that continuing dispute and occasional conflict, probably by proxy forces, is likely.

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An Analysis of Superpower Political-Military Interaction

Introduction

By 1971 it was being asked with increasing frequency whether a world theretofore dominated by two giant nations would have to face the less certain and thus more fearful prospect of three competitive superpowers. In popular phraseology, the question was whether an "international political triangle" had come into existence.

The "triangularists," in asserting their view, had to overcome a somewhat entrenched acceptance of the bipolar model of the international system. Moreover, a strong case could be made that China, the prospective third superpower, was not only far from achieving a stature equivalent to that of the two superpowers but that the gap between them was widening, not narrowing. Neither of these obstacles seemed to deter the "triangularists" from their view.

A bipolar system was in any event more a theoretical expression than a true description of the world political scene. The innovator who had theorized the bipolar systemic model initially had differentiated loose and tight bipolar systems,[1] and prior to China's first nuclear detonation in 1964, it had been predicted that in the next ten years

> ...the system of polarization of power will cease to be recognizable; that other states will count for so much in

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[1] Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957, pp. 36-43. The "loose bipolar sys-

> world politics that the two present great powers will find it difficult, even when cooperating, to dominate them.[2]

Following the Chinese nuclear detonation, one international relations theorist spoke of a bi-multipolar system.[3] Not long thereafter it became possible to find direct scholarly reference to a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese triangle.[4] As China continued to test more powerful nuclear weapons and as the Sino-Soviet dispute became less esoteric and more militarily dangerous, discussion of the political triangle became commonplace. The outbreak of major violence along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 triggered a flood of commentary in the popular press concerning the triangle[5] as well as additional scholarly effort on the subject.[6]

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tem" model accomodates other than national actors, such as multinational blocs or supranational bodies.

[2]Hedley Bull, "Atlantic Military Problems: A Preliminary Essay," (prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations meeting of November 20, 1963, p. 21), quoted in Richard N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September, 1966), pp. 314-27.

[3]Ibid., pp. 326-27.

[4]The best and most comprehensive early scholarly triangular analyses known to the author are in Morton H. Halperin, (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, which also contains, as an appendix, a three-person game theoretic analysis by Bernhardt Lieberman, "The Sino-Soviet Pair: Coalition Behavior from 1921 to 1965."

[5]See, for example, The New York Times, October 12, 1969 and January 5, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, September 15, and October 20, 1969 and January 20, 1970 (columns by Joseph C. Harsch); The Boston Globe, October 12 and November 6, 1969; and The Observer (London), January 11, 1970.

[6]See, for example, Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia and China, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969; John Paton Davies, "The

Needless to say, additional discussion accomplished little in the way of agreement or consensus that a triangular configuration indeed had become dominant in world politics. For some, the world would continue indefinitely to be bipolar, or, in the lexicon of communist theorists, divided into two camps.[7] For others, the world power configura-

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U.S. Invented the Imbalance of Power," The New York Times Magazine, December 7, 1969, pp. 50 ff.; Sir Robert Scott, "China, Russia, and the United States--A British View," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January, 1970), pp. 334-43; A. Doak Barnett, "A Nuclear China and U.S. Arms Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 3 (April, 1970), pp. 427-42; and two articles by Harry G. Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on Strategic Deterrence," Orbis, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1969), pp. 407-34, and "Strategic Arms Limitations and the Sino-Soviet Relationship," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 4 (June, 1970), pp. 265-89. Additionally, the volume by A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and China--The Next Decade, New York: Praeger, 1970, the report of a March 1969 conference sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations, includes specific references to the triangular situation or multipolarity by conference participants Lincoln P. Bloomfield (p. 55), Allen S. Whiting (pp. 85-86), and Kenneth T. Young (p. 166), Klaus Mehnert (p. 173), and John K. Fairbank (p. 199). Theodore C. Sorenson, Harrison E. Salisbury, and a few others address the matter of concurrent U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. and China without referring to triangularity or multipolarity. A more recent valuable analysis is Michel Tatu, The Great Power Triangle, Atlantic Paper No. 3, London: The Atlantic Institute, 1971. This was reprinted in four parts in The Times (London), January 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1971.

[7]For at least one communist theoretician, the conception of an international political triangle discussed in the Western press was an imperialist plot to intensify distrust between the two great socialist powers, the Soviet Union and China. I. Vasilev, "The Global Strategy of U.S. and Sino-Soviet Relations," Rudé Právo (Prague), September 23, 1970. Vasilev is a prominent orientalist.

tion was more than triangular. To the rectangular or pentagonal school, Tokyo[8] and perhaps New Delhi[9] were equally as important as Peking in world politics now or in the future.

A pragmatic view, however, emphasized that China did possess certain characteristics of a world superpower: a growing nuclear capability; the world's largest and, in many ways, one of the most talented populations; a great land area of strategic value due to size and location as well as resources; and perhaps most importantly, a memory of past power, a drive to reassert international leadership, and a pretension to greatness. China certainly trailed Japan economically and technologically, but the situation was reversed in most other measures. The reversal was probably most important in two vital and overlapping characteristics: nuclear capability and pretension to greatness.

Thus while a Japanese economic giant might prove to be an international problem in the future, the pragmatic view found nuclear-armed China to be a current international problem. This perception was greatly intensified by the fact that Japan's most important recent international interactions were cooperative while China's most important

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[8]Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970; Kazuo Murakamy, On the American-Soviet-Chinese Triangular Power Relations and Japan's Role in Asia in the 1970s, Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, mimeographed, March, 1970.

[9]Raymond Aron, Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations, New York: Praeger, 1968, p. 319.

recent international interactions have been conflictive.

In fact, until China developed a nuclear weapons capability, a broadened study of conflictive relationships between nuclear-armed states has not been possible. Both Britain and France have accommodated their nuclear capabilities to those of the United States. British-U.S. and French-U.S. interaction has been argumentative on numerous occasions, but never militarily conflictive. Meanwhile both Britain and France have assumed supporting rather than initiatory roles in Western conflicts with the Soviet Union. Thus U.S.-Soviet conflict or confrontation can be analysed directly but British-Soviet or French-Soviet interaction has been impossible to isolate from the U.S.-Soviet patterns.

China, then, whether or not classed positively as a superpower and whether or not considered a member of a "superpower triangle," can be fairly thought of as a nuclear-armed "star" on the current international stage whose future role, for better or worse, will have profound effects on mankind.

China always has been a riddle wrapped in an enigma, particularly to the occidental observer. The unification of China and the expulsion of foreign interests from the mainland by the Chinese Communist Party has done little to alleviate the mystery, and may have had an opposite effect. The inherent difficulty in fathoming the societal complexities of China, however, in no way detracts from the necessity to enhance our understanding of Chinese actions in the international arena. Espe-

cially important is an understanding of the evolution of Chinese conduct in those conflict situations involving the coordinated use of political and military measures that are edged with a threat of nuclear warfare.

Although much has been written about modern Chinese strategy,[10] a large part of the work has been extrapolated from the philosophical writings of Mao Tse-tung or based on Chinese military activity in the pre-nuclear stage of Chinese development. Certainly these works are valuable in their own right; they definitely are of value to this inquiry, which will draw heavily on them. But the passage of time since Peking acquired nuclear weapons, although covering a mere six-year span, provides a new opportunity for an analysis of a nuclear China interacting with other nuclear powers in world affairs. This thesis has been designed to exploit the opportunity.

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[10] Among the better literature: A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, New York: Harper, 1960; _____ (ed.), Communist Strategies in Asia, New York: Praeger, 1963; Alastair Buchan, (ed.), China and the Peace of Asia, New York: Praeger, 1965; Vantin Chu, Ta Ta, Tan Tan, "Fight, Fight, Talk, Talk," New York: W.W. Norton, 1963; Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York: Praeger, 1965; and, with D.H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965; Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962; Samuel B. Griffith, II, "The Glorious Military Thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 1964), pp. 669-74; D.E. Kennedy, The Security of Southern Asia, New York: Praeger, 1965; Stuart R. Schram, "The Military Deviation of Mao Tse-tung," Problems of Communism, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January-February, 1964), pp. 49-56; and Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla, New York: Harper, 1963.

Plan and Method

China is perhaps best described as an embryonic nuclear superpower. The initial modifier is especially fitting because it indicates growth in progress as well as the prospect of future growth. In fact, due to the growth phenomenon, there is a distinct possibility that faint patterns, or the beginning of new and special trends, of conduct can be discerned in Chinese foreign relations since 1964, when Peking acquired a nuclear capability.

A major problem, however, is to define a method through which it will be possible, first, to isolate or define, and, then, to measure and compare patterns of Chinese behavior vis à vis those of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Fortunately, there seems to be at least one solution to this problem. It is based on two premises. The first, which is almost a truism, is that as a nation's technology and weapons systems change, so do its attitudes and its foreign policies, as well as the tactics which it employs to try to achieve its goals. Following from this is the second premise, that a set of trends or patterns in Soviet-American interaction over the twenty-five years of the nuclear era can be discerned. These trends or patterns can provide at least the beginnings of a basis of measurement and comparison for subsequent Chinese interaction with one or both senior superpowers. Case studies of Chinese interaction with the United States and the Soviet Union will be necessary to isolate or define the specific patterns of Chinese behavior. Simultaneously, they will

highlight whether Soviet or U.S. behavior toward China has shown different characteristics than their behavior toward each other.

Specifically, the plan of this thesis is as follows: an overview of United States-Soviet politico-military interaction during the nuclear era will be presented in Chapter 1. Patterns or trends in the interaction will be highlighted with a view toward generalizing them to an interaction between any pair of nuclear-armed nation states.

In Chapter 2 I will derive four hypotheses on superpower politico-military interaction from the trends and patterns observed in Chapter 1. In view of the complexity of the subject with which they deal, it will be necessary to impose several caveats on the hypotheses. Further, the right to amend or add to them will be reserved.

Before examining Chinese international behavior it will be necessary to review the development of the Chinese nuclear capability during the past decade, and to estimate China's current nuclear posture. This will be briefly accomplished in Chapter 3.

Case studies of Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interaction will be developed in the succeeding two chapters. As noted above, China's interaction with the superpowers since Peking began to manage nuclear weaponry has been essentially conflictive. Peking has repeatedly alleged that the Soviet Union and the United States, while contending with each other for supremacy in the world, are nevertheless colluding with each other by any and all means, including the use of force, to pre-

vent China from achieving due prominence.[11] The Chinese leadership in fact has regularly predicted attacks by either or both of the two superpowers since 1964 and has prepared to counter them. Chinese forces have engaged in combat with U.S. and Soviet forces. Chapter 4 will examine in detail the Chinese-U.S. politico-military interaction in the period 1964-1968, when Peking may have diagnosed Washington to be the major threat to China. Chapter 5 will examine in detail the Sino-Soviet politico-military interaction in the period 1968-1970, when Peking probably diagnosed Moscow as the major threat to China.

The topical presentation of these lengthy chapters is based on a view that interstate political-military interaction is analogous to the message traffic in a large, three-stranded telegraph cable connecting two participants. (In the international sense there also would be political-economic and cultural cables.) The "insulation" of the politico-military interaction cable may be removed and the message traffic in each strand examined separately. One strand is the pathway for the record of superpower military engagement. Another strand is the route in which the political dialogue between the two powers is transmitted. The third strand, which may be thought of as a "tap" on superpower interaction ca-

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[11] One of hundreds of Chinese statements to this effect carried an especially picturesque title: "Anti-Imperialist Warrior [the Soviet Union-W.P.] Reduced to Size: Puny Clown Toadying to Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 27, July 4, 1969, p. 33.

bles to another superpower or to a lesser third power, is the channel containing what may be described as the tacit exchange between the two powers.

Each of the three strands consists of several "filaments." The military engagement strand has two filaments, conventional and nuclear; the political dialogue strand has three filaments, irregular, political, and diplomatic; and the tacit exchange strand has a complete set of filaments corresponding to the main cable.

But the interstate political-military interaction cable is most unusual. The strands and filaments of this interaction cable carry signals (read messages or events) of varying frequency and intensity. The cable is not shielded. Signals can be lost or drowned out. Moreover, there often is considerable inductance or "cross-talk" from one strand to another. Hence there can be no assurance that the recipient of a signal in fact has perceived exactly what was transmitted. The probability is always finite that a response to a given stimulus, or reply to a given query, in the cable will be unintended or anti-intended.

Use of the analog adds complexity to the case studies in the sense that the events in each strand and filament of interaction are chronologically treated. The disadvantages of this complexity seem to be substantially outweighed by the gains accruing from ordering an otherwise amorphous mass of information. As Chapters 4 and 5 proceed, subsidiary definitions and explanations of the analog will be inserted where required.

In Chapter 6 the evidence from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will be weighed to determine whether it tends to support the hypotheses on superpower interaction advanced in Chapter 2. There may be a better than even chance that one or more of the hypotheses will not be supported. Should this occur, possible explanations will be offered. Insofar as this analytical procedure is self-correcting, revisions to the initial hypotheses, and new hypotheses, will be advanced. Since the case studies may generate information applicable to other than hypothesized issues, Chapter 6 will conclude with comment on the further issues raised by the inquiry.

A Note on Source Material

A research design which emphasizes international events since 1964 is heavily dependent on newspaper reports, magazine articles, and, in some cases, radio broadcasts. All of these sources have been readily available. Not only Western publications in English, French, and German but Soviet and Chinese publications in English as well as English translations of Russian and Chinese language publications have been used to develop Chapters 4 and 5.

However, Chapter 1, concerning the record of the Soviet Union and the United States in the first quarter-century of the nuclear era, necessarily must be treated on a gross scale in the interests of brevity and conservation of research time. It will be assumed that much of the record is fairly well known, and the argument therein will be based

largely on secondary sources. This holds true, to a certain extent, for the exposition on Chinese nuclear development in Chapter 3. An effort has been made to select authoritative and unbiased secondary sources for these chapters.

The Level of Analysis

This plan of approach for an analysis of superpower interaction implicitly indicates that the discussion will be concentrated on the nation-state level of activity. To be explicit about the level of analysis, however, it must be stipulated that the concentration on nation-states as actors will not be taken so seriously as to proscribe discussion of internal characteristics or processes when this is deemed relevant to the understanding of a particular episode. Certainly there will be instances when the importance of a domestic decision process in China or the U.S.S.R. will be critical to the narrative, but where information on the subject has not yet been made available. In these cases, expert opinion will be relied on insofar as possible. Emphasis, then, is on the nation-state level of analysis. Important incidental reference will be made to internal events. And, as the opening commentary has indicated, the phenomenon of an emergent third superpower has important ramifications for the international systemic level of analysis.

Remarks on the Title

Although this research design examines developments in Chinese politico-military interaction with each of the two superpowers in turn, the inquiry nevertheless is founded on the record of interaction of those first two superpowers. Thus, the total analysis should improve our understanding of superpower interaction on a universalistic as well as an individualistic (e.g., Chinese policy-making) basis, and it is entitled accordingly.

However, the broad scope of the title in fact has been limited in part. That is, by specifying political-military interaction, more than incidental interest in cultural and economic interactions has been automatically ruled out. For an economic determinist, of course, this approach is entirely unacceptable. For the researcher in politics whose problem is exceedingly large at the outset, such initial delimitation is essential.

By including the political-military interaction of superpowers, be they mature or embryonic, and excluding, for all practical purposes, cultural and economic interactions in order to emphasize the political aspects, the title reflects this author's intent to keep alive the issue of triangularity. Hopefully, the analysis which follows will help the interested reader to draw an opinion of his own as to whether or not world politics in the 1970s may fairly be described by the systemic conception of an international political triangle.

Chapter I

Superpower Interaction--The U.S.-Soviet Example

Introduction

Persons closely involved in an important sequence of events easily can fail to note meaningful trends. Caught up in battling the action of wind and wave in a series of local storms, they may not discern the imperceptible but strong relentless movement of a main current carrying them toward the rocks and shoals of a forbidding coastline.

For instance, the military aviator of either the Soviet Union or the United States who has served since the late 1940s has experienced a succession of dangerous crises as a function of the Cold War. He is not positive how this conflict originated. Few are.[1] But he does know that each new crisis found him strapping an increasingly heavier, more sophisticated, powerful and deadly airframe around his flight suit which, shortly thereafter, would hurtle him into the air to engage an equally improved man-machine team sent by the opponent. Concerned with the immediate, he cared little about the significance of the trend: each time he was sent into a crisis situation, he wielded much greater destructive potential.

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[1]There have been several meaningful interpretations of the origins of the Cold War, as follows: the Cold War resulted from the world view and objectives of International Communism (Charles Burton Marshall, The Cold War: A Concise History, New York: Franklin Watts, 1965); the idiosyncracies of Stalin personally (Marshall D. Shulman, Beyond the Cold War, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); the errors and intransigence of U.S. policy (D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, Lon-

Once removed from the action by time, distance, or degree of involvement, however, the same participant often is able to see the effects of imperceptible but relentless currents, the significance of always increasing sophistication and destructive potential.

This image suggests that the U.S.-Soviet Cold War interaction can be typified in at least three important trends. The aviator's experience alludes to a most obvious main trend, commonly termed the "arms race." But there is also a noticeable contradictory trend that is signified by the phrases "arms control" or "arms limitation." The arms control trend primarily is expressed in the record of specialized diplomacy between the two superpowers, diplomacy undertaken for the purpose of improving security through limiting the growth of destructive power. As the arms race has proceeded through the Cold War years, it has been accompanied by an arms control dialogue.

There is a third, less noticeable trend in superpower interaction that can best be described by the phrases "crisis control" or "crisis limitation." This type of interaction is denoted by a continuing series of superpower diplomatic or military moves designed to defuse imminent crises. The purpose is to avoid not only the possibility of nuclear confrontation but incidents involving the engagement of conventional forces which might escalate to a nuclear exchange.

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don: Allen and Unwin, 1961, Gar Alperowitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); or the unpurposeful, undesigned but tragic interplay of tremendous forces led by mortals all too prone to great folly (Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

These three trends will be outlined briefly in this chapter as a basis for further analysis.

The Arms Race Trend[2]

Willingness to expend large amounts of energy and treasure in pursuit of national security is a major characteristic of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Over the quarter century of the nuclear era they regularly have expended about ten percent of their gross national product per annum on their respective national military establishments.[3] This search for security has received high societal priority to the extent, now realized more clearly, that other pressing social problems have been neglected. Nonetheless, much higher proportions of resources could have been devoted to defense purposes. In this sense what has become known as an "arms race" in fact may have been an "arms creep."[4]

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[2]I have found the following books of great value in preparing this and the following sections of this chapter: Jeremy Stone, Containing the Arms Race, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966; Herbert York, Race to Oblivion, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970; Chalmers M. Roberts, The Nuclear Years, The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970, New York: Praeger, 1970; George H. Quester, Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-Five Years, New York: Dunellen, 1970.

[3]In 1969 the estimated "out-turn" of the United States defense expenditure was $79.774 billion, or 8.6% of the GNP. Soviet expenditures were estimated at $39.333 billion, or 8.5% of the Soviet GNP. Only Israel (25.1%) and the prominent opposing Arab states (10-14.7%), Laos (11%), and North (21.3) and South Vietnam (13.6%) expended proportionally higher amounts. The Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970-1971, pp. 110-11.

[4]The phrase "arms creep" is William W. Kaufmann's. Others have referred to an "arms walk."

Total possible expenditures, particularly in the United States, could have far exceeded total actual expenditures.

The "arms race" or "arms creep" proceeds on two levels, the nuclear or strategic force level, and the non-nuclear, conventional, or general purpose force level.[5] In this discussion accent will be placed on the strategic arms race, but it must be recognized that the superpowers also have engaged in a conventional arms race that may be equally dangerous. Superpower-produced conventional weapons systems are deployed over wide geographic areas by the superpowers themselves, as well as dispersed to nations throughout the world in grants or sales.[6] It follows that these procedures significantly raise the chances for military engagements that could escalate to the nuclear level.

There is a general consensus on the driving power behind an arms race. The race can be characterized in a number of ways, including mathematical analogs,[7] but it is perhaps most easily described as a dy-

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[5]There is also an in-between level of the so-called "tactical" nuclear weapon which can be delivered by general purpose force weapons systems.

[6]The U.S. is the world's largest arms supplier; the U.S.S.R. is second. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70, New York: Humanities Press, 1970. The S.I.P.R.I. statement was summarized in The New York Times, November 2, 1970. The most detailed study of the transfer process for conventional weapons systems has been done by the M.I.T. Center for International Studies Arms Control Project directed by Prof. Lincoln P. Bloomfield. See Amelia C. Leiss, with Geoffrey Kemp et. al., Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Center for International Studies, C/70-1, February, 1970, and associated annexes.

[7]By Louis F. Richardson in Arms and Insecurity, and Statistics

namic action-reaction sequence propelled by fear[8] and accelerated by misperception, misestimation, and acceptance of "worst-case analysis." International distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States, exemplified by obsessions with secrecy and deliberate programs of deception, has continued to be so great that if a newly designed weapons system exhibited any potential for performing, the designing nation would produce and deploy it before the opponent nation was able to do so.[9] The fact that many weapons systems have been deployed by the two superpowers during the last twenty-five years before their operational feasibility was firmly established is the strength of the technological determinism argument.[10]

When the Soviet Union initially deployed an ABM system in 1965, its performance unquestionally was not up to the claims made for it by Chairman Khrushchev and Soviet Air Defense Command (Protivovozdush-

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of Deadly Quarrels, London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1960. Also see more recent work by Paul Smoker, including "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 1 (1964) pp. 55-63. Samuel P. Huntington distinguished qualitative from quantitative and abortive from sustained arms races in the classic essay "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, (eds.), Public Policy, Cambridge: Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration, 1958, pp. 41-86.

[8]George W. Rathjens, "Against the ABM," IEEE Spectrum, August, 1969, pp. 40-41.

[9]York, op. cit., pp. 31, 40, 84, 237-39; also see Ralph E. Lapp, The Weapons Culture, New York: W.W. Norton, 1968, p. 12.

[10]Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisitions Process; An Economic Analysis. Boston: Harvard U. Graduate School of Business, Division of Research, 1962, Chapters 2 and 11; Quester, op. cit., pp. 76-83.

naya Oberona--PVO) generals.[11] Yet that deployment triggered a U.S. decision to proceed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) development and deployment. U.S. MIRVs caused a Soviet response in kind, which then provided additional impetus for a U.S. decision to deploy ABMs.[12]

Moscow and Washington have perpetually doubted each other's intentions. They have conducted a long Alphonse and Gaston scenario, each unwilling to take the first step away from hostility for fear of deception by the other. Only recently the Kremlin concluded that Washington, while talking of limiting strategic arms, was in fact expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal:

> ...the criterion of "sufficiency" officially incorporated in the basis of the arms race policy scarcely differs from the former criterion of "supremacy."[13]

The penultimate tragedy in the dynamic action-reaction sequence is that even when one participant in the arms race realizes that the intelligence estimates on the opponent's deployment decisions were in error, or that his distrust was mistaken, it is often too late, for a variety of reasons, to completely halt or reverse his response. There have been occasional

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[11] Soviet ABM claims have been analysed by John Erickson in an article "'The Fly in Outer Space': The Soviet Union and the Anti-Ballistic Missile," The World Today, March, 1967, pp. 106-14. Also see Clemens, op. cit., pp. 176-90, 290-91.

[12] York, op. cit., pp. 188-227; also see The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1970.

[13] A.B. Khlebnikov, "Soviet-American Relations: Some Urgent Questions," USA: Economics, Politics, and Ideology, No. 3, signed to

instances, in both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., when governments have acted to limit production and deployment of aircraft or missiles when it was determined that the opponent was acting contrary to expectations. A complete halt or reversal of a program has been practically unknown, however, except when the program was obviously redundant.

Therefore, the arms race dynamic has caused each superpower to produce, deploy, or stockpile nuclear destructive potential almost beyond the grasp of human imagination. From two U.S. atomic bombs in 1945, the combined nuclear arsenals of the superpowers have grown by leaps and bounds. By 1960 the world nuclear stockpile was estimated at some 30,000 megatons. There were some 10,000 warheads, including thousands of hydrogen bombs, in the U.S. stockpile alone at that time. The U.S. and the Soviet Union each had achieved a multiple "overkill" capacity. In the decade of the 1950s the expected yield of nuclear weapons changed a thousand-fold while the means of delivery, sub-sonic aircraft, changed little. Nevertheless, the number of people "at risk" in areas targeted by the U.S. alone changed from a few million to a few hundred million.[14]

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the press March 11, 1970, pp. 3-8. (The journal is published by the influential Soviet Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. [the "Arbatov" Institute]). Not to discount Washington's sincerity in seeking to limit strategic arms, it is nevertheless evident that the Kremlin assessment was correct. See below.

[14]York, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

Nonetheless, superpowers continued to develop their strategic forces. Weapons became more sophisticated and smaller, suitable for ICBM delivery, while yield changed little. But the numbers of missile systems grew rapidly to giant proportions.[15] During the decade 1969-1970, the speed of the delivery systems increased thirty-fold, but as the weapon yields changed little, the number of persons "at risk" stayed about the same.[16]

At the outset of the 1970s, it seemed as though an ABM-MIRV round in the arms race would increase numbers of warheads to astronomic heights. Persons directly "at risk" would increase tremendously even though the extra warheads ostensibly were necessary to insure penetration of enemy defenses of counterforce targets. In a world which already had nuclear stockpiles sufficiently large to allocate fifteen tons of TNT[17] to every human being, superpowers continued to increase their nuclear arsenals. MIRV deployments, if executed as planned, meant the following:

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[15] Stone, op. cit., p. 133, presents a graph of the U.S. missile growth picture from FY 1963 through FY 1967, during which the U.S. ICBM/SLBM delivery capability grew from about 320 to about 1640 vehicles. Also see S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook, op. cit., p. 41, and Quester, op. cit., pp. 293-96, for graphs comparing the growth of U.S. and Soviet strategic missile forces from 1959 to date. Quester's presentation also portrays the record of comparative defense expenditures, effective ground forces, and atomic-capable bomber aircraft.

[16] York, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

[17] S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook, op. cit., p. 381.

Number of Separately Targetable Strategic Warheads[18]

	BEFORE MIRV	AFTER MIRV
By the U.S.	3854 (14.5)*	10,264 (40)
By the U.S.S.R.	2155 (7.5)	6,295 (26)

*Brackets inclose a numerical expression of units of overkill.

Available evidence seemed to indicate that this expected growth probably would occur. Washington was seriously concerned over continued Soviet deployment of an especially high-payload ICBM,[19] which might be MIRVed. On the other hand, Moscow certainly analysed U.S. MIRV plans as highly threatening, for MIRVs completely restructure the mathematics of a nuclear exchange. A U.S. decision to produce a prototype of a new-generation bomber, the B-1, and serious consideration of an advanced SLBM system, the ULMS, aggravated Moscow's concern.

Both superpowers were aware of the implications in the continuing improvement in ICBM guidance. Accuracy seemed to be increasing by a factor of two every four years in U.S. missilry; Soviet improvements were slower but perhaps not far behind. Even the most sophisticated "hardening" of a land-based ICBM silo would not protect the missile if an incoming warhead detonated within an eighth of a mile. Both superpowers

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[18]Table derived from a graph presented in G.W. Rathjens and G.B. Kiskiatowsky, "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," Scientific American, Vol. 222, No. 1 (January, 1970), p. 22.

[19]Both the President and the Secretary of Defense spoke on this matter, the latter repeatedly. See The New York Times, April 28, 1970, for presidential remarks, and June 10, July 10, and October 10, 1970 for typical SecDef statements.

feared the prospect of unexpected technological advances in anti-ballistic missile systems[20] or anti-submarine warfare systems[21] by the other that would wreck their deterrent posture. Looming in the not distant future was a dread possibility that either or both superpowers would suspect that the other had achieved a capability for a first strike that could eliminate opponent land-based ICBMs and bombers. In the first strike case, the only way to save the targeted ICBMs would be to launch them automatically upon receipt of warning of an inbound attack. "Launch on Warning" holds an inherent danger of acting in error,[22] with cataclysmic results unless some sort of disarming or destruct mechanism, with failsafe communications, was incorporated in the "Launch on Warning" missiles.

By 1971 it was difficult to avoid a conclusion that resources allocated to security had not purchased a commensurate sense of safety and well-being. It might be said that after a quarter century of arms purchases, often to the detriment of other valid national priorities, the superpowers had become less secure than before.

Furthermore, increasingly sophisticated weapons systems demanded

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[20]The Soviet Union was reported to have invented an "asphalt cloud" ABM system. Time, October 12, 1970, p. 33.

[21]The New York Times, June 16, 1969, an account of a letter from Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover to Senator Henry M. Jackson.

[22]"Launch on Warning" is the bête noire of, among others, Herbert York, and is the reason for the title of his book Race to Oblivion, op. cit. Also see Quester, op. cit., p. 154.

such substantial investments that there was real concern over their rationality and validity.[23]

Under these circumstances, the superpowers began to place increasing emphasis on the negotiation of agreements designed at least to limit the arms race and, at best, reverse it.

The Arms Control Trend

Since the superpower arms race has proceeded on nuclear and conventional levels, it might be expected that arms control trends would be found on two similar levels. To a degree this is true. However, productive arms control measures have been comparatively more numerous and more significant on the nuclear level than the conventional level. Priority on controlling the employment of a weapon has seemed to vary directly with its sophistication, cost, and destructive power.[24] Great emphasis has been placed on limiting nuclear systems, while the main effort on limiting non-nuclear systems has been concentrated in the chemical and

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[23]Governmental concern over the sky-rocketing costs of weapons systems has been frequently expressed in both Moscow and Washington during recent years. For the Soviet viewpoint, see Col. Yu. Vlasyevich, "On The Laws Governing the Dynamics of Military-Economic Costs," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil, No. 16, August, 1970, pp. 16-22, reprinted in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol. 22, No. 44, pp. 6-7. The article uses U.S. data.

[24]Probably because numbers of unsophisticated conventional weapons systems produced are so great and their production sources and distribution channels are so diffuse as to render control, in the sense of formal international agreements and machinery, out of the question.

biological warfare area. The following discussion is addressed to the nuclear-level arms control effort of the superpowers.

It also should be noted that tacit, or informal, as well as overt, formal arms limitation arrangements are theoretically possible.[25] It is probable that tacit understandings on armaments occasionally have occurred between the superpowers. But tracing tacit developments is difficult and, since tacit understandings may in the end be followed by formal agreement, would unnecessarily burden the discussion.

The record of superpower arms control attempts is extensive but its total effect has been disappointingly small. Over 1500 arms control meetings involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the course of the nuclear era have netted meagre results. The arms limitation sequence reflects the same elements of suspicion and distrust noted in the arms race. Each superpower often has seen initiatives of the other as the height of insincerity, as flagrant polemics, or as obvious publicity stunts, attempts to garner support from other nations.[26] More detrimental, since arms control is the other side of the arms race coin, each superpower seems to have been persuaded that security and political influence were more readily gained unilaterally through further armament than bilaterally or multilaterally through arms negotiations.

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[25] Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, pp. 54-67.

[26] Cf., Quester, op. cit., p. 187; also see John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament; A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship, New York: Praeger, 1962.

Yet the arms control experience does feature a number of positive achievements and there recently has developed a potential for substantially greater progress in strategic arms limitation.

The superpower arms control record has been categorized in several ways, but for purposes of this discussion, a two-fold categorization should be sufficient:

I. The Moribund Years, 1945-1962.

II. The Years of Promise, 1963-1970.[27]

For seventeen years after Bernard Baruch told the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission that "We are come to make a choice between the quick and the dead,"[28] the superpower arms control record was dismal. Not only was the Baruch Plan stillborn, but Soviet proposals for staged disarmament and a formal H-Bomb test moratorium, the Eisenhower "Open Skies" initiative, aerial inspection of Europe, the Rapacki Plan for a European nuclear free zone, and the ideas of a test ban treaty or a weapons production ban made little headway. As their bickering dialogue continued, the superpowers sometimes found themselves proposing what each had spurned when the other had initiated it.[29] The continuing point of contention was the inspection and verification issue, which the

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[27] Cf., Roberts, op. cit., pp. 3-8, a four-phase categorization; also see Quester, op. cit., pp. 18-22.

[28] Bernard M. Baruch, My Own Story, New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1958, pp. 324-25.

[29] Roberts, op. cit., p. 37, Quester, op. cit., pp. 105-111.

U.S. insisted was vital in promoting trust and confidence necessary for a lasting agreement. When inspection could be arranged without infringing on perceived security interests, as in the cases of the Antartica Treaty and the founding of the International Atomic Energy Agency, progress was made.

By 1963, however, the superpowers had managed to terrify themselves into a frame of mind more conducive to progress on arms limitation. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 commonly is regarded as the terrifying turning point[30] which finally caused the superpowers to recognize the interdependence of their ultimate interests. In 1963 "Le Grande Frères"[31] mutually agreed to try to work around the inspection/verification problem, thus making possible a watershed arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

While the Antarctic Treaty had been a hopeful harbinger of progress as well as a pattern for future arms limitation agreements

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[30]There is room for conjecture on this point. William W. Kaufmann has mentioned to the author that he believed the 1961 Berlin Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than the Cuban Missile Crisis. This partially verified the author's personal impression of Cuban Missile Crisis action from a Pentagon vantage point that the prospects for direct Soviet-U.S. conflict were slim and, for nuclear conflict, even more so, due to Soviet calculations of the overwhelming lack of possibility of their success through either conventional or nuclear means.

[31]Aron, op. cit., Chapter XV.

covering desolate areas, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was an actual precursor of progress and a pattern for future agreement in matters of direct strategic relevance. During the next seven years the superpowers followed up, in the Antarctic Treaty pattern, with the Outer Space Treaty and, in 1971, a treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed.[32] Of more immediate strategic relevance, in the Test Ban Treaty pattern, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was approved and ratified which, in Article VI, obligated the signatories to search for ways to limit numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals.[33] Continuing in this vein, the superpowers commenced talks on Strategic Arms Limitation in Helsinki in November 1969. The SALT series, inconclusive at this writing, is continuing. This is the first time that the superpowers have come to grips with the problem of limiting, or even reducing, their weapons system inventories.

This resumé should not be taken to imply that the Years of Promise have proceeded without difficulty, for problems have been plentiful. Just as arms control attempts during the Moribund Years were ham-

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[32]The Treaty Banning the Stationing of Nuclear Weapons and Other Types of Mass-Destruction Weapons on the Seabed and in the Ocean Floor was approved by the UNGA Political Committee on November 17, 1970. It was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on February 11, 1971, and will become operative after twenty-two national ratifications are deposited with the United Nations.

[33]The NPT, having been duly ratified by 40 nations plus the nuclear powers, went into effect on March 5, 1970. It was signed initially, and almost simultaneously, in Moscow, Washington, and London on July 1, 1968.

pered by external crises, Berlin in 1948, the Korean War, Suez, Hungary and Poland, the Formosa Strait, and the U-2 incident, so were the post-Cuban Crisis attempts. Had it not been for the Vietnam War and the Czechoslovakian invasion, for example, the NPT, whose antecedents can be traced to 1960, might have come into effect much earlier, thus accelerating SALT.[34] SALT, too, faced the problem of continued existence amid the trials and tribulations of superpower interaction in other areas. Washington had once agreed with Moscow that SALT should be disconnected from the problems of East-West relations, only to contradict that proposition later on.[35] SALT's survival of the U.S. May 1970 Cambodian incursion and a period of heightened mutual U.S.-Soviet suspicion in the Fall of 1970, however, indicated that its chances for continuance were good.

The Years of Promise seemed to be enhanced still further by technological advances in the 1960s which might make it possible to overcome the inspection/verification stumbling block. Seismic detection of underground nuclear tests had improved greatly since the Limited Test Ban Treaty signature, as had photographic and other sensor monitoring of events on the earth's surface by reconnaissance satellites.[36] The cur-

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[34]The initial proposal for discussions on limiting offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems was made to Moscow by Washington in 1964.

[35]Secretary of State Rogers was the spokesman for both positions, a dichotomy pointed out by Izvestia, November 16, 1969. (M. Sagatelyan, "On the Eve of the Helsinki Meetings," also carried in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 46, December 10, 1969, p. 14.)

[36]Satellite photography had benefitted from years of exper-

rent problem of inspecting the interior of ICBM MIRV-cassettes seemed insuperable to the layman and to many experts. But to a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

> ...our verification capabilities using "national means" alone are considerably greater than it has been possible, so far, to reveal.[37]

In sum, the arms control trend was one of increasing activity and more favorable prospects during the nuclear era. The success that thoughtful men had hoped for arms limitation efforts thus far had eluded their grasp. Problems were plentiful. But the Years of Promise looked better than the Moribund Years and a degree of optimism seemed justified. The word count between the two superpowers on arms control matters had remained relatively constant over the 1500-plus arms control meetings conducted during the nuclear era, but the prospects for important results from the dialogue seemed more promising at the outset of the 1970s.

Closely allied with the arms control dialogue was another superpower dialogue on crisis control, the subject of the third trend of interaction.

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ience with high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. RB-36, U-2, and, more recently, SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft have overflown the Soviet Union and China seeking nuclear weapon and missile production information since the early 1950s. In the 1960s aircraft reconnaissance was supplemented, but not superceded, by shallow orbit satellites, the U.S. Samos and the Soviet Cosmos series. Cf., Quester, op. cit., pp. 192, 206.

[37] William C. Foster, "Prospects for Arms Control," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April, 1969), pp. 413-21. Before the opening of

The Crisis Control Trend

The crises of the Cold War had seen the superpowers in fearsome confrontation, yet the Cold War never had involved prolonged combat between the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. This is not to say that shooting and casualties have not occurred. United States reconnaissance aircraft have been shot down by Soviet forces.[38] Unarmed U.S. transport aircraft, flying off course, have been intercepted and destroyed by Soviet fighters. Superpower naval units operating in close proximity sometimes have experienced minor collisions or hair-raising near misses which engender diplomatic flurries similar to those arising from shooting scrapes. But the fact of the matter is that both the U.S. and the Soviet governments generally have been rather circumspect in the employment of major units of their armed forces, and have exercised close supervision over their activities, throughout the nuclear era.[39]

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the Helsinki session of SALT in November, 1969, the U.S. rushed to completion "the most thorough review of espionage capabilities ever conducted" because Washington did not want to see the talks bog down over the inspection/verification issue. The New York Times, October 2, 1969.

[38]The U-2 of Gary Powers and the RB-47 incidents of 1960 are most well known. Numerous other incidents have occurred that are less well known because the U.S. unit involved was able to return to U.S. territory safely. Thus, a badly shot-up Navy patrol bomber once crash-landed on the U.S. Little Diomede Island in the Bering Strait after having been engaged by Soviet interceptors.

[39]Thus Stalin was willing to use proxies but not Soviet troops in combat against U.S. forces in Korea.

As arms control efforts have paralleled the arms race throughout the nuclear era, crisis control efforts have been a third continuing feature of superpower interaction.

Moreover, when the major turning point in arms control progress occurred in 1963, the crisis control trend experienced a concurrent dramatic change. A two-fold categorization of superpower crisis control practices similar to that derived for their arms control experience is therefore possible: the years prior to 1963 may be characterized as uncooperative and unsophisticated; those after 1963 may be characterized as cooperative and sophisticated.

However, it is difficult to evaluate one of these eras as more nerve-wracking than the other. On the surface, the years since 1963 would seem to be emotionally less demanding on the two national leaderships because of the more cooperative and sophisticated procedures and facilities in operation. However, these also were the years in which the arms race was rapidly ascending to new heights of dangerous destructive power, making any and every crisis control advance entirely necessary but perhaps insufficient. There was room for legitimate doubt in 1971 whether crisis control in fact had kept pace with the arms race. The nagging suspicion that escalation was always a distinct possibility, since crisis control might not work, continued to dominate superpower diplomacy.

In the unsophisticated years the successful experience of the superpowers in preventing escalation might well be characterized as the result of both astute politico-military decisions and a good bit of luck.

The United States proved adept at blockade-running in 1948--when the Berlin Airlift circumvented the Berlin Blockade--and at establishing and enforcing an American blockade in 1962--when the Cuban Quarantine stopped the ingress and prompted the removal of Soviet missiles from the Western Hemisphere. In both cases the U.S. move deliberately conveyed Washington's intention to avoid escalation and leave the next decision up to the Soviet Union. Moscow's astuteness appeared in Stalin's and Khrushchev's responses, which accepted the proffered opportunities to avoid conflict. Nonetheless, each superpower often exhibited tendencies to aggravate a crisis to an extreme pitch during the unsophisticated era. Dulles' "brinkmanship" and Khrushchev's "rocket-rattling" diplomacy, even if sometimes practiced post-crisis, made the 1950's a very tender decade.

Crisis control continued to be successful, in an ultimate sense, in the early 1960's. By this time, however, as nuclear missiles rapidly entered the superpower inventories, each crisis assumed a look of cataclysm. The 1961 Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 were so serious that the need for innovative measures to improve superpower crisis control was self-evident.[40]

During the 1961 Berlin Crisis, American and Soviet armored units faced each other near the Brandenburg Gate, crews on alert, tank cannon muzzle to muzzle. In Washington the Administration's Berlin Task

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[40]Which crisis was the more serious has been debated, as noted above, p. 31.

Force developed scenarios of escalation involving "probes" of the autobahn, using conventional or tactical nuclear modes, and President Kennedy spoke in thoughtful but apocalyptic tones "...If we push the button--if I push the button..."[41]

One year later confrontation was between Soviet missile troops in Cuba and the U.S. Tactical Air Command, between Soviet submarines and the U.S. Navy, and ultimately, between SAC and the Soviet Missile Force. SAC was dispersed, TAC was ready to strike at Cuban IRBM/MRBM launching sites, and the Navy detected, tracked, and ordered Soviet submarines to the surface. A quick or misunderstood move in this tense situation might have been irretrievable.

In June, 1963, keeping in mind the decisionmaker's agonies of Berlin and Cuba, President Kennedy declared

> ...nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.[42]

The American University speech, subsequently hailed as the basis of a "Soviet-American Survival Pact,"[43] was followed by progress in arms control, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and a significant development in cri-

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[41]To C.L. Sulzberger in early October 1961. C.L. Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants, New York: MacMillan, 1970, p. 811. Even a non-nuclear "probe" down the autobahn to Berlin, if attacked by Soviet and East German forces, could have triggered other engagements along the East-West German frontier, thus quickly bringing tactical nuclear weapons into use. Quester, op. cit., pp. 167, 208-14.

[42]President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," address at American University, June 10, 1963, quoted in the State Department Bulletin, Vol. 49, No. 1253, July 1, 1963, p. 4.

[43]Harry Schwartz, "The Soviet American Survival Pact After Five

sis control: the Moscow-Washington "Hot Line" was opened in September 1963, marking the beginning of the cooperative and sophisticated years in crisis control.

It has been pointed out that emergency bargaining between the superpowers during crisis situations had been accommodated fairly successfully through normal diplomatic channels. If communication difficulties existed, they stemmed from inadequate technical communication links.[44] (Thus President Kennedy and the Excom would rely on Radio Moscow and communications received through irregular intelligence channels [e.g. John Scali of CBS] during the missile crisis.) The "Hot Line," a technological-political innovation designed in part to correct technical communications deficiencies, was primarily an instrument for crisis control.

Since 1963, incidents in the Vietnam War, events in Europe in 1968, and in the Middle East in 1967 and 1970 probably have resulted in use of the "Hot Line." However, the evidence substantiating two possible instances of superpower "Hot Line" usage concerning incidents in Vietnam is slim. Governmental statements on the subject have not emanated from either superpower. But remarks concerning the strafing of a Soviet freighter in Cam Pha, North Vietnam by USAF F-105s tend to support the idea.[45] Further support can be derived from an incident involving night

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Years," The New York Times, July 8, 1968.

[44]Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, New York: Harper and Row, 1964, pp. 44-45.

[45]Col. Jacksel M. Broughton, USAF (Ret.), Thud Ridge, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969, p. 246, concerning "The Turkestan Inci-

photoflash photography of a Soviet frieghter off the coast of South Vietnam in which the Soviet master's erroneous report of an attack had gone from the freighter to Moscow, as a protest to Washington, and as an inquiry to the South China Sea almost before the photographic aircraft had returned to base.

"Hot Line" usage in the Mid-Eastern Six-Day War is much more fully documented. President Johnson personally indicated that he had called Moscow on the special line to assure Premier Kosygin that aircraft launched from Sixth Fleet carriers were not going to participate on the Israeli side.[46]

Conversely, during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union reportedly made every effort to keep Washington informed of Warsaw Pact force movements and to assure the Administration that those movements were aimed solely at Czechoslovakia and not at NATO. Many of Moscow's messages were carried by Ambassador Dobrynin, and we do not know whether the "Hot Line" was used during the East European action. We may speculate, however, that it was exercised.[47]

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dent." The strafing and subsequent USAF court martial action resulted in Col. Broughton's earlier-than-expected retirement. Although he was not flying either of the strafing aircraft, Col. Broughton was the immediate superior in command. Further light on the "Turkestan Incident" is provided in Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny--Informing the People on National Security, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 139-52. At p. 140 Goulding refers to a Soviet formal diplomatic protest over the Turkestan, but he does not mention the "Hot Line" specifically.

[46]During the Liberty incident.

[47]The Soviet effort to keep Washington informed about the Czechoslovakian invasion was seized on by Peking as another example of Soviet-

After nearly six years' experience with crisis control facilitated by assured rapid communications on the "Hot Line," a further step was taken in crisis control management. In March 1969 a new official Soviet-U.S. communication system for diplomatic message traffic, paralleling the "Hot Line," was inaugurated.[48] This new system was given its baptism of fire during the second Middle East crisis.

During the 1970 crisis in Jordan, Sixth Fleet units were physically intermingled with ships of the Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean as joint U.S.-Israeli intervention to thwart a Syrian armored probe into Jordan was being coordinated. Thus far there has been no confirmation of "Hot Line" usage in the 1970 crisis, perhaps because of the "redundant Hot Line," but it is known that the Soviet chargé in Washington was an important personal crisis control link as the U.S. encouraged Soviet pressure to persuade the Syrian government to desist.[49]

Superpower crisis control in the cooperative and sophisticated years has markedly improved. Command and control exercised by both sides is much more positive, and mutual consultation and coordination whenever military units are in close proximity has become established practice. The years since 1963 have not seen nuclear weapons "rattled" by either side against the other, nor have nuclear weapons figured directly in any

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American collusion, in this case to corroborate spheres of influence. See below, p. 223.

[48] The New York Times, March 20, 1969.

[49] Ibid., October 8, 1970.

crisis of great concern to the superpowers.[50] Superpower armed forces continued to operate in proximity to each other, often inadvertently employing tactics that might cause concern among opposing force commanders.[51] Yet they have, in one sense, become accustomed to each other, and their operational rules and practices, as they survey each other's dispositions, have become more circumspect and based on standardized tactics that make opponent behavior somewhat more predictable.[52]

Recapitulation

The primary thrust of this chapter has been to illustrate the progress of the superpower arms race, the contradictory superpower attempt to control the growth of nuclear weaponry, and the concurrent effort to deintensify or "de-fuse" crisis situations. Whether any or all of these three trends has reached a mature level is not ascertainable, for maturity is a subjective measure. But it has been shown that the superpowers have made remarkable advances in sophisticated and deadly nu-

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[50] An exception might be the saga of the Soviet submarine tender in Caribbean waters in late 1970. At least, at this writing, that saga did not seem to have crisis potential.

[51] William H. Honan, "Russian and American Pilots Play 'Chicken,'" The New York Times Magazine, November 22, 1970, pp. 25 ff.

[52] Ibid. For a dissimilar but fascinating view of superpower crisis control derived from the same data but observed through the lenses of Marxist philosophy, see V.V. Zhurkin, "The United States and International Political Crises," USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, No. 12, signed to press December 9, 1970, pp. 14-26. Mr. Zhurkin and other members of the "Arbatov" Institute have been afforded opportunities to observe U.S. crisis decisionmaking at first hand in Washington, further supporting our argument of increasing improvement in Soviet-American crisis control.

clear weaponry; that they have made some, if inadequate, progress in arms control (albeit not to the point of an arms race reversal); and that they have made often unnoticed but significant advances in their efforts to control crises and prevent escalation.

It is possible to generalize from these trends and develop hypotheses on superpower interaction. This will be the subject of the following chapter.

Chapter II

Superpower Interaction--The Hypotheses

In the previous discussion of the arms race trend, passing reference was made to the development of mathematical analogs to arms races by Louis F. Richardson and Paul Smoker. Two important insights ensuing from the equations of these scholars can be summarized as follows: Richardson was highly doubtful that arms races could end without hostilities. The outbreak of World Wars I and II supported this conclusion even if the years since World War II have not. However, Richardson also noted the possibility that "submissiveness" by one side, or both sides, might result in a retarding or reversal of an arms race. "Submissiveness," in this sense, would be a collective national attitude bespeaking willingness to yield or subject the community to superior authority or control, whether this be exemplified by an opposing nation or by the inexorable logic of a dangerous and deteriorating series of international events. Smoker categorized submissiveness as a "fear factor," and said that it "causes both sides to cool off when the international temperature gets hot."

Through the application of more recent data to modifications of Richardson's equations, Smoker has pointed out that the nuclear era in fact has significantly raised the importance of "submissiveness" to arms race interaction. Therefore, in the interest of promoting peace, Smoker prescribes that when "submissiveness" appears, decisionmakers should act

so as to encourage any moves toward disarmament.[1]

It is evident from the overview of Soviet-American interaction in Chapter 1 that a climax of fear was reached in 1961 and 1962. Further, the superpowers thereupon did attempt to retard the arms race. Worthwhile arms control and crisis control activities were commenced, and resulted in some successes. But the record of superpower interaction subsequent to 1962 hardly reveals a conciliatory atmosphere. On the contrary, Washington and Moscow have continued to have to surmount crisis situations.

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, fear and anxiety motivated the superpowers to modify their mode of conduct to include more arms control efforts and more crisis control communications--but not to end their competition. Far from it. As President Kennedy put it

> ...while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert... confrontations...[2]

Although fear of nuclear confrontation was great, it had not outweighed the fear of the unknown possibilities in being dominated by the opposing superpower. Neither Washington nor Moscow was ready to acquiesce to the other's goals. Each would continue to arm, partially correlating its

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[1]Richardson, op. cit., Smoker, op. cit. Huntington, op. cit., did not accent submissiveness, but concluded that war was more likely to develop early in an arms race and that a quantitative arms race rather than a qualitative arms race was likely to reach a definite end in war, arms agreement, or victory for one side. (p. 79).

[2]Kennedy, op. cit., p. 4.

armament decisions with those of the other. Each would be more energetic in its arms control dialogue with the other. Each would act so as to lessen chances of misunderstanding and to improve crisis control.

Thus the three trends described in Chapter 1 can be pictured as continuously increasing trends. Downturns, if any, are not pronounced. The superpower arms race trend has been typified by increasing numbers of more deadly weapons and increasing overkill capacity. Showing few signs of leveling off, it has risen consistently across the nuclear era at somewhere between a linear and an exponential rate.

The arms control trend has been typified by less intense activity, particularly before 1963. But since that time the superpowers have been rather more engaged in arms control. Their arms control dialogue in 1969 came to grips, for the first time, with the problem of actually limiting numbers of nuclear weapons systems.

The crisis control trend has been typified by continuously improving methods and machinery across the nuclear era, with a significant improvement in 1963 attributable to the inauguration of the Moscow-Washington "Hot Line" crisis communications system.

The roughly parallel juxtaposition of a set of lines denoting these trends, all of which would rise to the right if the x-axis denoted time, lends itself to the formulation of three hypotheses on superpower interaction. These hypotheses, which deal with series of events over time, are predicated on the arms race trend and compare the trend in other actions to it.

The recounting of events in now historic superpower crisis situations suggests a fourth hypothesis on superpower interaction not based on a trend but addressed specifically to superpower political-military behavior under conditions of extreme tension.

It should be clear at the outset that our expectations from the hypotheses are very modest. If one were to carve a totem pole of types of hypotheses on the basis of their "scientific acceptability," these hypotheses would have to be somewhere near the lower end. It will be impossible to either validate or invalidate them with precision. The data base for inquiry is both so large and yet so incomplete (due to contemporaneousness and to governmental disclosure regulations) that they cannot be experimentally treated with sufficient rigor for validation. However, the hypotheses should not be regarded as "haunted house doctrines."[3] At a minimum, it should be possible to assemble and categorize sufficient evidence to suggest a tendency toward validation. It may be possible, in some cases, to demonstrate some support for our hypotheses. Insofar as this is accomplished, the hypotheses may be helpful to future theory building.

A further caveat regarding the hypotheses concerns causality. Basically, the hypotheses offered here should not be regarded as con-

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[3]"Haunted House Doctrines" are assertions that neither can be proven nor disproven. "I know there is a ghost in that old dark house on the hill." "No, there isn't. Prove that there is one." "I can't, but prove that there isn't."

clusive causal statements. They are not primarily intended to describe a causal relationship between a trend of increasing strategic weapons system inventories and a hypothesized superpower behavior. Rather, they should be understood as describing concurrent behavioral phenomena which may, may in part, or may not be causally connected. Actually, as might be expected, increasing nuclear weapons system inventories probably are best regarded as one of a number of interrelated causes that result in a given international behavior. Whether the acquisition of nuclear weapons systems by a nation, or its opponent, can be held to account for a majority, or even a plurality, of a total spectrum of causality behind a nation's behavior is open to speculation, because finite numbers (a percentage of variance) cannot be assigned to it with objectivity. Insofar as we may subjectively believe that the acquisition of nuclear weapons does change national behaviors, however, the hypotheses will take on a higher meaning.

Keeping these caveats in mind, let us enunciate four working hypotheses:

Hypothesis I

Hypothesis I, which might be called the "Nuclear Crisis Avoidance" hypothesis, says that

> As their strategic weapons system inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly willing to gauge their diplomatic and military initiatives and responses to a level well below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder.

It might be conjectured that Hypothesis I, if affirmed, would mean that heavily-armed superpowers had overcome, or passed beyond, an interest in risk-taking to achieve national goals. However, the introductory discussion in this chapter and the remarks in the crisis control section of Chapter 1 were designed to indicate that despite increasing strategic weapons inventories, some superpower risk-taking has continued. Therefore, this hypothesis should be interpreted as saying that such risk-taking, or "brinkmanship," that might occur in superpower diplomatic and military initiatives and responses would be gauged below the nuclear threshold. While this seems to be fairly accurate reflection of Soviet-American experience, only an evaluation of the case studies of interaction will ascertain whether the Chinese-American or Sino-Soviet experiences support this interpretation of the hypothesis.

Hypothesis II

Hypothesis II, which might be colloquialized as the "Hot Line" hypothesis, says that

> The larger the strategic weapons system inventory available to a superpower, the greater the proclivity of that superpower to develop ready lines of communication with an opponent superpower.

It is obvious that Hypothesis II may run afoul of the ambiguity in the phrase "ready lines of communication." Each superpower may have its own subjective view of what constitutes a ready line of communication. In the Soviet-American experience, the two governments decided on

fixed specialized communications network, the "hot line," for crisis communications between top decisionmakers, and later augmented this network with a parallel special network for routine diplomatic traffic. Whether developments in Sino-Soviet or Chinese-American experience have begun to parallel this, or whether the decisionmakers concerned feel a need to do so, will be examined in the case studies.

Hypothesis III

Hypothesis III, which might be referred to as the "SALT Talks" hypothesis, says that

> As their strategic weapons system inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly ready to undertake arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower designed to limit or reduce arms levels.

It may be argued that Hypothesis III cannot be supported by Chinese-American or Sino-Soviet experience. It is common knowledge that China has not, at this point, participated in arms control negotiations to the extent that Moscow and Washington have. Peking consistently has regarded arms control or arms limitation efforts in what is referred to as the Leninist tradition. However, there are two Leninist traditions that fit under the general rubric of disarmament. Before the Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin declared that disarmament proposals merely distracted the masses from the only valid means for eliminating war, a communist revolution that would end the class struggle. Lenin subsequently

changed this view. After the Bolsheviks had come to power, Lenin decided that disarmament proposals could be used to tactical advantage to preserve the base of socialism and to divide and embarrass capitalist powers.[4] The Chinese leadership has never acknowledged the later Lenin position.[5] Thus, while both Moscow and Peking have called for general and complete disarmament, only Moscow, following the later Lenin tradition, has deemed it appropriate to enter formal arms control negotiations with capitalist states.

However, there are other than formal arms control negotiating procedures available to nations. Hypothesis III is deduced from the actual Soviet-American experience, and it is not difficult to check the Chinese record of interaction with either the United States or the Soviet Union for opportunities or moves to negotiate on arms levels.

Hypothesis IV

Hypothesis IV, which is not predicated on a trend, but on exhibited superpower behavior in specific crisis circumstances, and which might be called the "Submissiveness" hypothesis, says that

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[4]Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race, Soviet Interest in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, pp. 5-12. Additional sources are noted on these pages.

[5]Cf., Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Publications, 1968, pp. 225-30.

> Superpower conflict situations which pose a clear and present danger of nuclear warfare (such as when general purpose forces are engaged and escalation seems imminent, or strategic forces are arrayed against each other and a dispute seems insoluble by other than military means,) stimulate the superpowers to lessen tension through crisis control measures or explanation of strategic postures.

Unlike the first three hypotheses, Hypothesis IV seems to need little amplification. It seems to reflect Soviet-American experience fairly well, and the records of Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interaction should be sufficiently clear, even though they are much more contemporary, to facilitate the accumulation of further evidence.

These four working hypotheses on superpower politico-military interaction ultimately may not in some cases reflect real-world international politics with the desired degree of precision and universality. Therefore, the right to modify them or add additional hypotheses in order to incorporate the evaluation of the evidence in the case studies is reserved.

Before proceeding to the examination of Chinese-American and Sino-Soviet interaction in pursuit of this evidence, it is necessary to outline the development of China's nuclear forces.

Chapter III

Development of Chinese Strategic Warfare Capability

> Can atom bombs decide wars? No, they can't.....Without the struggles waged by the people, atom bombs by themselves would be of no avail...
>
> --Mao Tse-tung, August 13, 1945[1]

The government of China has kept this maxim of Mao Tse-tung in the forefront of the decision process concerning Chinese military force structure. The maxim probably expresses the philosophy behind the development of the Chinese strategic warfare capability as well as any other phrase.[2] To the Chinese, nuclear weapons are important on the world political scene, but not as important as the national political will of a unified people.[3]

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[1] Mao Tse-tung, "The Situations and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan," Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. 4, p. 21. This statement may not have been written until the 1950s. Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York: Praeger, 1965, p. 30. Alternatively, the statement could have been drafted in 1945 and amended in 1951 or 1952.

[2] In 1957 Mao modified the maxim into much more colorful phraseology:

> The atom bomb is a paper tiger...It looks terrible but in fact is not. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass annihilation; the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new weapons.

--Mao Tse-tung, "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," NCNA, Peking, October 31, 1958, reproduced in Current Background, November 12, 1958, p. 8.

[3] Cf., A. Doak Barnett, China After Mao, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 38, 45, 63, 236-37, 250.

Accordingly, the Chinese government nuclear weapons program has been conducted with what might be termed all deliberate speed. China's less developed economy dictated a specialized allocation of resources to nuclear development. Unless other urgent requirements were to be indefinately deferred, a crash program was not a feasible alternative. Since Western commentators have remarked derogatorily on the slowness of the Chinese program, or to lags therein, and Soviet sources have remarked that China had established foolishly high priorities and badly misallocated resources to the program,[4] it would be tempting to conclude that the Chinese program must have been properly scheduled.[5]

Making our own evaluation, it seems reasonable to say that the Chinese program, given the less developed economy and technology that characterizes Chinese society, really has recorded remarkable accomplishments in the space of six and one-half years. The fact that the program seemed to proceed at a fairly constant rate through the societal uproar of the Cultural Revolution accents its remarkable nature.

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[4] Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), January 21, 1970 (commentary in The New York Times, April 27, 1970). A stronger parallel remark was presented in Rudé Právó (Prague), July 15, 1970.

It has been estimated unofficially that Chinese expenditures on missiles and warheads may be equivalent to $1.5 billion per annum. Time, March 8, 1971, p. 22.

[5] It should be noted that in their earlier stages, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet programs were marked by the consistently phased series of test detonations that the Chinese program has displayed. The U.S. tested twice in 1946, four times in 1948, and conducted two large test series in 1951; the Soviet Union tested once in 1949 and twice in 1951. The Chinese test series will be discussed below.

Moreover, when juxtaposed to the French development of a force de dissuasion,[6] to which a highly developed technology and rather sophisticated economic controls could be applied, the Chinese program comes off well. But to be on safe ground, it is best merely to term the Chinese program deliberate.

Indicative of the less than top priority of the atomic program is the fact that even after their own initial successful detonation of two nuclear weapons, Chinese spokesmen continued to proclaim man's superiority over weapons. In 1965 Lin Piao said

> The spiritual atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.[7]

This phrase has continued to be prominent in Chinese pronouncements; it may readily be found in Chinese periodicals today. It represents the ongoing Maoist dictum on strategic arms.[8]

To be sure, the allocation of resources to the nuclear program resulted in differences in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) hierarchy,

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[6]To use de Gaulle's own terminology. The more common sobriquet force de frappe was not used by the general, a great stylist of French prose.

[7]Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1965, p. 27.

[8]It may be questioned whether Chinese adherence to Mao's thinking will continue after Mao's death. The successor Soviet leadership cabal rapidly changed Stalin's line on nuclear weapons, which had been nearly identical with Mao's, after the Soviet dictator's death.

sometimes of crucial import. Modernizers in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) undoubtedly pushed for improved weaponry of all kinds, perhaps to the point of their own dismissal.[9] Former PLA Marshal Chen Yi, serving as Foreign Minister, once told foreign correspondents "Maybe we will walk around without pants, but we will have our own nuclear weapons."[10] However, these intramural disputes always have been resolved in favor of modest but steady advance, and against a crash program. The pattern of decisions reemphasizes historic Chinese patience and long-range perspective. Weighing in favor of the methodical, long-range approach were distant goals which did not involve atomic war-making. Rather, they accented the political value of a certain amount of nuclear weaponry: deterrence of superpower attack, improved political influence in Socialist countries, enhancement of Chinese support for wars of national liberation, and the restoration of Chinese hegemony in Asia.[11]

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[9] See, inter alia, Morton H. Halperin and John W. Lewis, "New Tensions in Army--Party Relations in China," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1966, pp. 58-67; David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshall P'eng Teh-huai, The China Quarterly, No. 8 (1961), also in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966; Harold P. Ford, "Modern Weapons and the Sino-Soviet Estrangement," The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), pp. 160-73; and Ellis Joffe, "The Conflict Between the Old and the New in the Chinese Army," in ibid, (The Joffe article also is in MacFarquhar, op. cit., pp. 34-56); and The New York Times, January 27, 1966.

[10] Quoted in Ivan Dimitrov, "The Spirit of Militarism, Narodna Armiya (Sofia), July 29, 1970, p. 4. The article is a polemic against Chinese collusion with West European nations.

[11] Cf., Halperin, China and the Bomb, op. cit., pp. 44-55, 131-34.

There is persuasive evidence that Mao and his associates never envisaged a politico-military blitzkrieg to achieve these goals. After the Chinese nuclear tests of 1964 and 1965, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai each stated that at least another twenty years would be needed to make China "really strong."[12]

Nonetheless, steady advance over a period of less than ten years can result in the achievement of an important nuclear capability. A brief analysis of the growth of this capability from zero to meaningful megatonnage is the subject matter of the remainder of this chapter. The developmental process can be categorized in three stages,

I The Pre-nuclear Period, 1949-1963,

II The Bomber-Atomic Period, 1964-1967,

III The Missile-Hydrogen Period, 1967-date,

which will be discussed consecutively. The Chinese nuclear growth sequence then will be compared, in point of time, with the U.S.-Soviet record set out in Chapter I. The analysis will conclude with a presentation of estimates on, and the implications of, current Chinese capabilities.

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[12] The Washington Post, October 1, 1965, quoted by Vergil Berger of Reuters from Peking. Mao told Li Tsung-jen, a former acting Nationalist President who returned to China from the U.S. in 1965, substantially the same thing. Peking Radio in Mandarin to Taiwan, August 8, 1965; C.H.G. Oldham, "China's New Technology," The Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1966, verifies the long-range emphasis of Chinese planning from knowledge gained in a 1964 visit.

The Pre-nuclear Period, 1949-1964.

One of the ironies of history is that both of the superpowers, each in its own way having rendered aid to the development of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, then signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Soviet and U.S. aid to China mainly was given during the 1950s. By 1960, with a few exceptions,[13] Chinese nuclear development no longer received assistance. Soviet aid to China was intended and formalized, while the American contribution was anti-intended and unstructured. Soviet aid concentrated on material and engineering inputs and student training; the American contribution can be characterized as one of sophisticated, trained brainpower.

The time sequence of superpower contribution to the Chinese nuclear capability lends itself to interesting speculation. Moscow agreed with Peking on a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950, and there is little doubt that the agreement contained secret provisions for military assistance to China. However, it is unlikely that Stalin was eager to disseminate advanced weapons technology.[14] Mao subsequently remarked that the reason the treaty took so long to negotiate was that Stalin did not trust him and thought

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[13]Some Chinese atomic researchers remained at the Soviet Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna until late June 1965.

[14]Cf., Joffe, op. cit., p. 36.

he might become a second Tito.[15]

About the same time, a prominent young Chinese scientist and engineer in America, Dr. Chien Hsueh-shen, was preparing to return home to Shanghai. Dr. Chien holds a master's degree in aeronautical engineering from M.I.T. and the Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology, magna cum laude. He was director of the rocket section of the U.S. Defense Scientific Advisory Board during World War II. (As a CalTech faculty associate of Theodore von Karman, Chien went with him to Germany just before V-E day to analyse the German scientific effort. At Braunschweig, von Karman and Chien discovered German work on a trans-oceanic buzz bomb.) Chien became one of M.I.T.'s youngest full professors in 1946, at age 34. Later, he was professor of aeronautics and head of the Gugenheim Jet Propulsion Laboratory at CalTech. He is one of the world's leading aeronautical and jet propulsion experts.

Chien did not return to China in 1950 due to U.S. government intervention. Five years later, however, he was allowed to depart--his secret knowledge presumably obsolete. In 1955 he declared that he wanted to help China "...live with honor, happiness, and in peace." He became director of China's nuclear research program, with emphasis on

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[15] In remarks to the Twelfth Central Committee Plenum of the CCP, reported by Mainichi (Tokyo), March 9, 1967, noted in John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 15.

rocketry, in charge of an estimated 1300-2000 engineers and 500-750 scientists.[16] Today Dr. Chien is a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and the Presidium of the National People's Congress.[17]

Chien Hsueh-shen is perhaps the most remarkable member of a cadre of scientist-engineers trained in the United States.[18] The intriguing aspect of their collective story, emphasized by Chien's own odyssey, is that, shortly after their reassembly in Peking in the mid-fifties, China's indigenous nuclear development program really began in earnest. American-trained Chinese scientist-engineers thus may have been a prime motive force behind China's decision to seek more assistance in the area of advanced weapons systems, including nuclear weapons and guided missiles. During the period 1957-1960 Soviet assistance was forthcoming.

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[16]Stanley S. Karnow, "U.S.-Trained Intellectuals Advise China," The Washington Post, February 27, 1966; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Chinese Who Studied in U.S. Believed Key Man in Development of Missile," The Washington Post, October 29, 1966.

[17]The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1970.

[18]Others include Chien Wei-chang (CalTech/JPL), Wei Chung-hua (M.I.T.), and Wang Kan-chang (U. of Calif., Berkeley.) The director of the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy, Tsien San-tsiang, and his wife were associates of Joliot-Curie. (It should be noted that not all of the Chinese scientific cadre fared well during the Cultural Revolution. Red Guard posters demanded that Marshal Nieh Jung-Chen, Chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission and Deputy Premier, be criticized and burned to death. Liu Shao-chi's son, educated in the U.S.S.R. and a rocket expert, was detained. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, June 25, 1968.)

The Soviet Union earlier had provided aid to the Chinese armament industry, enabling the first Chinese-made MiG jet fighters, tanks and light naval craft to appear in 1956. The Korean War of course was the impetus for this early industrial support and direct arms aid[19]--for which China paid the U.S.S.R. even though China had not instigated the war. The Khrushchev government also seemed to be favorably disposed toward military assistance to China. On October 15, 1957, the Soviet Union and China signed an agreement that, according to Peking, promised "an atomic bomb and technical data for its manufacture" among other "new technology for national defense." The agreement resulted in substantial Soviet military aid to China in the form of advanced conventional weapons systems[20] and, perhaps more importantly, an impetus toward the development of the modernized industrial capabilities on which a strategic weapons program could be founded.

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[19]Richard M. Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power, New York: Praeger, 1968, pp. 20-35, 40-42, describes the extent of Soviet military and industrial aid to China in detail, asserting that the Chinese, at a conference with the Soviets and North Koreans in August, 1950, agreed to cross into North Korea if the Soviets provided them with modern arms and aircraft. (p. 20). The supply of MiG-15s to China was "seemingly endless," and a strategic bomber force (B-29 copies) and a tactical jet bomber force (Il-28 types) also was provided.

[20]Including 50-60 TU-14 "Bosun" twin-jet patrol bombers and, perhaps, short and medium range ballistic missiles in 1958. Alice Langley Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 164-65. Also see Life, July 13, 1959, p. 36, an account of a Khrushchev-Harriman meeting. Advanced aircraft definitely were provided--MiG-19s and TU-14s. Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 35, 66-67.

Apparently, however, the 1957 agreement ran aground on the rocks of conflicting purposes. Whether because the Soviets demanded bilateral control arrangements on some advanced (read atomic-capable) weapons systems, a concept unacceptable to Peking; because the Chinese thought the aid insufficient; for other reasons as yet unfathomed; or as a reflection of other matters in dispute; the agreement was terminaged in 1959.[21] Soviet technicians and their blueprints were withdrawn in 1960.[22] China's program became the sole responsibility of its indigenous proprietors.

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[21] In May, 1959, one month before termination of the aid agreement, Ho Chi Minh told two Italian Communists, in the presence of Chinese journalists, that China was conducting nuclear research and would soon have its own atomic weapon. Giuseppe Boffa, Dopo Krusciov, Turin, 1965, p. 61, mentioned in Kevin Devlin, The Moscow Meetings, Munich: unpublished manuscript, 1969-1970, Part II, p. 11. This could substantiate the suspicions that the 1957 agreement was very much concerned with atomic weapons. But one of the more puzzling aspects of the agreement is why the U.S.S.R. signed it in the first place when the Soviet international line was emphasizing nonproliferation and a test ban. Clemens, op. cit., pp. 13-43, poses five hypotheses for the Soviet decision and its reversal. Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Soviet Attitude," in Halperin (ed.), Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, op. cit., pp. 205-17, favors the control issue as the decisive factor. Also see Morton H. Halperin and Tang Tsou, "The 1958 Quemoy Crisis," in ibid., pp. 269-70; Oran R. Young, "China and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," in ibid., pp. 15-28; William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964, pp. 340-70; Halperin, China and the Bomb, op. cit., pp. 78-82; Hsieh, op. cit.; Quester, op. cit., pp. 180-81; Donald Zagoria, op. cit., pp. 170-71.

[22] According to the Chinese, the Soviets withdrew 1,390 experts, cancelled 343 contracts, and left 257 scientific and technical projects uncompleted.

The Bomber-Atomic Period, 1964-67

After Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear weapons program was withdrawn, Peking resorted to importing materials (e.g., chromium, nickel) from Western nations and Japan to make up deficiencies in Chinese production facilities.[23] By late 1964, China had in operation one nuclear "research" reactor supplied by the U.S.S.R. in 1958, two weapons-grade plutonium producing reactors, and an enriched-uranium gaseous diffusion plant.[24] Chinese technicians assembled a nuclear device and exploded it on October 16, 1964.[25] The first explosion, yielding 20 KT, was atmospheric (as were all Chinese tests until 1969), and thus contravened the Test Ban Treaty of a year earlier. But Peking had not accepted the treaty in the first place. China promised "no first use" of the new weaponry but ignored the matter of atmospheric testing. The second Chinese test came seven months later, on May 14, 1965. Like the first explosion, the second yielded about 20 KT. But the second bomb

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[23]For an East European report on the extensive nature of the Chinese import program from industrial Western Europe, see Dimitrov, op. cit. An excellent example of the prevailing Soviet view on this was carried by Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, April 16, 1968.

[24]The Chinese probably had received Soviet aid on the large gaseous diffusion plant, but the technology of the Pu239 reactors was available and within Chinese capability. Halperin, China and the Bomb, op. cit., p. 76.

[25]For a fascinating speculation as to why the Chinese test came on October 16 rather than on National Day, October 1, see Hinton, op. cit., Chapter 17.

was delivered by a bomber aircraft, one of the TU-4's given to China by the Soviet Union[26] over a dozen years earlier. There has been no direct evidence that China attempted to make this aircraft-atomic weapon system operational in the Air Force of the PLA.

On the contrary, at a secret conference of the National Defense Council in Peking on January 8, 1965, after the first but before the second Chinese nuclear test, the Minister of Machine Building, General Wang Pin-cheng, reported on plans for a series of land-based short-range nuclear missiles.[27] These plans apparently were approved and presumably included provisions for hiring German aircraft designers and rocket experts. Recruiting teams from the Military Science Academy operating from Switzerland and Austria offered lucrative contracts to German specialists in 1966 and 1967.[28] Should they have operationalized an aircraft atomic delivery system, the Chinese would have matched an American capability of twenty years earlier.

Instead, China's next step, which became known one year later,

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[26]The TU-4 was from the PLAAF 25th Air Division at Sian, whose bomber crews reportedly had practiced weapon delivery for three months before the 1965 test. Bueschel, op. cit., p. 75.

[27]Ibid., p. 89.

[28]Ibid., p. 98. It was reported that a noted German rocketry expert had contracted with the Chinese government to build a rocket base. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, April 16, 1968, citing a report in Der Mittag (Dusseldorf).

was to develop a bomb with a ten-fold increase in yield. The test of May 8, 1966 resulted in a 200 KT explosion.

Six months later,[29] in a test that Chien Hsueh-shen probably found rewarding, a 20 KT weapon was sent to the target area in the nose-cone of a short range missile. This was twenty-one months after General Wang announced the missile program.

On December 28, 1966, the largest Chinese weapon to date, yielding over 200 KT, detonated above the target area after a flight of 500 miles.[30] Once again there has not been conclusive evidence of an attempt to operationalize any of these weapons or delivery systems, although this could have been done. China may have been striving for much more advanced systems and thus may have avoided the expense of establishing military units with equipment already inferior to that of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Such a decision squares with the Chinese Communist philosophy of frugality as well as making good sense militarily. But a decision on deployment of a nuclear weapons system soon would be necessary, as China progressed to the missile-hydrogen period.

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[29] On October 27, 1966.

[30] Whether this weapon was delivered to the test site target by aircraft or missile is not known. The U.S. Secretary of Defense indicated the former, but Chinese authorities told Francis James it had been "fired" 500 miles. Francis James, "In China's Wild West," The Times (London), June 15, 1969.

The Missile--Hydrogen Period, 1967-1970

In June, 1967 China tested a fusion device with a yield of three megatons. It has been reported that this was a lithium-6 (Li_6) bomb.[31] Six months later a 15-25 KT explosion in China was evaluated as a test failure in the West, although Chinese officials subsequently indicated they had been testing an H-bomb "trigger."[32] In any event, there have been no indications of failures in any subsequent Chinese tests: December 27, 1968, 3 MT; September 23, 1969, 25 KT underground; September 29, 1969, 3 MT; and October 14, 1970, 3 MT. These tests at the end of the decade indicate that the Chinese were settling on a 3 MT warhead design, and were refining the engineering of an operational fusion weapons system.[33]

Chinese missile technology had matched Chinese nuclear advances. In April, 1970 a 380 pound satellite was inserted into orbit by a two-stage missile.[34] The Chinese satellite, although more than twice as heavy as the Soviet Sputnik of 1957, received less attention.

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[31] James, op. cit. The Secretary of Defense has indicated that this bomb may have been delivered by bomber. Bueschel, op. cit., p. 99, indicates that the H-bomb was delivered by bomber, and detonated at high altitude. An RAF jet bomber dropped Britain's first experimental H-bomb in 1957.

[32] James, op. cit. However, the Chinese may have been dissembling.

[33] The AEC considered the eleventh test as "another step in the continuing effort to convert experimental nuclear equipment into usable weapons." The New York Times, October 15, 1970.

[34] One of the better news analyses on the first Chinese satellite was by Neal Stanford in The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1970.

However, as surely as Soviet ICBMs followed Sputnik within two years, a Chinese ICBM capability seemed imminent.

More evidence toward a complete picture of the Chinese missile capability was presented late in 1970, when it was announced in Washington that "well-placed sources" believed that a small number of 600-1000 mile range missiles had been kept in firing readiness at Chinese test-launch sites. The discovery was termed "recent."[35] How long these ready MRBMs had been deployed is sheer conjecture. Did the twelve MRBM test firings in 1967 mean some MRBM deployment as early as 1968?

China's missile proficiency gained further prestige when the second Chinese satellite, launched March 3, 1971, reportedly weighed 486 pounds.[36] Subsequently, a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman indicated that the launching vehicle might have ICBM applications (e.g., it might be able to deliver a small payload to the United States, but not a 3 MT thermonuclear warhead).[37]

Concurrently, the Secretary of Defense reported that China might have tested an ICBM on a reduced range trajectory late in 1970.[38]

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[35] The New York Times, November 23, 1970. For further development of this report, see below, p. 188.

[36] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, March 16, 1971. The thirteen-day delay from launching to announcement is somewhat mysterious.

[37] The New York Times, March 4 and 17, 1971.

[38] Ibid., March 17, 1971.

The Chinese atomic weapon-bomber delivery capability had been separated from a similar U.S. development by twenty years. The initial Chinese H-Bomb capability had been achieved thirteen years after the Soviet capability (1954); sixteen years after the first U.S. H-device (1951). The initial Chinese satellite launching capability had been separated from Sputnik by thirteen years. In 1970, China was closely approaching the technical equivalency, if not the numerical equivalency, of U.S. and Soviet missile systems of the 1958-1960 period.

While numbers of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems available to Chinese strategists were not great, they nevertheless had significant military and political meaning. The following section of this chapter presents several estimates of current Chinese atomic warfare capabilities and evaluates their strategic significance.

Estimates and Implications of Current Chinese Nuclear Capabilities

In 1969, Chinese officials placed their production of Pu_{239} at 300 kg. per year at the Yemen plant and 30 kg. per year at the Paotaw plant. An unspecified amount of fissionable material (U235) is produced at the gaseous diffusion plant at Lanchow.[39] Together, according to an American journalist, these plants might be capable of producing enough material for over sixty bombs a year.[40] Assuming production has been

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[39] James, op. cit.

[40] Salisbury, op. cit., p. 169.

constant and increasing, China could deploy an inventory of 200 or more nuclear weapons--basically atomic weapons, but a few hydrogen bombs.[41] The Institute for Strategic Studies, however, believing that the Chinese supply of fissile material was limited, preferred a more conservative estimate: about 120 atomic weapons of nominal (20 KT) yield, or a smaller number of weapons if hydrogen bombs were included.[42] The U.S. Secretary of Defense estimated in 1970 that the Chinese U235 stockpile was sufficient for only a few dozen weapons "of any type,"[43] a statistic accepted by S.I.P.R.I.[44] But the U.S. estimate seemed to refer only to hydrogen bombs suitable for ICBM warheads. In the context of IRBM or MRBM production, the Secretary of Defense spoke of the possibility of 100 missiles being deployed at "any time,"[45] and if each of these were fitted with a Pu239 atomic warhead, the Defense estimate of the total Chinese stockpile level, including U235 and Pu239 weapons, would substantially agree with that of the I.S.S.

Using an approximation for the minimum critical mass for a Pu239 explosion of 7 kg.,[46] and assuming a rising level of Pu239 produc-

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[41] Ibid. Also see The New York Times, October 13, 1970.

[42] I.S.S., The Military Balance, 1970-71, op. cit., p. 56.

[43] U.S. Senate, Joint Hearings of the Armed Services Committee on Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1971, "Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, February 20, 1970" (Subsequent reference will be to the Laird Statement), pp. 37-38, 45-48, 106.

[44] S.I.P.R.I. Yearbook, op. cit., p. 46.

[45] Laird Statement, op. cit., p. 108.

[46] Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966, p. 38.

tion in China from 1963 to 1970, with the last three years at a constant production level of 330 kg., it can be calculated that China could have about 230 7-kg. atomic bombs. This calculation tends to coincide with journalistic estimates. However, it is doubtful that the Chinese would manufacture all low-yield bombs. If the per-bomb requirement for Pu239 were higher, therefore, a lesser number of higher-yield atomic weapons would result. This reasoning tends to substantiate the Secretary of Defense commentary and the I.S.S. estimate.

As far as delivery vehicles were concerned, journalistic reports emphasized the possibility of a fairly large Chinese intermediate or medium range missile force in addition to the Chinese bomber force. After all,

> ...the Chinese produced their first missiles of 450-650 mile range in 1963. By 1966 they were up to 1200 miles, and in 1969 were on the verge of an intercontinental capability.[47]

There was one report of a complete Chinese IRBM complex near Nagchu Dzong in western China which, when fully operational, would hold all the border states from Afghanistan to Vietnam and much of the Sino-Soviet frontier within range.[48] Another missile launching complex in Manchuria was reported in the Fall of 1970.[49]

However, the U.S. government estimate of Chinese missile capability much more conservatively indicated that the Chinese

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[47] Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 169-70.

[48] Bueschel, op. cit., p. 98.

[49] The New York Times, November 23, 1970.

> ...threat is currently limited to air-delivered nuclear weapons, but an operational medium range ballistic missile could be deployed at any time...The start of flight testing for an ICBM is expected in 1970... [if so]...the Chinese could have as many as 10-25 ICBMs in 1975.[50]

A solid-propellant manufacturing facility has been completed,[51] and the Chinese ICBM of 1975 might therefore be expected to be similar to the U.S. Minuteman.

The Soviet Union has been tightlipped about the Chinese nuclear production and delivery capability.[52] A few rare insights have appeared in the East European press: Soviet experts play down the military value of Chinese atomic missile forces and think that American journalistic sources tend to overestimate the significance and danger posed to the Soviet Union. The Soviet experts believe that the small number of atomic and hydrogen weapons, as well as the satellite-launching rocket, are all "of laboratory size."[53] Although the Soviet experts did not refer to U.S. official estimates of Chinese strength in their interview with

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[50] Laird Statement, op. cit., pp. 37-38, 45-48, 107-09.

[51] Ibid., p. 37.

[52] The New York Times, April 27, 1970.

[53] Istvan Koermendy, "Soviet Union-China," Magyar-Országg (Budapest), Nos. 31-35, August 2, 9, 16, 23, and 29, 1970.

A Czech journalist, however, reported that Chinese engineers had succeeded, during 1967-1970, in developing a one megaton warhead and a compact warhead capable of missile delivery. Why? "To gain a hegemonistic position within the framework of socialist society" (e.g., political supremacy over the U.S.S.R.). Dr. M. Dubovsky, "Why and Against Whom? Reflections on the Launching of the Chinese Satellite," Rudé Právó (Prague), July 15, 1970, p. 7.

the East European journalist, chances are that agreement between them would be fairly close.

If the Chinese nuclear capability lies between the conservative U.S. and Soviet governmental figures and the more inflated journalistic estimates,[54] it nevertheless poses a definite threat to Soviet Far Eastern population centers. Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Nakhodka, Blagoveshchensk, Komsomolsk-na-Amur, Chita, and Irkutsk. U.S. installations in Japan, Okinawa, South Vietnam, and ships of the Seventh Fleet could be taken under fire, as could the island of Formosa. The Chi[illegible] in 1970 could not threaten Moscow, Leningrad, Washington, or San [illegible]cisco, but they indeed could hold substantial American overseas a[illegible]o-viet Far Eastern populations "at risk." As Chou En-lai put it, China had broken the nuclear duopoly of the superpowers.[55]

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[54]The author tends to favor the higher estimates. The Secretary of Defense has said "...with only a relatively few shots the Chinese have made more rapid progress than any other nation..."--Laird Statement, op. cit., p. 108. It is valuable to compare Soviet nuclear stockpile development in the early 1950s. A 1951 estimate called for 60 atomic weapons; a 1952 projection indicated 130 warheads by 1953, 200 by 1954, and 270 by 1955. Associated Universities, Inc., Report on Project East River, New York, 1952, quoted in Quester, op. cit. p. 77.

[55]Chou En-lai interview with French correspondents Debre and Parbot, July 14, 1970, reported by Peking, NCNA International Service in English, July 28, 1970. Chou's remarks subsequently were officially disseminated in his message to the Third Conference of Non-Aligned Nations' Chiefs of State and Heads of Government in Lusaka, Zambia. This prompted a Soviet counterargument. Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, September 9, 1970.

Those arguing against the credibility of the Chinese nuclear force in 1970 could point out that since China had always sworn to a doctrine of "no first use" and that since the Chinese force was rather primitive by U.S. or Soviet standards, it was probably vulnerable to a first strike--and not a credible deterrent. However, this appraisal seems of doubtful validity. The Chinese opportunity for dispersal is excellent. The Chinese historically have been adept at deception. The Chinese bomber force, twin-jet TU-14s and Il-28s as well as even more obsolete TU-4s, is sufficiently large in numbers to facilitate a deceptive dispersal of the small number of Chinese weapons. Dispersion and deception would be further enhanced if the weapons were sized so as to be deliverable by Chinese Air Force MiG-17s in the fighter-bomber version. Moreover, there were some tentative indications of Chinese hardening:

> By the end of 1970 all atomic installations must be hidden underground...Military industries have been relocated to Sinkiang and Szechwan provinces...Hoffmann, a representative of West German monopolies...has...visited military plants in which not a single representative of a socialist state...has...set foot...[56]

According to the Institute for Strategic Studies,

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[56]Dimitrov, op. cit. Additionally, Japanese, Canadian, and British reporters in China reported many instances of Chinese excavation, probably for civil defense purposes, in early 1970.

> The practical difficulty of eradicating the Chinese nuclear potential may help to encourage Soviet reluctance to launch any major attack on China.[57]

The strong possibility that even one Chinese nuclear weapon in one obsolete bomber,[58] or in one MRBM, or on the single Chinese missile-launching submarine, would survive a superpower preemptive strike and then successfully destroy a superpower city probably is enough to deter that superpower.[59] The essence of the persuasive thesis of McGeorge Bundy is that not one world political leader will knowingly accept the total destruction of even one of his cities.[60] There are definite indications that the Soviet leadership would not be willing to risk Vladivostok, and, according to Bundy, no U.S. president in the

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[57] I.S.S., Strategic Survey, 1969, p. 72. Similar practical difficulties probably had been envisaged by the U.S.S.R. during consideration in the late 1940s of whether to try a preemptive strike against the U.S. stockpile in New Mexico, and by the U.S. during consideration in the early 1950s of whether to try a preemptive strike against Soviet H-Bomb test and production facilities. Quester, op. cit., pp. 32-36, 90-91.

[58] PLAAF bomber crews are generally well-trained and have extensive air force service. Most senior personnel were trained in Soviet flight schools. Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[59] In the U.S.-Soviet interaction, early U.S. deployment of vulnerable liquid-fueled ICBMs complicated the Soviet attack problem and made the Kremlin think of losing Leningrad or Moscow. The Atlas test missiles were still malfunctioning when operational Atlases were being deployed.

[60] McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (October, 1969), pp. 1-20.

nuclear age has been willing to contemplate sacrificing any U.S. or allied city. Decisionmakers are aware that it is utterly impossible to accurately calculate a strategic exchange,[61] and that, therefore, there is always a high probability that one weapon could get through to destroy one of their cities.

Thus very small numbers of nuclear weapons, and even very elemental delivery systems, can be sufficient as a deterrent.[62]

By the mid-1970s, of course, when the Chinese probably will have deployed some twenty-five or even seventy-five ICBMs, the strategic situation prevailing in the world would be much more tenuous than in 1970. For instance, this Chinese force could put, at a minimum, eleven million,[63] and at a maximum, twenty-three million, U.S. citizens to death. But, for the immediate purposes of this inquiry, knowledge of the growth of the Chinese nuclear capability during the years 1964-1970, and Chinese strength in 1970, is sufficient.

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[61] York, op. cit., pp. 166-69.

[62] Ibid., p. 168. This philosophy, of course, was the basis of de Gaulle's decision on the force de dissuasion, and is a useful argument for those who favor nuclear proliferation. The Chinese, however, probably had more justification for developing their force de dissuasion than did the French.

For a thought-provoking essay on the increasing inutility of force as an option for national leaders, see Klaus Knorr, On The Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

[63] Laird Statement, op. cit., p. 43. The figure is based on 25 ICBMs, each with 3 MT warheads, and a 40% reliability. Thus the casualty estimate is highly sensitive to the reliability assumption.

During the years 1964-1967, when Chinese forces clashed with U.S. forces and Peking may have evaluated the U.S. as the major threat to China, the Chinese nuclear capability was very small and limited to atomic weapons delivered by aircraft. By 1968-1970, however, when Chinese forces clashed with Soviet forces and Peking probably evaluated the Soviet Union as the major threat to China, the Chinese nuclear force had incorporated thermonuclear weapons and missile as well as bomber delivery capabilities. The succeeding two chapters will attempt to ascertain whether these changing capabilities were reflected in differing modes of Chinese conduct toward the superpowers and in their modes of conduct toward China, as major conflictive political-military events unfolded with first one, and then the other, superpower.

Chapter IV

The Chinese-American Interaction, 1964-1967

Introduction

Chinese-American relations over the decades since Yankee clippers sailed the far Pacific have proceeded in "love-hate" cycles. In the late 1930s and 1940s the Roosevelt-Chiang Kai-shek coalition against Japan moved relations to a high point on a "love" node. But Mao's accession to power on the mainland in 1949 caused a great reactive swing to a "hate" node. By and large, Chinese-American relations have been marked with mutual and often noncomprehending public hostility ever since. The period 1964-1967 provides a valuable example, because hostilities then reached a pitch equal to, if not greater than, that at any other time since the Korean War. Only in 1968 and 1969, after President Lyndon Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and Richard Nixon's conciliatory campaign remarks concerning China, would fever lessen and the two giant states relax into a wary and hostilely suspicious interactive pattern--but without bloodshed.

This chapter will examine in detail the fevered period, 1964-1967, of Chinese-American relations. The presentation will be topical rather than chronological. A similar topical presentation of material on Soviet-Chinese interaction will be made in Chapter 5 in order to facilitate the comparison and conclusions of the study. However, before proceeding with the presentation on these critical years, it will be helpful to sketch a brief background picture of earlier Peking-Washington

interaction.

The Interaction in Perspective: Hostility Since 1949.

It is probably the epitome of wishful thinking to entertain any hope whatsoever that the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung would ever have adopted a conciliatory and at least partially forthcoming attitude toward the United States, the "imperialist aggressor." One way to have tested the concept of a "live-and-let-live" Chinese-American utopia would have been for Washington to renounce the battered Chiang government and extend recognition to the new Peking government in 1949. With the Cold War deepening day by day and the prevailing conception of a monolithic International Communism directed from Moscow almost a dogma in the West, this simply was not a reasonable option. Instead, "containment" of the Soviet Union was extended to China. As it turned out, "containing" Communist China required nearly as much military equipment, and many more American lives, than did "containment" of the Soviet Union. Interacting policy decisions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union soon brought Chinese and American troops into battle in Korea. Casualties resulting from this bloody war left permanent scars on both participants, even on their top leaderships. Mao An-ying, an air division commander in the PLAAF, was either shot down by U.S. fighters, or caught on the ground in his headquarters by U.S. bombers, in 1950. He did not survive. Mao Tse-tung would not readily forget the loss of his son. While there was no corresponding bitter occurrence involving very top-level decision-makers on the U.S. side, American casualties were so high

as to leave an unwritten but firm resolve in the U.S. that the Chinese regime would never knowingly be allowed future benefit from any U.S. action.

In order for Washington to remain currently appraised of Peking's activities, close surveillance of China was established by U.S. air and naval units. By nature passive, this surveillance effort occasionally by accident, and sometimes by design,[1] became provocative. Interceptions and air and sea battles resulted, with some casualties inflicted on both sides. The U.S. surveillance/patrol effort, conducted by Task Force 72 of the Seventh Fleet and by special Air Force units operating "Flying Platform" RB-47s, extended for the length of the Chinese coastline--a continuing expensive major military effort that, while informationally and in some ways politically valuable to Washington, undoubtedly continued to provoke the Chinese.

In addition to the occasionally provocative peripheral surveillance effort a second development in the late 1950s thoroughly aggravated Peking. Nearly concurrently with the Chinese-Soviet agreement on aid for "advanced" weapons systems (1957), the U.S. commenced high altitude deep penetration flights over China with U-2 aircraft.[2] For

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[1]For instance, to check on Chinese air defense reaction times and to ascertain Chinese combat radar frequencies, a surveillance aircraft might suddenly turn toward the Chinese coast rather than paralleling it.

[2]Francis Gary Powers, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, pp. 67-68, 129; also see Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

several years the U-2's were beyond reach of Chinese interceptors or missiles, highlighting Peking's impotency against rapidly advancing American technology. Moreover, the U-2 penetrations over China, unlike those over the Soviet Union but similar to all incursions by U.S. aircraft or ships on the China periphery, were legal if Taipei's interpretation of rights stemming from its claim to be the sole legitimate government of China is accepted.

In the early 1960s U-2 surveillance operations were turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Air Force: Chinese aviators flew U-2s over their homeland and were sometimes shot down by PLA missiles.

One area of China especially concerned the United States: the coast opposite Taiwan. With the Korean truce barely a month old, U.S. naval aircraft made a special reconnaissance in force--some 300 carrier-based fighters and bombers were employed--over Chekiang and Fukien provinces. Flying low directly over the mainland in a flamboyant maneuver to check on Chinese air dispositions and strength, they were unopposed by Mao's interceptors.[3] However, this was not always the case. The Formosa Strait, like the entry corridors to Berlin, became a permanent locus of confrontation.

The Strait was a more frequent graveyard than the corridors. It is possible to describe Chinese-American relations since Korea as a lurching of giants from one crisis to another, over Formosa. Major

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[3]Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 28-30. The author provides a vivid account of this operation but does not list sources.

crises occurred quadrennially: 1954, 1958, and 1962.[4] The crises were patterned very similarly: China threatened the Nationalist offshore islands; the U.S. countered with a force level build-up sufficient to insure Chinese failure; the Soviet Union refused to make up the Chinese deficit.[5] Although individually and collectively these special confrontations must have been grossly disheartening and disillusioning on three counts, Washington's intransigence, Moscow's lack of support, and Chinese Nationalist military successes,[6] Peking's resolve to bring Taiwan back under the ancient hegemony of the mainland has never faltered. Thus the Formosa Strait remained a critical area during the Chinese-American interaction in 1964-67. It continues as the foremost problem area between China and the United States today.

Perceptions of the Early 1960s

The Kennedy Administration succeeded to office convincingly briefed to the effect that the Far Eastern situation, particularly in Indochina and especially in Laos, was critical, and that few U.S. options

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[4]The crises are described well by, inter alia, Hinton, op. cit., and Hsieh, op. cit. Also see U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The Control of Local Conflict: Case Studies, Vol. IV, "Far Eastern Case Studies," Waltham, Mass: Browne and Shaw Division of Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., August 15, 1969, pp. 59-105.

[5]Charles A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: the Quemoy Case," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 1962), pp. 201-13.

[6]Between May 11, 1954 and February 16, 1961, the Nationalists claimed to have shot down 43 MiGs at a cost of two Nationalist fighters. Bueschel, op. cit., p. 55.

there were promising.[7] There was not much validity remaining in the 1954 Geneva settlement. The fraternal hand, if not the paternal guidance, of Peking was seen behind most moves of the Indochinese, Laotian, Thai, and Burmese Communists. Tibet had been seized and taken behind the "bamboo curtain," and the Chinese-Indian border conflict looked ominous. Indonesia under Sukarno was militant and sympathetic to China. Doctrines of "people's wars of national liberation" emanating from Peking, embellished by Hanoi, and seconded by Moscow, seemed difficult to counter with any readily available weapons. Looming above the threat of Chinese-backed guerrilla warfare was the spectre of an imminent Chinese nuclear capability,[8] undoubtedly substantiated by U-2 photography. Nothing in the U.S.-Chinese record of the 1950s indicated a possibility of change in the 1960s. President Kennedy said

> Our problem now, of course, is that with the rise of the Communist power in China combined with an expansionist, Stalinist philosophy, our major problem...is how we can contain the expansion of Communism in Asia so that we do not find the Chinese moving out into a dominant position in all of Asia... There are a billion people in the Communist empire operating from central lines and in a belligerent phase of their national development. So that I think this is a period of great danger for Asia...[9]

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[7] Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Crest, 1967, pp. 299-302.

[8] Stuart Alsop, "A Conversation with President Kennedy," The Saturday Evening Post, January 1, 1966, p. 9, reported that this subject troubled President Kennedy more deeply than any other.

[9] Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 850-51.

and predicted that his successor would have to deal with an expansionist China armed with nuclear weapons and missiles.[10]

These American perceptions certainly were based on evidence other than military moves, for the PLA, not particularly mobile in the first instance, and possessing increasingly obsolete equipment, remained quiescent. The U.S. actually was seeking a valid mode of response to a predominantly political offensive of Peking's which opportunistically capitalized on military moves by any and all Asian communist parties and governments. But the U.S. response finally determined was perhaps more heavily weighted on the military side than the political.

Thus it was not unreasonable for Peking to perceive a definitive and growing threat to China being prepared by a much more dynamic American administration than its predecessor. President Kennedy opted for a temporary settlement for Laos, but sent a large number of military advisors (1961) and helicopters and crews (1962) to South Vietnam. Building conventional forces to a level that hopefully would be effective in two simultaneous major wars and one localized operation, the U.S. concurrently embarked on a tremendous increase in its strategic warfare capability. Minutemen and Polaris missile systems rapidly entered the operational inventory. Peking correctly assessed that part of this ex-

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[10] Ibid., p. 887. Quester, op. cit., p. 191, opines that it was the imminent Chinese nuclear capability rather than Peking's political offensive that brought about a "significant [U.S.] alteration of resource allocation vis á vis China..."

pansion was directed against Chinese aspirations. The President's personal involvement in an expansion of Army Special Forces, whose mission had been drastically modified from behind-the-lines post-nuclear strike operations to counter-guerrilla operations, anywhere, any time, also was correctly assessed by Peking as a development dangerous to Chinese interests.

In the 1962 to early 1964 period, Special Forces operations in Indochina were stepped up, the Seventh Fleet exercised in the Formosa Straits, peripheral surveillance of China was intensified, high altitude penetrations of China by Nationalist U-2s were augmented by USAF RB-57 and A-11 (now SR-71) operations, fifteen B-52s were deployed to Guam, and Polaris missile submarines began to deploy to the Western Pacific, all of which substantiated Peking's perception of an increasingly militant opponent.

The U.S. also extended its containment effort to include the far southwest border area of China. Although a U.S.-Indian mutual defense treaty did not exist, incidents on the disputed Sino-Indian border resulted in U.S. military deliveries to India in 1963, and, in November 1963, a joint U.S.-U.K.-Indian air defense exercise. This exercise was roundly rebuked by Peking; apparently it greatly disturbed the Chinese leadership.[11] Peking's weak southwestern neighbor also was being given poli-

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[11]"War Drums Beat Louder," Peking Review, No. 44, November 1, 1963, pp. 21-22; "The Truth About How the Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Have Allied Themselves With India Against China," Peking Review, No. 45, November 8, 1963, p. 27; and issue No. 46 of the same magazine, November 15, 1963, p. 25.

tico-military support by more frequent excursions of U.S. Seventh Fleet warships into the Indian Ocean,[12] and it was becoming highly likely, in Peking's view, that any expansionist moves on the part of China or Southeast Asian communists would be countered by U.S. military force.

While the U.S. feared a "major push" by Communism in Asia,[13] Peking had accused Washington of "making active preparations for a new war,"[14] and of preparing a war base in Asia.[15] In 1966 a retrospective evaluation of the developments of the early 1960s by the Chinese, and also by responsible officials in Washington, emphasized an eastward shift in U.S. global strategy.[16] Washington contended that the eastward shift

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[12]"Indian Press Embarrassed," Peking Review, No. 2, January 10, 1964, pp. 23-24.

[13]The New York Times, July 31, 1963.

[14]"Commentator," "Warning to U.S. Aggressors," Peking Review, No. 37, September 14, 1962, pp. 8-9; also see "U.S. Aggressors in the Dock" in the subsequent issue of ibid., p. 6.

[15]"Brinkmanship in Laos," Peking Review, No. 24, June 23, 1964, p. 34.

[16]"Correspondent," Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Peking, February 1, 1966. In the U.S., Secretary of Defense McNamara said on February 23, 1966 that

> ...The focus of the U.S. defense problem has shifted to the Far East. Overt aggression by the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe...seems increasingly unlikely as long as we maintain our military strength and unity.

--Testimony before a Joint Session of the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations and the Senate Armed Services Committee.

was entirely a reaction to Chinese expansionism that had taken the form of indirect aggression by proxy guerrilla forces; Peking would hold, with some justification, that what little the Chinese had done by themselves did not warrant a large-scale U.S. eastward shift. In Chinese eyes the increased U.S. activity spelled aggression. Peking subsequently has never failed to insist on this interpretation.

The Chinese commenced indigenous military operations against high altitude penetration flights in the 1962-63 period, probably with Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles. Nationalist-operated U-2s were downed in China in September 1962 and November 1963.[17] But military action involving U.S. forces and Chinese Nationalist forces did not commence in earnest until mid-1964,[18] when the Chinese-American confrontation, in its Indochinese aspect, began to escalate. Once started, however, Chinese-American military engagements continued, with varying frequency and intensity, until early 1968.

As this crisis period is discussed in detail, it will be important to remember two things. First, that American operations in Vietnam had been undertaken, according to the retrospective view of former Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, because

> ...great power forces within the area were seen in starkly bi-polar terms: the "East Wind" of China was blowing strong-

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[17] A Chinese Nationalist RB-57D had been downed in October, 1959, and an RF-101 downed in August, 1961, both at lower altitudes.

[18] A U.S. Navy P2V-7 had been shot down in November 1961, over northeastern China.

> ly and thrustingly versus a "West Wind" which was pretty much American alone. Indonesia was tilted far to the left, almost wholly aligned with China,...Then, if ever, a Hanoi takeover of South Vietnam seemed likely, in conjunction with other trends, to make probable not only North Vietnamese domination in the Indochina area but a wave of Chinese expansion into the rest of Southeast Asia.[19]

Thus, while the brunt of U.S. operations fell on North and South Vietnam, operational exigencies sometimes involved Chinese territory and Chinese forces directly. This did not necessarily mean that they were erroneous, misplaced, or untimely, as far as Washington was concerned. It was China that was being countered, after all.[20] However, in Peking's view, the entire U.S. operation in Vietnam was aggressive, and direct operations against China or Chinese forces only made matters worse.

Second, it will be important to keep in mind that Chinese initiatives and responses vis á vis the U.S. in the South probably were always tempered in some way by the developing conflict situation with the

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[19]William P. Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2. (January, 1971), pp. 187-88. (Italics added.) An indication of the predominance of Chinese aid to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops was revealed in a report on weapons and ammunition captured by U.S. troops in Cambodia in May and June, 1970:

Origin	Weapons	Ammunition
China	60%	80%
U.S.S.R.	25%	5%
East Europe	10%	5%
Western	5%	10%

The New York Times, June 22, 1970.

[20]Cf., Quester, op. cit., p. 270: "To refute Peking while fighting Hanoi might be...just as reasonable as Hanoi's policy of allowing the Chinese to claim intellectual credit for a guerrilla war Vietnamese Communists were fighting."

Soviets in the North. The Soviet-Chinese disagreement was developing in intensity throughout the 1964-67 period; its early military manifestations on the border must have given Peking pause as to how definitive Chinese actions could or should be in the South. Moreover, Peking often has viewed Soviet moves in Vietnam as objectively anti-Chinese and therefore collusive with the U.S., while Moscow has opined that the Vietnam war long would have been settled in Hanoi's favor had China acted in coordination with the international communist movement. Developments in the split provided opportunities as well as dangers for Washington throughout the critical period. Some special ramifications of the Soviet-Chinese disagreement for the U.S.-Chinese interaction will be presented in more detail in the penultimate section of this chapter, but an awareness of the relevance of the Sino-Soviet rift is a necessary backdrop to the intervening sections.

Third, it should be understood that the succeeding sections of this chapter, the Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Military Engagement, the Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Political Dialogue, and the Tacit Exchange, constitute different modes of observation, or observation from different vantage points, of very closely interrelated political and military events. The reader is invited to review our introductory remarks in which an analog, in the form of a telegraph cable, for political-military interaction was set forth.[21] We are about

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[21] Supra., pp. 13-14.

to listen in on the messages and events passing along each strand and each filament of that cable of interaction. As we monitor these various channels, our review will be chronological. Thus when we have completed the 1964-1967 period in one channel, it will be necessary to step back in time, picking up the next channel in 1964, and then taking it through 1967, etc. It is acknowledged that this procedure may result in some duplication and overlap. The reader will recall that our analog indicated that the poor insulation of the cable meant that inductance or "cross-talk" would occur. However, despite this overlap, the categorized mode of presentation that results from applying a method of chronological monitoring to the analog ultimately will result in a complete and clear understanding of a very complex international interaction.

I. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Military Engagement

The Conventional Engagement

U.S. military activity in Southeast Asia generally is dated from the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August and September, 1964, involving U.S. destroyers, North Vietnamese torpedo boats, and U.S. carrier aircraft. The Tonkin Gulf scenario by now must be familiar to everyone. But more important to this presentation is an earlier direct U.S.-Chinese clash in June, 1964, in Laos.

U.S.-sponsored air activity against the Pathet Lao had been increased in Laos in the late spring of 1964. On June 8th, U.S. fighter-bombers attacked a communist installation, the Chinese Economic and Cul-

tural Mission, at Khang Khay on the Plain des Jarres. A Chinese official was killed in this raid, and Peking loudly protested. The Chinese verbal response was vehement: the U.S. was warned of a Laotian war; emergency talks were demanded; the Chinese people went into mourning; and a great military review was held in Peking. But a counteractive Chinese military response was not forthcoming. Instead, Peking asserted that the U.S. would be "punished" and promised more aid to Hanoi.

Chinese defenses were sharpened and Chinese missilemen began to exact an increasing toll of Chinese Nationalist, and later, U.S. surveillance aircraft. A Nationalist U-2 was shot down in July, 1964, followed by a reconnaissance drone aircraft in November, 1964, an RF-101 in December, and another U-2, the fourth, in January, 1965.[22]

In February, 1965, responding to rocket or mortar attacks on U.S. facilities in South Vietnam, the United States began bombing military installations and supply routes in North Vietnam. This automatically routed U.S. aircraft near China's southern border. Chinese territory was overflown, Chinese targets were hit (usually by accident), and both Chinese and U.S. aircraft were shot down.

Peking has described the ensuing Chinese-U.S. military struggle on numerous occasions. A recent version states

> Especially noteworthy is the increasing frequency and ferocity of U.S.

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[22]Wreckage of the four Nationalist U-2s shot down between 1961 and 1965 became a permanent exhibit in Peking. The New York Times, August 22, 1965.

> intrusions into China's territorial waters and air space since 1964, when U.S. imperialism expanded its war of aggression in Indo-China. On many occasions, American warships and aircraft went so far as to recklessly shell, strafe, or bomb Chinese airplanes, fishing boats, merchant ships, and inhabitants living in border areas. They destroyed Chinese civilian houses, killed or wounded Chinese fisherman and once shot down a Chinese plane in training flight. They have posed a grave threat to the Chinese people and caused serious losses to them in life and property.[23]

The account continues with an accurate catalog of U.S. and Nationalist aircraft losses to Chinese air defense units. But for purposes of this study, a record of U.S. losses and Chinese losses has been compiled from U.S. sources and is presented in tabular form:

American, Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist Losses, 1964-1968*

United States	Chinese Nationalist	Chinese Communist
		6-8-64 Khang Khay, Laos, strafed, official killed
	6-11-64 P2V	
	7-7-64 U-2	
	11-16-64 Drone	
	12-22-64 RF-101	
	1-11-65 U-2	
		2-7-65 CinC PLAAF Gen. Liu Ya-lou killed in Vietnam.
4-9-65 F-4		4-9-65 MiG-17

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[23] "Anti-PRC Provocations Continue," Peking, NCNA International Service in English, June 27, 1970. Also in Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 27, July 3, 1970, pp. 72-74.

Table Cont'd.

United States		Chinese Nationalist		Chinese Communist	
				7-11-65	Hokow, China bombed
		8-6-65	Formosa Strait: two sub-chasers claimed by PLA navy	8-6-65	Formosa Strait: three gunboats claimed by Nationalists
9-20-65	F-104				
10-5-65	F-105				
				10-5-65	Fishing craft strafed
				10-31-65	Merchant ship strafed
		11-14-65	Formosa Strait: minesweeper lost, gunboat damaged	11-14-65	Formosa Strait: four gunboats reported sunk
				11-20-65	Khang Khay, Laos strafed, personnel casualties
		1-9-66	Aircraft, n.e.c.		
		2-7-66	Drone		
				3-11-66	Fishing craft strafed
4-12-66	A3B				
				5-12-66	MiG-17
				5-28-66	Fishing boats strafed
				8-29-66	Two cargo ships hit in Vietnam
				12-6-66	Six fishing boats sunk
				12-17-66	Embassy in Hanoi bombed
		1-14-67	F-104		
				2-22-67	Fisherman killed
4-25-67	Two F-4s				
6-26-67	F-4				
				6-29-67	Ship in Haiphong seriously damaged
				7-6-67	Ship in Haiphong seriously damaged
8-21-67	Two A-6s				
		9-8-67	U-2		

Table Cont'd.

United States	Chinese Nationalist	Chinese Communist
9-17-67 Drone		
		12-4-67 Freighter strafed in Hon Gai, NVN
		1-3-68 Freighter bombed in Cam Pha, NVN
		1-20-68 Freighter bombed in Hon Gai
		1-27-68 Freighter bombed in Cam Pha
2-14-68 A-1H		
3-22-68 Drone		

*Note: Data taken from the M.I.T. Center for International Studies Project on Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution files, except for the entry on Liu Ya-lou, reported in Bueschel, op. cit., p. 83. Bueschel also includes an exciting journalistic account of many of the engagements listed above, on pp. 61-66.

The table is valuable as much for what it does not show as for the information it presents. Considering the size of forces involved, and the numbers of air and naval sorties conducted by each side in proximity to the other, remarkably few losses were incurred by either. The enormous sortie level of the U.S. in the Vietnam War is well known.

For their part, Chinese fighter aircraft also occasionally flew from Vietnam. In January, 1966, during an American bombing suspension, Chinese MiG-21 fighters reportedly were rotated between Red China and Vietnamese airfields northwest of Hanoi. But they returned to China when U.S. raids resumed.[24] Additionally, there have been frequent Chi-

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[24]Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

nese air exercises along the borders of southern China and at the three main airfields on Hainan Island since May, 1965. More than 200 Chinese interceptors could be scrambled at any time.[25] But they normally were not scrambled, because U.S. units normally did not penetrate Chinese airspace. China promulgated serious warnings number 300 through number 452 from June 30, 1964 to March 19, 1968 in response to alleged U.S. intrusions. But many of these flights were over Chinese-claimed islands in the South China Sea, not over the mainland.

Thus the overt conventional military interactive pattern is mainly characterized by mutual restraint. Those engagements that did occur were basically in an air-to-air, air-to-sea, or air-to-ground pattern, with a few rather traditional but small-scale sea battles in the Formosa Strait, with no ground-to-ground actions on the record even though some Chinese construction battalion troops were in North Vietnam.[26]

An important aspect of the conventional military interaction

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[25] Ibid., p. 86.

[26] Such ground combat actions as did occur during the period were of a covert nature, either Nationalist commando raids or intelligence gathering units launched from Formosa, Quemoy, or Matsu, or CIA directed intelligence teams of non-U.S. personnel operating from Laos into China. Peking complained repeatedly about these operations. See the NCNA broadcast of June 27, 1970, noted previously, for a good example. Another typical broadcast referred to the release of 64 captured "U.S.-Chiang Kai-shek armed agents and 12 boatmen." Peking, NCNA Domestic Service in Chinese, December 15, 1965. Regarding Chinese construction troops in North Vietnam, see The New York Times, November 16, 1966.

concerns the introduction into combat of new weapons systems. Once again, the pattern is one of marked mutual restraint. What noticeable upgraded equipment introduced by the Chinese during the 1964-67 period was limited to aircraft systems. There were no introductions of improved ground or naval weapon systems. As it was, China mainly operated Shenyang aircraft factory versions of the MiG-17 and MiG-19 throughout the period. A few Chinese manufactured MiG-21s were introduced in February, 1965. Even the MiG-21 was hardly a match for the sophisticated and powerful F-4 operated by USAF and USN squadrons.

For its part, the United States introduced a considerable variety of new military hardware into the Vietnam conflict. But some new weapons systems were on a trial basis (e.g., the five-plane F-111 unit) and few of them were operated in combat situations with Chinese units. (A new Navy attack bomber, the sub-sonic but sophisticated A-6, did operate near the Chinese border. Two straying A-6s were promptly shot down by the PLAAF.[27]) U.S. Navy guided missile destroyers, operating in the Tonkin Gulf, were equipped with new surface to air missiles effective against aircraft over 80 miles away, threatening Chinese operations above Hainan Island and the mainland. These SAMs were not fired against Chinese aircraft.[28]

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[27] The New York Times, August 22 and 23, 1967.

[28] North Vietnamese fighters were downed by these U.S. Navy SAMs over Hanoi.

The Nuclear Warfare Option

What about the possible introduction of atomic weapons systems into this critical situation? This would not have been a difficult military problem for the United States. Both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems were readily available in the Far East. B-52s were operating over Vietnam from Guam and, later, Utapao, Thailand. F-105s in use against North and South Vietnam were capable of delivering tactical nuclear weapons, as were a series of carrier-based naval aircraft including the A-3, A-4, F-4, and A-6. Three and often four aircraft carriers were operating close to China throughout the crisis period--ships in which the Navy will "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear weapon armories. Backing up this available tactical atomic capability, of course, was the Strategic Air Command's growing missile and bomber force based in the United States. This cumulatively massive striking force unquestionably could have been well targeted, counterforce or countervalue, on Chinese targets. The high altitude reconnaissance flights previously mentioned provided extensive targeting information.

For their part, the Chinese did not have a nuclear option early in the period. It will be recalled that the first Chinese nuclear test was in October, 1964, the second in May, 1965. Assuming reasonable plutonium production and warhead manufacturing rates, an inventory of, say, 40 to 70 nominal yield warheads could have been accumulated by the

end of the period.[29] There is little doubt that some of these weapons could have been delivered on American overseas installations during the period late 1966 to early 1968, had the Chinese been so inclined, and despite the limitations of their obsolete delivery systems.

Yet there is no authenticated information available to the effect that either the U.S. or China even commenced, and then recalled, military moves against the other with nuclear-armed forces. This is not to say that such military moves were not rumored, particularly among U.S. circles. Several reports circulated in 1965 and 1966 (they occasionally are heard even today) that the U.S. was preparing to mount a strike on Chinese nuclear installations from Formosa. But the evidence to back up these reports is slim indeed. For instance, in a New Year's Day message, 1965, Chiang Kai-shek noted an obligation to destroy Communist nuclear installations and advised all scientists and technicians to stay away from their jobs for their own safety.[30] In March, 1965, it was revealed in military testimony in the House of Representatives that the U.S. definitely had plans for the objective destruction of Chinese communist military and industrial installations, including nuclear facilities, in case of general conflict.[31] In November, 1965, reports circulated that six large urban centers of southern China were being evacuated for fear of

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[29] Supra., pp. 68-72.

[30] Taipei, CNA in Chinese, December 31, 1964.

[31] Testimony of Major General John D. Lavelle, USAF, in U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Armed Services Committee on Subjects Affecting the Naval and Military Establishments,

U.S. attack. But these reports were not given credence by U.S. government spokesmen.[32] Whether there was substance to them, and, if so, whether an evacuation was commenced for fear of an imminent U.S. atomic strike, has not been ascertainable as of this time.

Therefore, we are left with the facts that while there could have been atomic-armed moves initiated by either side against the other, there is no evidence that these moves occurred, or that they were even started. The only evidence is that they may have been contemplated, planned on a contingent basis. In the record of military interaction concerning nuclear-armed units, there is considerable information on capabilities, particularly on the U.S. side; there is both direct and deductive information on the intentions of both sides; but there is meagre, infinitesimal information on actual military moves of atomic-armed units of either side. Did the secret PLA Second Artillery Division move men and equipment nearer Formosa? Nearer to the Indochina frontier? Did the PLAAF 25th Air Division at Sian load atomic weapons? Did the USAF deploy these weapons to Formosa? To Thailand with the B-52s there? Was there a retargeting of SAC ICBMs onto Chinese targets? We do

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including H.R. 4016, Military Procurement for Fiscal Year 1966, March 10, 11, and 12, 1965, Paper No. 7, p. 1169.

[32] Le Monde (Paris), November 25, 1965, reporting a CBS telecast by Marvin Kalb that was later declared unsubstantiable by the State Department. On January 4, 1966 the Peking Daily disclosed that the PLA in Southern China had been placed on alert "one or more times recently." Paris, AFP, January 4, 1966.

not know the answers to these questions. Perhaps such information never will reach the public domain.

However, as a judgment, it can be held that the atomic confrontation of the U.S. and China was limited to verbal moves by both sides; statements, such as Chiang's, probably were made for psychological effect. Therefore, the nuclear confrontation, like the conventional forces confrontation of the two powers, can be characterized as a pattern of continuing general mutual restraint.

Since the atomic confrontation dwelled in the realm of intentions and capabilities, but not actions, it was perhaps as much a component of the political interaction as of the direct military interaction. Therefore, it will be addressed, once again, in the following chronicle of the political dialogue between the powers.

II. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-American Political Dialogue

In marked contrast to the military interaction between China and the United States during 1964-67, which was characterized by restraint at both the conventional and nuclear levels, the political interaction, or dialogue, between the two states during the same period is best characterized as extensive and volatile. The political dialogue between any two great nations, of course, consists of many components. To simplify this presentation, a threefold categorization of the dialogue, using a criterion of communication channels, has been selected: the first is the irregular dialogue; the second, the public political dialogue; and, the third, the diplomatic dialogue. Such a broad spectrum of pos-

sibilities for dialogue surely reflects its extensive nature. But the volatility of the dialogue must be illustrated in the presentation of material for each category.

The Irregular Dialogue

The irregular dialogue includes material on political interaction that might not necessarily enter the public domain as well as the exchange of information from one side to another by accident rather than design. In the first instance, of course, would be the exchange of delicate and important information between governments through their secret intelligence channels. In the second instance would fall events such as unattributed news releases, speculative news stories, semiofficial commentary on, perhaps, related or even exotic matters, messages passed through unusual channels of any kind and other exchanges of an informal, irregular, unusual or accidental genre.

It will not be possible, as a general rule, to collect meaningful information on the Chinese-U.S. dialogue in the intelligence channel for many years. While we may be sure that such channels exist (the Soviets pointedly tell us so[33]), there is no way to ascertain what information they are carrying. On the other hand, information on the content car-

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[33]A. Dronov, "Peiping's Undercover Contacts," New Times, No. 9, March 5, 1969, pp. 20-22. The undercover U.S.-Chinese contacts were given as in (1) Japan, (2) Hong Kong, and (3) Warsaw, outside the embassy environs. There is some reason to suspect other highly confidential U.S.-Chinese links in Paris, Copenhagen and Geneva.

ried in other irregular channels often becomes known, usually through the work of an inquiring reporter. This type of information is available for perusal. It is not necessarily complete, but is often indicative in several ways.

There are numerous precedents or examples of important political-military information being passed between the U.S. and China over irregular linkages. The most noteworthy occurrence was during the Korean War, when Washington, noting that Chinese bombers and fighters could attack U.S. bases and logistics routes the length of Korea, informed Peking, probably through the Indian diplomatic representative in Washington, that if this was done, mainland China would be attacked. Peking responded, through unrecorded channels, that if China were attacked, U.S. bases in Japan as well as Korea would be fair game.[34] The result was an unwritten but binding limitation on the conduct of the war that served until the truce--which may have been reached either because the Chinese were near exhaustion, because President Eisenhower threatened to extend atomic war to China, or both.

It is possible that a similar unwritten but binding understanding on the limitation of U.S. and Chinese conduct during the 1964-67 crisis period was reached quite early in the period. If this is so, the understanding may have been at least initiated through irregular channels.

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[34]Jack Anderson, "What Really Happened in Korea," Parade, September 22, 1963. Based on unreleased documents and interviews.

The instant case is that of an interview of Mao Tse-tung conducted by his American friend of long standing, Edgar Snow, on January 9, 1965, during a lengthy Peking visit. Snow's published report of the discussion included the following important information:

> ...he[Mao Tse-tung] repeatedly thanked foreign invaders for speeding up the Chinese revolution and for bestowing similar favors in Southeast Asia today. He asserted that China has no troops outside her own frontiers and has no intention of fighting anybody unless her own territory is attacked.
>
> ...Mao said that forces of history were also bound, eventually, to bring the two peoples together again; that day would surely come. Possibly I was right that meanwhile there would be no war. That could occur only if American troops came to China...
>
> ..."I do not believe that makers and administrators of United States policy understand you," I said. Why not? China's armies would not go beyond her borders to fight. That was clear enough. Only if the United States attacked China would the Chinese fight. Wasn't that clear? ...Fighting beyond one's own borders was criminal...[35]

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[35]Edgar Snow, "Interview With Mao," The New Republic, February 27, 1965, pp. 17-18 ff. (Italics added.) Other statements by Mao in this interview to the effect that the U.S. would not expand the Vietnam War into North Vietnam ("Mr. Rusk had made it clear") and that American forces would be ready to leave Vietnam in one or two years looked incongruous when the interview was published after the U.S. had bombed North Vietnam. Thus Mao was thought to have been a poor prophet who had "miscalculated completely" and "whose personal prestige must have suffered considerably." Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy "Debate," 1965-1966," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, Vol. 2, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, at pp. 29 and 33. However, it seems legitimate to question whether Mao's predictions were the important operative part of the interview.

Mao's statement of Chinese guidelines, as reported by Snow, was of course available much earlier than its publication in the United States,[36] certainly prior to the commencement of U.S. air raids on Dong Hoi and Vinh Dinh, North Vietnam on February 7, 1965. A week after these raids had started, intelligence sources in Hong Kong reported no information indicating Chinese preparations for war--the Chinese army remained in defensive positions,[37] thus verifying Mao's remarks. According to these same sources, Peking may have been playing the Vietnamese situation rather cooly as a means of forcing the Soviet Union either to take a militant stand on Vietnam and jeopardize peaceful coexistence with the United States, or a soft stand and thus jeopardize its leadership of the international movement.[38] This Machiavellian analysis of the Mao guideline well may contain an element of truth. In any case, Moscow was not taken in--the Soviet Union provided noteworthy assistance to North Vietnam while maintaining a semblance of peaceful coexistence with the U.S.--and Washington proceeded to act as if Mao's statement could be taken at face value. The Mao-Snow interview subsequently has been regarded by Moscow as a primary example of U.S.-Chinese collusion against the Moscow brand of world communism, and Chinese radio listeners

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[36] E.g., the Mao-Snow interview was published in the London Sunday Times of February 14, 1965.

[37] The Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1965, a report from Hong Kong by John Hughes.

[38] Ibid.

have not been allowed to forget it.[39]

Mao's single criterion for Chinese entry into the Asian conflict was neither modified nor amended in the irregular dialogue for quite some time. About a year later, the Chinese government warned the U.S. that it would treat any U.S. bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong with great seriousness. The warning was issued by Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi and transmitted to the U.S. through a Senator of the Philippine Congress.[40] This warning assumed acute importance when the U.S. intensified the bombing campaign over North Vietnam in 1967.

The next exchange in the irregular dialogue, and the next modification of Mao's criterion, was surfaced by Rene Dabernat, the foreign editor of Paris Match, in January, 1967. According to Dabernat, in the spring of 1966 a Chinese diplomat in Paris asked the Quai d'Orsay to inform Washington that Peking had three conditions for not engaging U.S. forces in Southeast Asia: that North Vietnam not be invaded; that the Red River dikes not be bombed; and, as before, that China proper not be invaded. However, Washington scoffed at the story, particularly at the contention that any limitation on the conduct of the Vietnam War had resulted from it. Washington acknowledged only that the U.S. had received numerous "third party" messages to the effect that China wished to avoid a head-on collision with the United States over Vietnam. One Washington

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[39] See, for example, Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, February 20, 1970; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, March 16, 1970; and Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, May 9, 1970.

[40] The Washington Post, March 25, 1966.

report held that the United States was well aware of risks through its own intelligence and therefore repeatedly signalled a reciprocal attitude to Peking.[41]

Several months later, the more authoritative voices of U.S. Senators Gore and Clark revealed that China had established three conditions for abstaining from open warfare "a long while" earlier, through hitherto undisclosed channels. Two of the conditions paralleled Dabernat's report: that North Vietnam not be invaded and that China proper not be attacked. The third condition did not relate to the security of the Red River dikes, but to the continued solvency of the North Vietnamese government. According to Senators Gore and Clark, the third condition was that if Ho Chi Minh fell, China would intervene.[42]

There is no record of denial of this senatorial comment by the Administration.

Concurrently with the Gore-Clark episode another instance in the irregular dialogue added still another variation to the previously reported Chinese policy guidelines. Simon Malley, an Egyptian-born naturalized U.S. citizen in China as an accredited representative of Jeune Afrique (Tunis), reportedly interviewed Chou En-lai and three other senior Chinese leaders. He was told that China was ready to send volunteers south, and that China would engage U.S. forces if they either en-

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[41]Rene Dabernat was interviewed in U.S. News and World Report, January 23, 1967, pp. 93-97. Also see The Washington Post and The New York Times for January 16, 1967.

[42]The New York Times, May 22, 1967.

tered North Vietnam or approached the borders of China. Additionally, and as a new criterion, Chou reportedly said Peking would act if there was a "sell out" peace settlement arranged by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and agreed to by, or imposed upon, Hanoi.[43]

Perhaps because of the purported statements regarding the Soviet Union, Peking immediately denied the Malley report.[44] Hsinhua said that Malley had never seen Chou, Chen Po-ta, Chen Yi, or Yang Cheng-wu during his two-day sojourn in Peking in March, that his report was "sheer fabrication," and a

> political plot deliberately concocted by the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists...to smear the solemn stand of the Chinese government and people on Vietnam...and to estrange the fraternal relations between China and Vietnam.[45]

In Washington, the State Department said simply that "nothing new" was detected in Malley's account, and indicated that Chinese denial of the interviews probably was dissembling on Peking's part. Malley, who resides in New York City, stands by his report.

These glimpses of the irregular dialogue between Peking and Washington tend to indicate that irregular channels are vitally important in the totality of communication between the two powers. These visible occurrences in the irregular dialogue seem to have been important in de-

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[43] The Times (London), Daily Sketch (London), and The New York Times, all of May 15, 1967; The Chicago Daily News, May 16 and 18, 1967.

[44] The New York Times, May 17, 1967.

[45] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 28, 1967.

limiting the patterns of military conduct between the two during a critical period of their continuing interaction. The dialogue in this channel was fairly restrained and businesslike. Evidence does not indicate an overshadowing presence of "gamesmanship" or polemicising. The Chinese stated their positions, the United States acknowledged, directly or indirectly, and that was that. This type of procedure therefore can be said to have many virtues. Unfortunately, the same did not hold true for the public political dialogue between the two powers.

The Public Political Dialogue

The public political dialogue between the two powers operates on two levels, which may or may not be in agreement, either with each other or with the irregular dialogue discussed previously. The first level of the public political dialogue is that of official statements of the various members of the top national leaderships, expressed in speeches, written directives, press conferences, and similar formalized presentations which are designed for the immediate release and dissemination of information. The second level of the public political dialogue includes the continuing commentary by important media of each nation--broadcasts, telecasts, and editorials. There is a possibility of overlap. A particularly important official speech may have polemic aspects which endure in the media for some time. There is also an option of one side polemicizing on a formal and non-polemic speech by a leader of the other side. In the U.S. case, the free media means that polemicizing may not

be vitally important in understanding policy maneuvering.[46] But Chinese media polemicizing, closely controlled by the party, always is an important indicator of Peking's position.

A thorough examination of the public political dialogue engenders a need for categorization, for the material is voluminous. Categorization of the dialogue indeed is possible, even though each side took internally contradictory positions, for both Washington and Peking tended to operate in a self-reiterative manner. Washington's major themes during 1964-67 were:

1) A hard-line anti-Chinese attitude; containment; China the "top threat" to world peace.

--AMELIORATED BY--

2) No desire for war with China; no combat on Chinese soil.

3) Calls for an unconditional conference, including China, to bring the Vietnam War to a halt.

4) Hope for peace with a less militant China in the future.

5) Tentative willingness to improve people-to-people contacts, such as exchange of journalists and scholars.

Peking's major themes were:

1) U.S. imperialist aggressors provoke war by continuing their piratical actions.

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[46] This comment, of course, excludes consideration of the output of the USIA and such U.S. outlets as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. But for this thesis, the output of the USIA was neither available nor considered necessary because of the superabundance of material from the private sector of U.S. media operations.

2) U.S. is frantically preparing for war; U.S. attack, nuclear and conventional, is imminent.

3) U.S. challenged to invade; Chinese readiness proclaimed.

4) If war occurs, it will have no boundaries.

5) Official warnings to U.S. not to do a variety of anti-Chinese actions.

6) Unreserved support for U.S. opponents.

7) Exhortation for widespread anti-U.S. action.

--AMELIORATED BY--

8) No Chinese forces in combat unless China invaded or attacked.

9) Wars of national liberation should emphasize self-reliance.

10) The tense situation between the U.S. and China is not permanent.

The presentation of this section will be chronological and selective of material, allowing an intermingled exchange of official statements and media polemics, and thus illustrating the ongoing public interchange of views between the two sides. The material presented is not an all-inclusive account of the dialogue. Rather, selections from the dialogue have been made to illustrate major themes. It should be noted that it is possible to dissect certain speeches or certain sequences of speeches much further than is done here. For instance, a number of speeches by various members of the hierarchy in Peking cited herein have been subjected to close textual analysis, a search for every tiny innu-

endo, in order to theorize on factional alignments in the CCP.[47] However, for our purposes, the importance of the dialogue seems to lie in how certain statements were perceived, in the aggregate, by the other side rather than how they were perceived in detail by domestic listeners or the party or governmental hierarchy.

The thread of political dialogue will be taken up at the time of the U.S. bombing of Khang Khay, Laos, in June, 1964, when a Chinese official was killed. Peking's vehement responses to the incident have been noted above.[48] It may be conjectured that China's righteous umbrage was in part a reply to a particularly firm anti-Chinese speech by Secretary of State Rusk on May 10, 1964,[49] a speech that exemplified one major pattern for U.S. official statements for the next several years.

However, official U.S. comment on the Chinese verbal blasts of June, 1964 was not noteworthy. U.S. media noted that China was intensifying a "war of nerves in Southeast Asia."[50]

Washington, watching developments in China closely, next ap-

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[47] Ra'anan, op. cit., pp. 23-71. The same speeches also have been analysed by Harold C. Hinton to try to ascertain Chinese policy toward North Vietnam and by Donald Zagoria to try to fathom the development and modification of Chinese high strategy. See their articles in Ping-Ti Ho and Tang Tsou, (eds.), China in Crisis, Vol. 2, op. cit.

[48] Supra., pp. 89-90.

[49] In England, over BBC. The State Department Bulletin, Vol. 50, No. 1300, May 25, 1964, p. 818.

[50] The New York Times, June 21, 1964.

parently decided to eliminate world surprise, and, incidentally, to accent an aura of U.S. omnipotence, by announcing Peking's first nuclear test before the Chinese had conducted it.[51]

After the test on October 16, 1964, Chinese commentary was generally restrained. There was no boasting. But Peking took the opportunity to publicly suggest a general summit conference to discuss world nuclear disarmament. Chou En-lai circularized heads of state with this proposal.

The U.S. response to the test and the disarmament initiative amounted to a calculated "put down." President Johnson immediately deplored the test and called on Peking to sign the Test Ban Treaty.[52] He also reaffirmed "readiness...to respond to requests of Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression."[53] Moreover, the U.S. flatly rejected a disarmament conference, State Department officials terming it "a sucker proposal."[54] The Secretary of Defense then publicly reaffirmed the U.S. capability to destroy China with nuclear forces.[55]

Chinese media responded that the atomic test had shocked and irritated the United States, assailed the President's rejection of a

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[51]Statement by Secretary of State Rusk, September 29, 1964. The State Department Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 1321, October 19, 1964, pp. 542-43.

[52]The New York Times, October 19, 1964.

[53]Ibid., October 17, 1964.

[54]Ibid., October 24, 1964.

[55]Ibid., October 26, 1964.

conference, and accused him of belittling the Chinese feat.[56]

Seemingly taking Secretary McNamara's statements on capability as declarations of intent, and combining his statement with the Western Pacific deployment of the SSBNs Daniel Boone and Tecumseh, the Chinese loudly and officially protested a "naked war provocation" by the U.S.[57] Chinese media deplored the Polaris move strenuously. U.S. war provocation became a continuing theme in Peking.

This Chinese outcry hardly compared to the deafening din of official statements and media polemics emanating from Peking when U.S. bombers attacked North Vietnam the following February. "U.S. piratical actions" were officially condemned.[58] Peking media proclaimed that North Vietnam and China were close brothers, that aggression against one was aggression against the other, and that 650 million Chinese would not remain indifferent. President Johnson's justification of the action was termed "gangster language" by the Chinese press.[59] "Concrete action against the U.S.," another typical Chinese position, was urged.[60]

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[56]"Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons," Peking Review, No. 44, October 30, 1964, pp. 5-6.

[57]Chinese protest of December 29, 1964, carried in ibid., January 1, 1965, p. 20. Also see a related article, pp. 21-22.

[58]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, February 9, 1965, and again, on February 13, 1965.

[59]Renmin Ribao, February 10, 1965; Peking Review, No. 7, February 12, 1965, pp. 19-20.

[60]"Call for World Support for People of Vietnam and Indo-China," Peking Review, No. 8, February 19, 1965, pp. 5-6.

As the U.S. bombing campaign continued and assumed a regular rhythm of its own without provocations by Viet Cong or North Vietnamese troops, and as Marines landed in South Vietnam, Premier Chou En-lai "officially warned" Washington.[61] Chinese media indicated that volunteers were ready to move south.[62] Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi officially reaffirmed Chinese support for North Vietnam.[63]

Washington's Vietnam strategy included both carrot and stick aspects. In April and May, 1965, President Johnson offered massive aid to all Indochina and an unconditional conference to bring the war to an end.[64] Both Hanoi and Peking labeled this initiative a hoax, and Peking media spoke of President Johnson's "Neo-Hitlerist doctrines."[65] The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of Communist China resolved to give unreserved support to the Vietnamese struggle.[66]

President Johnson's April 24th designation of a combat zone, which, perhaps unthinkingly, included portions of China proper, Chinese territorial waters, and Chinese islands, was roundly deplored by Chi-

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[61] The Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 1965.

[62] Renmin Ribao, March 25, 1965; Peking Review, No. 14, April 2, 1965, pp. 11-12.

[63] "Aiding Vietnam is China's Sacred Internationalist Duty," in ibid., pp. 10-11.

[64] For the text of the initial Johnson proposal, see The State Department Bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 606.

[65] Renmin Ribao editorial, "Johnson Doctrine is Neo-Hitlerism," Peking Review, No. 21, May 21, 1965, pp. 9-10.

[66] Peking Review, No. 17, April 20, 1965, pp. 6-7.

nese media.[67]

Whether directly related to the U.S. escalation in Vietnam or for other substantial reasons, the Chinese leadership then officially promulgated the Mao criterion, given informally to Edgar Snow four months earlier, for Chinese entry into an Asian war. The official statement was made by Deputy Premier General Lo Jui-ch'ing in Red Flag, the CCP theoretical journal. It was widely disseminated by the government press agency.[68] General Lo's position in this regard was strikingly similar to Mao's own; undoubtedly it was given close scrutiny in Washington.

Perhaps in response, or perhaps as a different brand of carrot, the Administration undertook a temporary bombing halt in Vietnam, but this was termed "a form of war blackmail" by Chinese media.[69]

In June, 1965, when President Johnson consecutively invited the socialist countries to "reason together"[70] and ordered U.S. troops to participate in the Vietnamese fighting,[71] Premier Chou called the United

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[67]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 1, 1965.

[68]General Lo Jui-Ch'ing, "Commemorate the Victory over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism Through to the End!," Peking Review, No. 20, May 14, 1965, pp. 7-15; The New York Times, May 11, 1965.

[69]"Statement of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 21, 1965," Peking Review, No. 22, May 28, 1965, pp. 10-11.

[70]Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Morality of Nations," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, No. 1357, June 28, 1968, pp. 1026-28.

[71]White House Statement of June 9, 1965, in ibid., p. 1041.

States a "peril to security" and said that China was ready for a full war in Vietnam.[72] The distinction in regard to location, and the rather obscure treatment of the word "ready" (e.g., was China ready for a war not involving China to happen?) distinguished Chou's statement from Lo's. Canadian correspondents reported no sign of preparations for imminent war in China.[73]

As Washington dispatched more troops to Indochina, Chinese media asserted that a geographic expansion of the war was contemplated.[74] The U.S. troop level had reached 125,000 men when Lin Piao delivered perhaps the major public pronouncement from Peking during the critical period. His famous speech, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," featured a major exhortation to the Chinese people to prepare for a U.S. attack that could be imminent.[75] Lin also used the speech to publicize, in less detailed form, defensive doctrines to be used in the event of a U.S. nuclear attack followed by ground invasion that had been promulgated by General Liu Yun-cheng somewhat earlier.[76]

As the "hardline" containment of China was a major American public theme, the threat of imminent American attack became a major Chinese public theme.

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[72]Paris, AFP in English, June 3, 1965.

[73]Toronto Daily Star, June 12, 1965.

[74]Renmin Ribao, August 3, 1965; Peking Review, No. 32, August 6, 1965, pp. 17-19.

[75]Lin Piao, op. cit.

[76]Liu Yun-cheng, "The Role of the People's Militia," Peking Review, No. 6, February 5, 1965, pp. 19-20.

In September, 1965, Washington warned China that the United States would respond to any intervention in the Indian-Pakistani fighting over Kashmir.[77] But Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi, in a virtuoso performance, challenged the United States to begin a war with China.[78]

Vietnam fighting continued to escalate. Scrapes between U.S. and Chinese forces became more frequent, and Secretary of State Rusk officially termed China the "top threat" to peace.[79] At the close of the year, while a British observer stated his

> ...view that the danger of aggression by the Peoples Republic of China is...remote and that claims 'to conquer the world' are mere rhetoric,[80]

some U.S. aides reportedly were contemplating the risks of a direct clash with China.[81]

War preparedness was the major preoccupation of the Chinese media in 1966, preparedness against a U.S. attack.[82] President Johnson's

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[77] The New York Times, September 16, 1965. The warning was passed at Warsaw.

[78] "Press conference of September 29, 1965," Peking Review, No. 41, October 8, 1965, pp. 7-14. The challenge theme was often reiterated. See Peking Review, No. 4, January 21, 1966, p. 6, No. 38, September 16, 1966, p. 7, and No. 39, September 23, 1966, p. 26.

[79] The New York Times, October 21, 1965.

[80] H. Trevor-Roper, "All's So Smugly Right in Red China," The Washington Post, November 14, 1965.

[81] The New York Times, December 3, 1965.

[82] Peking Daily, January 4, 1966.

State of the Union message, according to the Chinese publicists, "smelled heavily of gunpowder."[83] Peking was sure that Taiwan was being strengthened as a war base, and, at an army conference on political work, Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Peng Chen told the army to make preparations for a nuclear or conventional attack "at an early date."[84] Popular songs in China included "Deal Ruthless Blows at the Yankees" and "Resolutely Fight Side-by-Side With Vietnamese Brothers."[85] Secretary of Defense McNamara's capability statement to the effect that the U.S. "could ruin China"[86] probably did little to alleviate Chinese apprehension.

According to the director of the Chinese Army's general political department, the United States

> ...has always wanted to impose war on the Chinese people...We must make full preparations against the war of aggression which U.S. imperialism may launch at an early date, on a large scale, with nuclear or other weapons, and on several fronts...All our work must be put on a footing of readiness to fight.....If the United States dares to attack, we can definitely drown the U.S. aggressors in an ocean of people's war.[87]

However, by recognizing that U.S. conventional capabilities had been upgraded by the Democratic Administrations, the Chinese people also were urged by their media to give greater attention to improving their own

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[83] The New York Times, January 20, 1966.

[84] Ibid.

[85] The Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1966.

[86] The New York Times, January 26, 1966.

[87] Hsiao Hua speech reported from Peking by NCNA International Service in English on January 25, 1966.

conventional weapons.[88] Peking thus seemingly wanted to deemphasize the possibility of nuclear war.

In February, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, in a major policy speech, reiterated the U.S. commitment to a policy of containing China and hoped that a new generation of Chinese leaders would see that China's best interest lay in pursuing peace. He said that the U.S. and China were "antithetic" throughout the world.[89] In response, a high but unnamed Chinese official agreed to the antithesis, saying that "to be opposed by our enemy is not a bad thing; it adds to our honor," and, quoting an ancient scholar,

> everybody knows that the enemy is hateful, not that he is also most useful;
> that he is harmful,
> but not that he is also most beneficial.[90]

Concurrently, Chinese media blasted the testimony of Secretary of State Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, 1966. Mr. Rusk's description of the Administration's search for peace in Vietnam was termed a declaration that the U.S. "was determined to seize South Vietnam by force." He was accused of threatening the Vietnamese and Chinese people with a "big war," for which the Chinese were "fully prepared."[91]

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[88] "Correspondent," Renmin Ribao, February 1, 1966.

[89] Text of the speech, given at Pomona, California on February 12, 1966, in The State Department Bulletin, Vol. 54, No. 1392, February 28, 1966, pp. 310-18.

[90] "Observer," Renmin Ribao, February 20, 1966; The New York Times, February 21, 1966.

[91] Peking, NCNA in English, February 20, 1966.

In a move perhaps designed to take some of the steam out of Chinese apprehension, and in his first public voicing of a possible U.S.-Chinese arrangement reached in private channels, President Johnson then announced what was to become another major U.S. theme in the political dialogue. On February 23, 1966, he explicitly denied any desire to risk war on the vast land areas of China.[92] However, the tempo of Chinese exhortations for war preparations, as well as Chinese official speeches and polemicizing about the threat of U.S. aggression, continued unabated.

When Chinese media had once again accused Washington of planning to start a war in Asia,[93] Secretary of State Rusk commented that peace with China could be foreseen:

> ...We do not want war with China...We do not intend to provoke a war. There is no fatal inevitability of war with Communist China...[94]

This can be regarded as a most explicit statement of the Johnson policy of no land war in China.

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[92] The New York Times, February 27, 1966; The Washington Post, March 5, 1966. An earlier intimation of this position appeared in Alsop, "A Conversation With President Kennedy," op. cit.: "President Johnson has apparently ruled that...the U.S. simply cannot mount an unprovoked nuclear first strike, however surgical its execution and limited its purpose."

[93] Renmin Ribao, April 7, 1966; Peking Review, No. 15, April 8, 1966, pp. 6-8.

[94] Statement before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 16, 1966, The State Department Bulletin, Vol. 54, No. 1401, May 2, 1966, p. 694.

Peking, however, was adamant. Chou En-lai once again pledged all-out support for Vietnamese communists and officially spurned a U.S. offer for peace talks.[95] On May 9, 1966, Chou initiated a new, more threatening, line which was to continue in the series of Chinese statements until the Vietnam War deescalated. Reiterating that China would not take the initiative in starting a war, Chou said "Once the war breaks out, it will have no boundaries..."[96] Whether this was a forecast of world-wide guerrilla war against U.S. facilities or a threat to use atomic weapons against U.S. forces in the Far East remains obscure to this day. Probably Chou was contemplating the former; but the PLA could have been capable of the latter by this time.

Deciphering Chinese intent was further complicated by other remarks made by Chou at approximately the same time. Speaking at a farewell banquet for a visiting Albanian delegation headed by Mehmet Shehu given two days after China's third nuclear test, Chou En-lai commented

> ...We will never submit to the nuclear blackmail of anyone, nor will we ever use nuclear weapons to blackmail others... we declare again...that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons...[97]

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[95] Renmin Ribao, May 1, 1966; Peking Review, No. 19, May 6, 1966, p. 24.

[96] "Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Towards U.S.," Peking Review, No. 20, May 13, 1966, p. 5. The statement was given initially to the correspondent of the Pakistan paper Dawn on April 10, 1966. It was repeated in an official defense ministry statement of May 13, 1966 after a Chinese MiG was shot down by USAF fighters on May 12, 1966. The New York Times, May 13, 1966.

[97] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 10, 1966;

In midsummer the U.S. greatly intensified the bombing campaign over North Vietnam--and commenced bombing close-in to Hanoi and Haiphong. This obviously violated one Chinese criteria for entering the war, that had come in the irregular channel from Chen Yi through the Philippine Senator to Washington.[98] A high Chinese spokesman denounced the raids,[99] and Chinese media indicated that the raids freed China to act in Vietnam.[100] Chou En-lai consistently opposed peace in Vietnam[101] and pledged full support to Hanoi once again. But U.S. intelligence reported no movement in China that foretold military action.[102]

In fact, Peking reemphasized the historic Maoist line of "self-reliance" to Hanoi. China would extend support to the Ho regime, but the North Vietnamese would have to win their war by themselves.[103]

The summer continued with little variation on the various themes promulgated by each side thus far. But all themes were played, by both sides, even though they were self-contradictory. Thus President

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Renmin Ribao, May 11, 1966.

[98] Supra., p. 104.

[99] "Commentator," Renmin Ribao, July 1, 1966.

[100] See Peking Review, No. 28, July 8, 1966, pp. 19-23.

[101] On June 29 and July 11, 1966.

[102] The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1966.

[103] Renmin Ribao, July 12, 1966; The Guardian (Manchester), July 15, 1966. The "self-reliance" line previously had been enunciated by Chen Yi.

Johnson reiterated a policy toward China of "Peace in Asia and the Pacific Area,"[104] but told the American Legion that he could not ignore Chinese threats.[105] For their part, the Chinese continued to predict a U.S. attack,[106] said that if a Sino-U.S. war broke out, "...all Asian countries offering bases to the U.S. will be turned into battle sites...,"[107] and continued strong propaganda support to the Vietnamese communists.[108] China was Vietnam's "vast" or "reliable rear area."[109] U.S. bombing of a Red River dike was condemned,[110] as were U.S. attacks on Chinese fishing boats and shipping.[111]

In September, however, came the first official indication that at least some elements of the Chinese leadership had accepted the by then often reiterated U.S. position that an attack on China was not being con-

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[104]Nationwide radio-TV address, reported in The New York Times, July 12, and 13, 1966; The State Department Bulletin, Vol. 55, No. 1414, August 1, 1966, pp. 158-62.

[105]Transcript in The New York Times, August 30, 1966.

[106]Chen Yi, reported in Asahi (Tokyo), July 13, 1966; also see Peking Review, No. 29, July 15, 1966, pp. 27-28.

[107]Tokyo, Kyodo in English, August 29, 1966, amplifying Yomiuri (Tokyo) report of August 11, 1966.

[108]Peoples Liberation Army Daily, July 19, 1966; China Youth News, July 19, 1966.

[109]Ibid; also see Renmin Ribao, September 2, 1966. The "reliable rear area" phrase is in use today.

[110]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 16, 1966.

[111]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, September 5 and 6, 1966.

sidered. The spokesman was Chen Yi, the occasion a conversation with an eight-man delegation from the Japanese diet. Said Chen:

> I do not think that the present tense situation between the U.S. and China will last forever...China supports the idea of Sino-U.S. talks on the settlement of the Vietnam dispute. The idea of peaceful settlement is Chinese foreign policy...[but] China will not impose its thinking on the Vietnamese people...[112]

Although this Chinese initiative undoubtedly was well received in Washington, the subsequent trend in Chinese official statements continued to be highly militant for several months. By mid-November, however, observers in Hong Kong noted a slight moderation of Chinese threats to intervene in Vietnam. Peking was becoming less belligerent[113] while continuing to proclaim a strongly anti-U.S. stand.

Thus Peking incidentally, while addressing another subject, would allege that

> ...The possession by the Chinese people of guided missiles and nuclear weapons is a great encouragement to the heroic Vietnamese people who are waging a war of resistance against U.S. aggression...,[114]

but would not, so far as can be ascertained, mention the possibility that

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[112] Tokyo Domestic TV Service in Japanese, September 6, 1966. A variation of the statement was in Mainichi (Tokyo), September 7, 1966. Also see The New York Times, September 7, 1966. There subsequently was a dispute over whether Chen's remarks had been correctly interpreted. Japan Times (Tokyo), September 9, 1966.

[113] The New York Times, November 16, 1966.

[114] "Observer," "Another Deal Between the Two Nuclear Overlords, the U.S. and the Soviet Union," Peking Review, No. 47, November 18, 1966, pp. 34-35. Hanoi's acceptance of Peking's premise in this case may be doubted.

nuclear weapons might be applicable in the Vietnam war.

On the other hand, despite public statements denying intent to attack China, the U.S. did not significantly lessen political pressure on Peking. President Johnson pointedly warned the Chinese against nuclear blackmail of Asian countries,[115] and, as is well known, the U.S. bombing campaign near China's southern border continued at a high level.

By the end of 1966, therefore, the evolution of various themes in the Chinese-American political dialogue was essentially complete. The themes of each side continued to be played throughout 1967 and into 1968; some of them continue in use as of this writing. Peking continued to condemn U.S. actions in Vietnam, especially an alleged bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi.[116] Chinese aircraft or ships accidentally hit by U.S. aircraft, and any intrusions into Chinese airspace, brought vehement protests from Peking. The U.S. was accused of "blatant provocations" and Chinese media held that the Chinese were ready to "fight to the end." President Johnson's "brinkmanship," according to Peking, was doomed.[117] For its part, Washington continued to insist that there was no intent to attack China, and President Johnson continued to indicate a desire to relax tension between the countries.[118] The White House said "We're confident Peking is aware that the U.S. does not seek involvement of Red Chi-

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[115] The New York Times, October 31, 1966.

[116] Peking Review, December 23, 1966, pp. 8-9.

[117] "Commentator," "Johnson's 'Brinkmanship' is Doomed to Failure," Peking Review, September 1, 1967, pp. 29-30; The New York Times, August 23, 1967.

[118] The New York Times, July 11, 1967.

na.[119] But other high administration spokesmen, including Vice President Humphrey and Secretary of State Rusk, continued to note the threat posed by Chinese Communism.[120]

In 1968, when President Johnson ordered a partial bombing halt in Vietnam that effectively removed the presence of U.S. aircraft from proximity to China's border, Peking publicly labeled the move "a fraud."[121]

In this presentation, emphasis has been placed on the public dialogue specifically concerning vital intentions of war and peace. The major thrust of the information provided, which is not all-inclusive but does present most of the highlights of those years, is that neither side wanted war with the other but that each initially feared that the other might attack. Although a mutually delimiting arrangement for the conduct of matters in Asia might have been reached in 1965, it was not until late 1966 that both sides had publicly acknowledged it. Confusing any widespread public recognition of the important arrangement was the tenor of the dialogue, which by and large, was maintained at an inflammatory level throughout the period.

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[119] Ibid., August 22, 1967.

[120] Ibid., October 16, 1967. The Vice President was perhaps more militant than Secretary Rusk, who had raised a spectre of a billion Chinese "armed with nuclear weapons" in what became known as the "Yellow Peril" speech of October 15, 1967.

[121] Peking Review, April 12, 1968, p. 14.

Thus it is opportune to take up the third level of political dialogue at this time--a dialogue that usually proceeded without inflammatory rhetoric but which, in the long run, may have been even more important than either the irregular or the public political dialogue in arranging a mutually hostile but viable mode of confrontation--the diplomatic dialogue.

The Diplomatic Dialogue[122]

This section deals with the progress of Chinese-American diplomatic meetings during the 1964-1967 period. What is known of these meetings indicates that they dealt with many topics other than the immediate vital issues of war and peace, such as disarmament and improved bilateral contacts--e.g., the exchange of correspondents, scholars, and seed grains. Many of these less vital issues became public knowledge soon after, or sometimes before, a particular diplomatic meeting, whereupon they were subject to official public comment and polemicizing.

In our chronicle we will include some information on disarmament because of its relevance to Hypothesis III, but will largely ignore

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[122]This section is largely dependent on Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating With the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, New York: McGraw, Hill, 1968, and, also by Young, Diplomacy and Power in Washington-Peking Dealings, 1953-1967, Chicago: The University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1967. There has been some conjecture that Ambassador Young, a distinguished American diplomat who has negotiated with Chinese diplomats at Panmunjom and Geneva, may have referred to the record of U.S. discussions with China in Geneva and Warsaw. However, he acknowledges drawing only from secondary sources. See the Preface, pp. xi-xiv, to Negotiating With the Chinese Communists.

information on improving bilateral contacts since it is somewhat ancillary to our argument.[123] It is accepted that certain material included in this section might also have been given emphasis in the preceeding section on the public dialogue. This is another manifestation of the overlap inherent in the categorization being used.

Although Washington has never recognized Peking, Chinese-American diplomatic meetings commenced in August, 1955, in Geneva. In 1958 they were shifted to Warsaw. U.S. and Chinese ambassadors to Poland were designated as the respective plenipotentiaries for the meetings. Each meeting followed a stereotyped "Panmunjom" format, with each side in turn stating a position on an issue. There have been no discussions. Communiques have not been issued. By 1964, over 120 of these stolid, mysterious meetings had been conducted.

During the 1964-68 period negotiators for the two states progressed through meeting number 134, held on January 8, 1968 after a two-month postponement. The frequency and sequence of meetings is important.

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[123] The conciliatory U.S. initiatives involved improved bilateral contacts, such as

a) easing of passport restrictions on travel to China,
b) admission of Chinese newsmen to the U.S.,
c) permission for U.S. doctors, scholars, businessmen and athletes to visit China,
d) admission of Chinese scholars to the U.S., and
e) intimations of a relaxed restriction on trade (i.e., in pharmaceuticals), occurred in late 1965, throughout 1966, and into 1967. They were spurned by China, and may have hardened Chinese resolve on more vital subjects. Ibid., pp. 278-98, 326.

Five meetings occurred in 1964, five in 1965, three in 1966, two in 1967, and one in 1968, following which a two year hiatus occurred. It was as though the official negotiators had less and less to discuss as the Asian crisis escalated more and more. This hardly seems reasonable--unless the Warsaw Meetings in fact had reached an early agreement concerning the mutual delimitation of moves in Southeast Asia for the purpose of preventing war between China and the U.S. If this proposition is true, it would seem that much of the threatening and poisonous public dialogue illustrated in the previous section was simply superfluous--or, in reality, pointed toward domestic or sympathetic foreign consumption rather than to influence the opponent.

The Soviet Union has taken the position that both these propositions are valid. According to Moscow, shortly after the Mao-Snow conversation in January, 1965,

> ...a Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talk was held...Apparently, it was to determine the Chinese leadership's stand in the event of an escalation of the Vietnam war. Judging from all events, the Chinese reiterated the policy of noninterference as indicated by Mao in his conversation with journalist Snow. Besides, at a later date Peking openly turned down the Soviet proposal for united action to counter the U.S. aggression in Vietnam.[124]

Inasmuch as the Warsaw Talks during this period were conducted in Poland's Myslewicki Palace, and thus were subject to Polish-Soviet surveillance

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[124]Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, February 20, 1970. This broadcast is typical of many Moscow statements on the Warsaw Meetings in the 1968-1970 period.

(in 1970, the resumed talks were held alternatively in the U.S. and Chinese embassies), there may be some truth in the Soviet propaganda claim. It would be valuable to ascertain whether a Chinese-U.S. arrangement was hammered out at the February 25, 1965 Warsaw meeting, at a series of meetings extending through 1965, or an even longer series extending into 1966. Available evidence indicates that the prevention of open war was a major topic at an extended series of meetings, and that by the time of the 131st meeting on September 7, 1966, an arrangement had been consummated.

According to Emile Guikovaty, a former Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking, on September 6, 1966:

> ...Throughout 1965 and the beginning of this year, Soviet diplomats and correspondents in Peking insisted in private conversations that China and the United States, at their periodic ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw, were discussing the conditions for broad negotiations on problems separating the two countries...The Soviet representatives...said they were convinced that China and the United States were striving by all means to avoid a direct clash.
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> ...Informed sources [also Soviet?-W.P.] said... that the Chinese and American ambassadors had clearly outlined the conditions which would prevent a collision of the two countries in Vietnam. Thus, U.S. pilots received formal orders not to approach the Chinese borders, and the Chinese agreed to consider any errors which might occur as regrettable incidents. The Chinese, on the other hand, said they would not intervene in Vietnam unless U.S. forces adopted an offensive attitude threatening Chinese territory. China publicly echoed this attitude by stating that Vietnam would be able to defeat the United States with its own forces...[125]

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[125] Paris, AFP in English, September 6, 1966.

From Warsaw in early 1967, experienced New York Times correspondent Henry Kamm reported a much less definitive Chinese-U.S. diplomatic exchange that extended through 1965 into 1966. According to Kamm's diplomatic informants,

> ...The conversations here have enabled the Chinese and the Americans to assess each other's intentions as well as to transact minor business. A guarded exchange is said to have been made last year to avoid a direct encounter over Vietnam.[126]

Writing from Warsaw at the same time, Yugoslav feature writer V. Popovic noted no specifics on an agreed Chinese-U.S. arrangement but commented significantly

> ...According to what is published, these talks furnish no results. Nevertheless they are being held and both sides want to continue holding them. It is paradoxical, but there is an air of confidence reigning at these meetings. Their most important characteristic is that they make it possible for both sides--for example despite the war situation in Vietnam--to prevent making a drastically wrong move with respect to the other.[127]

Ambassador Gronouski, the U.S. envoy at the talks during the later part of the crucial period, (he assumed the post in late 1965) has publicly stated only that discussions with the Chinese ambassador were "frank and serious." In 1967, Gronouski reaffirmed faith in the utility of the Warsaw meetings but said they had not yet served their principle

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[126] The New York Times, January 26, 1967. For nearly identical language in a Max Frankel dispatch emanating from Washington ten days earlier, see ibid., January 17, 1967.

[127] V. Popovic, "The Washington-Peking "Hot Line,"" Vjesnik (Zagreb), February 7, 1967. This story is valuable also for an excellent portrayal of procedures surrounding the Warsaw meetings.

function:

> I continue to hope that in time they will be instrumental in reducing tensions in East Asia, and thus in the world generally.[128]

However, there was little opportunity for the Ambassador's hope to be fulfilled. Only two more meetings of the series occurred after his statement, one in mid-June, 1967, and the last on January 8, 1968. By that time Ambassador Gronouski had resigned to aid the Humphrey campaign and the Chinese representative, Wang Kuo-chuan, had been recalled to Peking.

Obvious downgrading of the talks in 1967-68 provided an opportunity for publication of a thus far definitive resumē of the thirteen-year history of the Warsaw Talks in the United States. This account, prepared by Kenneth T. Young,[129] is based on an evaluation that the talks were dichotomous. Chinese-U.S. diplomacy was typified by "stalemate and elusion,"[130] and by missed opportunities.

For instance, after the first Chinese atomic test, Peking proposed privately at Warsaw, on November 25, 1964, that China and the United States exchange pledges on the "no-first-use" of atomic weapons. The pledges were to hold until the world disarmament conference, that Peking had publicly and concurrently proposed, had convened. It will be recalled that the U.S. immediately termed the Chinese-sponsored disarmament conference "a sucker proposal." In the same frame of mind, therefore, the U.S. evaded an exchange of "no-first-use" pledges and spoke instead of in-

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[128] The New York Times, January 26, 1967.

[129] Supra., p. 126.

[130] Young, Negotiating..., op. cit., pp. 263, 382-84.

spection and verification matters, staged disarmament, and Chinese failure to adhere to the Test Ban Treaty of the previous year.

However, the Chinese "no-first-use" proposal was significant in two ways. First, it was not tied to the Taiwan issue. It was the first "untied" proposal since 1961! Second, it was made privately. A month later, after Polaris submarines had deployed to Asia, Peking obliquely referred to the Chinese initiative--and the U.S. rejection, but did not polemicize on the proposal-rejection sequence until mid-1966. Washington's decision to reject serious discussion of the proposal meant that

> ...we shall never know whether this one gesture on the part of Peking away from stalemate would have engaged both parties in a meaningful dialogue for the first time since the Taiwan crisis of 1958.[131]

Moreover, the strategic implications of Washington's demurrer on "no-first-use" well could have been benumbing to the Chinese leadership, which at that time could not mention a Chinese deterrent.

In any case, the abortive "no-first-use" initiative ended what may have been an educational exchange on disarmament for the Chinese that had preoccupied the 1962-63 series of meetings.[132] Attention turned to Vietnam.

> At the 126th meeting on February 25, 1965 [recall the publication date of the Mao-Snow interview], just after American bombing of North Vietnam began, the United States government ap-

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[131] Ibid., pp. 262-63.

[132] Ibid., pp. 252-68.

> parently communicated a fairly long statement to Peking to make clear its position with regard to South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Communist China...[133]

The following meeting, in April, was occupied by an official conveyance of public statements made by both capitals in the interim. The June 30th meeting amounted to another "switchboard" operation to officially communicate the views of each side. After the September 15th meeting, departing U.S. ambassador Cabot said the talks had served a "useful purpose," but had made little or no progress in reducing Far Eastern tensions. However, by the end of 1965, American diplomats had made it "crystal clear" that the United States did not intend to invade China or crush North Vietnam, and was seeking only a peaceful settlement on acceptable terms.

The three Warsaw meetings of 1966 continued the series of "notifications on Vietnam." A serious talk with no progress was held on March 16th. At the May 25th meeting, the U.S. reportedly proposed a reciprocal lessening of hostilities as a basis for Vietnam peace negotiations (e.g., the U.S. would halt bombing North Vietnam if Hanoi, etc...). Peking soon publicly replied with charges of "peace swindles" and then rejected Washington's proposal privately at the September 7, 1966 meeting. This final meeting of 1966 was unusual in that the Chinese ambassador immediately read the secret transcript of the meeting to the press outside the Myslewicki Palace, accompanying the reading with polemical

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[133] Ibid., p. 269. (Italics added.)

assertions of his own.[134]

From Ambassador Young's account, the two meetings of 1967 accomplished little. He therefore concludes with the following evaluation:

> ...At least, Washington's attempt to define the meaning and limit the scope of United States policy there [Asia], unambiguously and comprehensively, is on the record, whatever its interpretation by Peking may be. And Peking's intentions and warnings...have been hammered onto the same record. It seems reasonable to conclude that having the medium for exchange of views at Warsaw regarding Vietnam has helped each side sketch out the rough parameters of what the other might or might not do. In view of the deadlocks in the Talks on all issues and the divergence between Washington and Peking concerning Vietnam, the nature of this exchange could only be general and inferential, not involving any explicit understandings or round-about deals...maintaining even this imprecise, limited and uncertain extent of responsible restraint was decidedly preferable to outright hostilities...[135]

There are substantial areas of agreement in all of these reports and analyses. Placing more weight on Ambassador Young's more authoritative presentation than on the press reports from many sources, it seems reasonable to conclude that the formal diplomatic dialogue in Warsaw most likely

(a) Did include the achievement of an "understanding" or "arrangement" regarding the limits of military confrontation in the Far East.

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[134] Pp. 268-75 of ibid contain a more detailed presentation on the 1965-66 meetings. For Ambassador Wang's polemics, see Peking Review, No. 38, September 16, 1966, pp. 7-9.

[135] Ibid., p. 332. Also, in part, in Young, Diplomacy and Power..., op. cit., pp. 17 and 32.

(b) Had probably largely completed this process during the 1965 series of meetings, somewhat ahead of press indications that the process had occurred in 1966, but behind the Soviet assertion that it was completed in one meeting.
(c) Had neither addressed problems nor indicated respective courses of action in explicit quid pro quo terms as several press reports would seem to indicate.

The political dialogue, when traced through its irregular, public, and diplomatic progressions, despite numerous twists and turns, side excursions, and manifold dichotomies and uncertainties, comes out paralleling the events of the military engagement presented earlier.

Perhaps more significant is the fact that remarkably parallel types of information were running in each channel of the political dialogue. Chinese and U.S. leaderships were not saying things in irregular or diplomatic channels that they also did not say, sooner or later, in their public dialogue.

However, our understanding of this ongoing interaction, although improved by isolating the military engagement and the political dialogue, is incomplete unless the tacit exchange is examined.

The tacit exchange includes both political and military actions undertaken by one side, either unilaterally or in conjunction with a "third" nation, that are significant to the other side. Also included are important political developments within each superpower that exert significant influence on its external actions. The distinguishing characteristic of these actions or developments is that although they are significant to the opponent, they are neither aimed directly at nor require a response from him.

III. The Tacit Exchange

The tacit exchange in the Chinese-American interaction will be examined in the following sequence:

A. Actions by, or developments in the U.S. of significance to China.

B. Actions by, or developments in China of significance to the U.S.

The Kennedy Administration's decisions to build up strategic delivery forces and conventional warfare forces to new plateaus of strength and versatility in the early 1960s were made not in response to a specifically Chinese threat but on the basis of an evaluation of the general world strategic picture in which China played only one part. Yet it is understandable that Peking, as has already been mentioned, could take the force posture increase as a direct threat to China, particularly when the first SSBN's deployed to the Pacific and B-52s were staged forward to Guam.

However, during the critical period 1964-1967, employment of these U.S. forces was such that Peking probably became reassured, without ever taking U.S. public protestations of non-intent for war with China into account, that the U.S. was not going to attack. While the U.S. deployed over half a million troops in Vietnam and the South China Sea often seemed crowded with U.S. warships and auxiliaries, most of these units went about their business without endangering China. The record of mutual restraint in military engagements, particularly those involving aircraft operations, has been discussed previously. Not mentioned was the unilaterally issued U.S. directive prohibiting attacks on targets within 25-30 miles of the

border between North Vietnam and China,[136] which kept forces apart fairly well despite the high speeds and great turning radii of modern aircraft. This geographic limitation was decreased to ten miles late in the period, after U.S. intentions presumably were thoroughly understood in Peking, and vice versa.

A corollary of the self-imposed U.S. geographic limitation on aerial warfare was Washington's decision to announce inadvertant intrusions by U.S. units into Chinese airspace or waters as soon as possible. These announcements unquestionably were of some propaganda value. Since they were generally truthful, even though errors occasionally occurred and Peking would charge U.S. duplicity and obfuscation, the Chinese probably took their total impact as reinforcing the impression of U.S. unwillingness to engage China.

Peking also can be supposed to have closely analysed the overall political conduct of the Vietnam War by Washington. Of great importance probably were the repeated attempts by the U.S. to invoke ceasefires, truces, and bombing halts. Although Peking derided and abused President Johnson's highly publicized searches for peace, the Chinese leadership easily could have seen in them powerful evidence of a lack of American enthusiasm for the Vietnam War--and then deduced an even greater U.S. disenchantment with the prospect of a China War.

Observing the U.S.-Chinese confrontation from an objective strategic vantage point permits the observation that if the U.S. were planning

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[136] The New York Times, August 22, 1967.

an attack of significant and lasting impact on China (e.g., not a hit-and-run raid), it would probably be three-pronged: from Indochina, from Taiwan, and from Korean or Japanese staging points into Northeast China. (Mao reportedly had been preoccupied with the possibility of a simultaneous U.S. attack on South China, a Soviet move into Sinkiang Province, and an Indian attack on Tibet since 1962.[137]) Peking must have been reassured when significant U.S. buildups did not occur elsewhere than in Vietnam. Even more reassuring must have been the dampening of Chinese Nationalist hopes for a return to the mainland by Washington.[138]

Moreover, the Far Eastern military picture was reinforced by events in the United States. As the Vietnam War continued to escalate but the Johnson Administration consistently refused to mobilize the nation, Peking probably took the official U.S. insistence on pursuing the war without mobilization of reserves or the economy as a prime indicator of limited U.S. intent.

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[137]Stewart Alsop, "The Mind of Mao," The Saturday Evening Post, January 15, 1966, p. 14. Alsop's report was subsequently substantiated in 1968 in an account of an interview given to a group from the Japanese Communist Party by Mao on March 28, 1966. Mao reportedly told the Japanese that if a U.S.-Chinese war occurred, Moscow would occupy China under the pretext of mutual defense. In this contingency, Mao intended to order the PLA to defend China against the Red Army, attempting to hold the area south of the Yangtse River. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 59-60, 67.

[138]On January 11, 1967, it was noted that Chiang Kai-shek had pledged not to invade the mainland unless Washington approved. The New York Times, January 11, 1967.

The Chinese also probably noted with interest that a mobilization attempt by Washington might not have been easily accepted by the American people. Characterizing themselves as keen students of American society and as experts on its internal contradictions, the Chinese were well aware of the unpopularity of the Vietnam War in America. Peking applauded anti-war manifestations in the United States, in part because they verified historic Chinese premises that the East had a monopoly on patience while Western nations, committed to quick victory, would not countenance a long-drawn-out war.[139] Captured North Vietnamese documents of 1966 claimed that Peking was urging Hanoi to play for time, fighting on indefinitely until China's nuclear and conventional power totally defeated the United States.[140]

While Peking was interpreting domestic developments in the United States as favorable to long-range Chinese aspirations, Washington unquestionably read domestic developments in China as favorable to American short-term goals in Southeast Asia. The Great Chinese Cultural Revolution, proclaimed by Chou En-lai on May Day, 1966,[141] indicated to Washington an intense Chinese preoccupation with domestic reorientation that could as

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[139] H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January, 1950), p. 99.

[140] Young, Negotiating..., op. cit., p. 351.

[141] Mao reportedly gave the initial impetus for the Cultural Revolution at a September, 1965 meeting of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. "Circular of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (May 16, 1966)", Peking Review, No. 21, May 19, 1967, p. 6. It was formally launched on April 14, 1966, at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

easily keep China from foreign adventures as it could ultimately require a foreign adventure to resolidify the country. On balance, the domestic preoccupation seemed a more persuasive prediction than foreign adventure. In any case, Chinese media proclamations of impending attack by the United States and/or the Soviet Union might have persuaded the Chinese populace that they in fact were involved in a great foreign struggle.

China's domestic turmoil began earlier than did noticeable anti-war opposition in the United States. Social unrest in China antedated the official proclamation of the Cultural Revolution by six months.[142] Reports of guerrilla warfare and widespread sabotage,[143] purges of corrupt officials and cadres,[144] and mounting tension in Peking[145] all were noted with interest by Washington before the Cultural Revolution officially had been so named. After it had become official Chinese policy, turmoil increased. An "anti-party group" was purged in Peking as China "swept away a horde of monsters,"[146] and the purges were broadened into the provinces. General Lo Jui-ch'ing disappeared early in 1966, and was reported purged

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[142]Taipei, CNA in English, October 28, 1965. An extensive report filed by hopeful Nationalist editors.

[143]E.g., Delhi Radio, December 14, 1965, reported widespread sabotage in Swatow.

[144]The Washington Post, January 20, 1966. Stanley Karnow dispatch from Hong Kong.

[145]The Washington Post, March 9, 1966.

[146]"Sweep Away All Monsters," Peking Review, No. 23, June 3, 1966, pp. 4-5.

in July 1966.[147] Marshal Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister, also would be purged, as would President Liu Shao-chi, Party Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, Peking Mayor Peng Chen, and other top leaders. Red Guard organizations were rampant in the summer of 1966, and strife caused by their activities, and the subsequent necessity to stop them, continued into 1968.

The end of the Cultural Revolution can be pegged to the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, October, 1968. It subsequently has been described as a grand factional struggle for power between Red Guards, revolutionary rebels, revolutionary committees, Maoists, anti-Maoists, military professionals, military politicians, various bureaucratic elements, and top-level cliques surrounding various leading political figures. From this enormous and lengthy disruption Lui Shao-chi became "China's Khrushchov," the scapegoat for China's troubles, Mao was restored as an active top political figure in lieu of his earlier role as an object of veneration, and Lin Piao emerged as the number two man in China and Mao's designated successor.[148] The deep factional struggle in China

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[147] The Washington Post, July 15, 1966. Speculation as to why he was purged is contained in ibid., March 9, 1966. A recent and detailed analysis is by Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, The Purge of Lo Jui-Ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning, Rand Memorandum R-548-PR, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, February, 1971.

[148] Regarding the Cultural Revolution, see Benjamin Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), pp. 1-17; _____, "The Reign of Virtue--Thoughts on China's Cultural Revolution," Dissent, May-June, 1969, pp. 239 ff. Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," China Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), pp. 63-91; "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China," Survey, No. 63 (April, 1967); A. Doak Barnett, China After Mao, op. cit.: and Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute; Back-

provided the United States with an opportunity to act, for although no known faction in China wanted to come to immediate terms with Washington, their inability to invoke an opposite decision also was evident.

It must be noted, however, that Washington's course was firmly set, and the essence of a Chinese-American arrangement for conducting military operations already fairly firm, before the Cultural Revolution became a matter of strategic importance. Thus it follows that Washington's stand in Vietnam may be thought of as one causal factor behind a domestic phenomenon in China which Washington then was able to turn to advantage. But the question of whether the U.S. action was more important than other causes of Chinese turmoil must be answered in the negative.

In fact, the mainsprings of the Cultural Revolution probably were domestic, rising in the perhaps quixotic effort of Mao to insure revolutionary elan in the Chinese Communist Party even after his passing. The domestic causes were amplified by a series of drastic foreign reverses elsewhere than in Vietnam. Events in Indonesia, Algeria, Ghana, Cuba, and even relations with Hanoi,[149] in 1965 and 1966, contravened Chinese aspirations and must have caused deep chagrin in Peking.[150]

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ground, Development and the March 1969 Crisis, Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., RM-6171 PR, August, 1970, pp. 48-56. Regarding Lin Piao, see Dennis Bloodworth, "Lin Piao, the Tiger Cat Stalking in Mao's Shadow," The Observer (London), April 20, 1969; and the Editor, "Lin Piao and the Cultural Revolution," Current Scene, Vol. 8, No. 14, August 1, 1970.

[149] The New York Times, November 16, 1966.

[150] On March 7, 1966, Renmin Ribao warned CCP members against sinking into "passivity and despair" because of recent setbacks suffered by revolutionary forces abroad and said "sometimes the leadership of the revolution itself may make mistakes of one kind or another." Also see The

However, of all strategic and foreign policy problems facing Peking during the period, the one that might have shared top billing with the "U.S. threat" was the "Soviet threat." Much of the argument of the Cultural Revolution, as experienced by top Chinese leadership circles especially in late 1965 and early 1966, was focussed on the question of which enemy to deal with first. It is most important to recognize that when factions solidified in Peking and one faction became dominant, those taking a "soft" line toward Moscow were the purge victims while the anti-Moscow "hard-liners," who were willing to defer the struggle with "imperialism" until the Socialist campground was restored to order, dominated the scene.[151]

Washington unquestionably kept the apparently deepening Sino-Soviet struggle under close scrutiny. But the perceptions of even the most acute observers were insufficient to pierce the veils of uncertainty surrounding the complex Sino-Soviet interaction. Washington decisionmakers needed to know whether the split was temporary or permanent and what actions by the United States might accent or diminish it. Would escalating the Vietnam war cause Peking and Moscow to reunite? Would an attack on China, even an accidental foray of low intensity, cause them to stop quarreling and activate their 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance? Or would escalation of the Vietnam War drive China and the

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New York Times, March 8, 1966.

[151] Cf., Ra'anan, op. cit.; "The Soviet Union and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China," Survey, No. 63, (April, 1967), pp. 3-8; also see Maury Lisann, "Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle," Problems of Communism, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November-December, 1969), pp. 32-41, at pp. 34, 36, and 38; and Harding and Gurtov, op. cit.

Soviet Union further apart? Might an attack on China by the U.S., if it were limited in scope and intensity, be viewed benignly by Moscow?

At the time, there were no firm answers to these questions. Of a distinguished group of consultants and advisors to the U.S. government concerned with these questions, it seems reasonable to suppose that, regarding Vietnam, some thought that escalating the war would drive a larger wedge between Peking and Moscow while others did not, and, regarding China, very few favored any sort of U.S. attack even though the Soviet response probably would not mean activation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty.

Therefore, Washington always was forced to be prudent, to operate on the assumption that the split was temporary, and that any hyperactivity might either drive Moscow toward Peking or Peking toward Moscow.

Hindsight indicates, of course, that the split was indeed a deep crevasse, not readily subject to solutions mutually arrived at or encouraged from outside by either allies or opponents. Further, it has become fairly evident that the Vietnam issue intensified the split between the Communist governments. Washington was able to act with the freedom it did have because Peking and Moscow, competing for favor and influence in Southeast Asia, especially with Hanoi, could not agree on a combined course of action. Washington, watching closely for any sign of a Chinese-Soviet rapprochement during 1964-1967, instead observed that split broadening and deepening.

Additional background material on the Sino-Soviet dispute will be presented in the following chapter, when the dispute becomes the main sub-

ject of attention. At this time, however, in order more completely to illustrate the relevance of the Sino-Soviet dispute to the Chinese-American interaction, we shall note several important instances in the worsening dispute that undoubtedly were regarded as important in Washington.

Hostility between Chinese and Soviet personnel probably was more serious in 1964 than was generally realized. Although there had been reports of earlier clashes along the border in 1961 and 1962, and even a few as early as 1959, these had not always taken on the appearance of armed clashes between uniformed troops. Rather, they often were small, minor violations of border regulations by the civilian populace. Sometimes, as in 1962, they involved large scale flight of refugees. Later, they took the form of obvious political provocation. And sometimes, the clashes did involve uniformed troops. Incidents over the years occurred from one end of the border to the other. Each side kept a log of the incidents.[152]

Moscow claims that it initiated a proposal for border talks on May 17, 1963, and the two sides began secret consultations on the border problem on February 25, 1964. However, the consultations were not destined to lead to talks. It was thought that the consultations had failed as of

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[152]The U.S.S.R. promulgated its log in 1969: Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, March 6, 1969; Moscow Radio in English to South Asia, March 25, 1969; B. Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions," New Times, March 26, 1969, pp. 8-10; Pravda, March 30, 1969 (also CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 13, April 16, 1969, pp. 3-5); Yuri Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," Trud, March 16, 1969, p. 3 (also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 11, April 2, 1969, p. 4); and Konstantin Simonov, "Thinking Out Loud," Pravda, May 3, 1969. China's log appeared in Renmin Ribao, March 3, 1969; "Report on Border Film," NCNA Domestic Radio, April 13, 1969; and Renmin Ribao, May 24, 1969. For an

May 8, 1964, when the Chinese negotiator walked out. According to a CPSU letter of late 1965, the Chinese representative threatened to solve the problem "with other means," adding "It is not excluded that China will attempt to restore her historic rights."[153]

In late May, 1964, the Soviets accused Peking of stirring up a border feud and committing "gross provocations."[154] On July 10, 1964, Mao Tse-tung told visiting Japanese socialists that

> Some people have said that the Sinkiang area and the territories north of the Amur River must be included in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. is concentrating troops along its border.[155]

In the same conversation, Mao tried to stir the irredentist aspirations of both Japan and West Germany, for he suggested that the Soviet Union not only had no right to the Kurile Islands and to the territory annexed from Poland when that nation's borders were shifted westward at the expense of defeated Germany, but should relinquish them.[156]

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earlier account of some of the "5000" incidents in 1962, see Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., pp. 141-42, 172-76.

[153]Quoted in a "secret" letter from the CPSU Central Committee to East European ruling parties and lower party echelons in the Soviet Union, published in Die Welt (Hamburg), March 21, 1966, Le Monde, March 23, 1966, and The New York Times, March 24, 1966. Much of the letter was known in the West in January, 1966. The New York Times, February 1, 1966.

[154]The New York Times, May 31, 1964.

[155]Sekai Shuho (Tokyo), August 11, 1964, quoted in Doolin, op. cit., pp. 42-44. (Document 14).

[156]Ibid., pp. 43-44.

Moscow must have been immediately aware of Mao's alarming speech,[157] although it seems to have been missed in the West. The speech was not widely promulgated until mid-August,[158] and was not reported in Pravda until September 2, 1964. Therefore, the significance of the remarks of Khrushchev's influential son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, regarding the increasingly military nature of the dispute, in early August, was overlooked. Adzhubei said

> ...on the Soviet frontiers, not only our entire military might but the heart of all our people stand guard--in the West and in the East.[159]

By this time Chou En-lai had been interviewed by a Japanese newsman and had given essentially the same Chinese line.[160] Under the circumstances, it was deemed necessary that Moscow respond directly and officially.

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[157] Mao's remarks were mentioned in Asahi Evening News, July 13, 1964, quoted in ibid.

[158] E.g., note the date of Sekai Shūhō, fn 155.

[159] Adzhubei's remarks were made during a visit to Germany. Der Spiegel (Hamburg), August 3, 1964. The Adzhubei visit may be considered a precursor of Soviet moves in 1969 and 1970. Adzhubei was trying to improve Soviet relations with the West at a time when the Chinese situation looked bleak. He may have been "taking soundings" preparatory to a major Soviet policy shift. Moscow eventually would follow through on this Westpolitik when the Chinese situation reached a crisis stage at the turn of the decade, signing a renunciation-of-force agreement with the Brandt government in 1970.

[160] Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), August 1, 1964, quoted in Doolin, op. cit., pp. 45-46. (Document 16).

Accordingly, Pravda published Mao's July 10th statement and set out to argue the matter publicly. In its refutation of Mao's position, Pravda declared that his demands on the Soviet Union were similar to Hitler's requirement for Lebensraum.[161] Khrushchev personally entered the fray in a speech in Prague a few days later. He challenged Chinese title to Sinkiang, Mongolia, and Tibet, said Soviet frontiers were inviolable, and, noting that Moscow now wielded weapons of unlimited destructive power, said it was dangerous, even criminal, to seek wealth through territorial expansion.[162]

Despite this escalating war of words and intimation of troop movements, and despite their reported breakdown, Sino-Soviet consultations apparently did continue during the summer. According to Moscow, the two sides did reach "agreement in principle" and Moscow proposed, in a note of September 26, 1964, that border talks begin on October 15, 1964. However, according to Moscow, Peking never replied to the notes.[163] Before

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[161] Pravda, September 2, 1964.

[162] Khrushchev's speech in Prague was reported in Pravda, September 5, 1964, also in CDSP, Vol. 16, No. 36 (September 30, 1964) pp. 6-8. For a more detailed examination of this Sino-Soviet summer exchange in 1964, see William E. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, pp. 27-30.

[163] For 1969 retrospective views on the 1964 secret border talks, see Renmin Ribao, March 10, 1969; NCNA Report on Border Film, April 18, 1969; "Statement of the Government of the PRC," Renmin Ribao, May 24, 1969; Major General of Border Troops A.N. Anikushin, "The U.S.S.R. Borders are Inviolable," Sovetskaya Rossia, March 19, 1969, p. 3; Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions;" Soviet government statements and notes in Pravda of March 30, April 11, April 12, and June 14, 1969; and O. Borisov and B. Koloskov, "The Anti-Soviet Course of the Mao Tse-tung Group," Kommunist, No. 7, May 6, 1969, pp. 86-97.

the October 15th convening date, Khrushchev was sent into compulsory retirement. Brezhnev and Kosygin have not acknowledged receiving a Chinese reply. Perhaps Peking considered the consultations overcome by events.

The aggregation of evidence on the border dispute, including reported massing of troops by the Soviets and the prolonged but sporadic consultations, has led to speculation that Khrushchev was contemplating a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear installations and that this, the most "hairbrained" of all Khrushchevian schemes, was the proximate reason for his removal by Brezhnev and Kosygin.[164]

While this speculation may be true in part, it is also true, and perhaps more valid, that Khrushchev's on-going attempt to convene a meeting of the international movement of communist and workers' parties, the purpose of which was to "excommunicate" Peking, was encountering serious opposition among the non-ruling parties--and some of the ruling parties (e.g., Rumania).[165] In short, Khrushchev was open to accusations of al-

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Moscow's September 26, 1964 proposal for border talks on October 15, 1964 should not be confused with Peking's February 29, 1964 proposal for wide-ranging Sino-Soviet talks, to meet October 10-25, 1964, to try to resolve outstanding problems of ideology prior to the Soviet-sponsored international communist conference. On this subject, Moscow then replied to Peking on March 7, Peking answered on May 7, and Moscow again replied on June 15. Devlin, op. cit., Part VI, pp. 47-52, and Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., p. 23.

[164]By Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1966, Chapter 17. Hinton has claimed that the speculation is confirmed by yet unreleased material of which he obtained knowledge. Clemens persuasively disputes the thesis. See Clemens, op. cit., pp. 273-74. Earlier, Griffith had opined that there was insufficient evidence to support Hinton's conjecture. Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., p. 59, fn. 157.

[165]For a more complete account of the varying attitudes of the

lowing party discipline to deteriorate, and this also may have been a factor in his overthrow. Further, continuing discontent over the economy, the crisis in agriculture and continuing opposition to Khrushchevian domestic reform programs, particularly in the bureaucracy, had coalesced. Perhaps most important, the Politburo probably had come to believe that Khrushchev was preparing to abandon the concept of collective leadership.[166] Therefore, he was forced into retirement.

Peking must have been relieved by Khrushchev's replacement. But it quickly became evident that the new group in Moscow was not disposed to cater to Chinese wishes. Nor was Peking willing to accommodate Chinese positions toward Soviet requirements merely to impress Brezhnev and Kosygin.[167] Both sides had too much at stake.

Neither the border dispute nor the major problem posed by Peking's unyielding sponsorship of factions and undisguised competing opposition Marxist-Leninist parties around the world were readily susceptible to resolution.[168] Brezhnev and Kosygin's policy of "no open polemics"

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non-ruling and ruling parties toward the conference and its obvious purpose, see Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 31-41, and Devlin, op. cit., Part VI, pp. 4-9, 33-43. Those parties opposing the conference were not only the pro-Chinese parties but other parties who wished, for reasons of their own, to accent their autonomy from Moscow.

[166]This interpretation follows Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

[167]Gittings, op. cit., pp. 68-72, 97, 101; Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 59-66.

[168]Devlin, op. cit., Part VI, pp. 10-16.

failed resoundingly. In Peking, Chou En-lai said that the new leaders were "much worse than" Khrushchev.[169]

The border situation probably became worse. In 1966, reports circulated in Eastern Europe of over 150 border clashes in 1965. On December 25, 1965, Peking protested to Moscow through diplomatic channels that Soviet troops in Mongolia were harrassing the Chinese border.[170] Renewal of the Soviet-Outer Mongolian Mutual Defense Treaty on January 15, 1966, and subsequent stationing of a 10,000 man Soviet armored unit on the Mongolian-Chinese frontier indicated to Washington that the border dispute continued to be a possible locus of major conflict and that Peking had not moved to ease the situation there. Confirmation came during succeeding months. In March, 1966, Peking rejected an invitation to the CPSU 23rd Congress because the Soviet Party had alleged that China had been encroaching on Soviet territory. On April first an incident occurred on the Sino-Mongolian border. Peking accused the Soviets of trying to find a pretext for aggression.[171] In May, 1966 Chen Yi described the Russians as

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[169] The New York Times, May 2, 1966. Chou had travelled to Moscow to meet Khrushchev's successors. Moscow unenthusiastically described their talks as "frank" and "comradely." [Pravda, November 14, 1964], and Peking later described the Brezhnev-Kosygin policy toward China as no different from Khrushchev's. ["Why Khrushchev Fell," Hongqi, November 21, 1964, English text in Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 387-92.]

[170] Peking Radio in Mongolian, June 20, 1966, reported in Lisann, op. cit., p. 36.

[171] Ibid.

"thieves" who had annexed 1.5 million kilometers of Chinese territory. According to Soviet reports, Chinese troops fired indiscriminately on Soviet ships on the Amur River, and by December, after both sides had reinforced the border, the Soviet Union was estimated to have twelve divisions along the frontier.

In January, 1967, after reports of a clash on the Ussuri River, Moscow accused Peking of wildly provocative behavior in connection with the Cultural Revolution.[172] Soviet border guards reported other incidents in December, 1967.[173] Peking complained of a Soviet "intrusion" onto Chenpao ("Treasure") Island in the Ussuri River on January 23, 1967, and, in 1969, published its version of other border problems during 1967.

In February, 1967, as Mao reportedly warned Chinese frontier guards of a new Soviet build-up,[174] Washington also closely watched the Sino-Soviet dispute over aid to Vietnam. Once again there was to be an initial dispute--and an intensification of it between 1965 and 1967. Moscow has stated that twice during 1965 the Soviet Union proposed a trilateral summit meeting on Vietnam, to consist of North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet leaders, and that Hanoi was agreeable but Peking refused to cooperate. The question of importance here is "What was Moscow's major reason for urging a trilateral summit conference?" Was the Soviet proposal pri-

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[172] Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," op. cit. Also see "Danger of Sino-Soviet Border Conflict Grows," Borba (Belgrade), January 29, 1967, which reported a clash involving Chinese tanks in Sinkiang; and Izvestia, February 1, 1967.

[173] Ibid.

[174] The New York Times, February 12, 1967.

marily aimed at increasing aid to North Vietnam? Or was Moscow trying to euchre Peking into a position where the Chinese had to stand up and be counted in order to retain a semblance of worthiness in the eyes of the International Communist Movement? It seems reasonable to accept affirmative answers to both these questions, but it is difficult to rank one Soviet motive above the other.

Peking refused to come to the meeting, thus accenting the depth of the split with Moscow, but continued to reiterate its whole-hearted support for Hanoi. The Chinese refusal probably resulted in a "devaluation of Chinese stock" held by the Communist parties of the world, except for the strongly pro-Chinese parties. It was becoming possible, at this stage, to begin to see the Vietnam War as a coincident cause for a decline in Chinese prestige and an elevation of Soviet prestige.

Moscow tried to accent this impression by asserting that China hoped to provoke war between the United States and the Soviet Union and then "sit on a hillside and watch the battle of the tigers."[175] Thus China allegedly was obstructing overland shipments from the Soviet Union to Vietnam in order to force more Soviet shipping into the combat zone.

Peking vigorously denied Soviet charges of obstructing shipments and in turn accused Moscow of slandering China. While denying an alleged Soviet request to send four thousand Red Army troops to North Vietnam, to

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[175] *Die Welt* (Hamburg), March 21, 1966, the CPSU C.C. "secret letter." Also see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, No. 2394, Part I, January 16, 1967.

"occupy and use" several air bases in China, and to grant uninhibited overflight rights to the Red Air Force (for reasons of sovereignty), the Chinese nevertheless claimed to have done their "utmost" to facilitate delivery of Soviet military goods free of charge.[176] However, it is fairly certain that the Chinese did restrict Soviet use of Chinese airspace and landing facilities,[177] and may have harassed transient Soviet personnel at these facilities in cases when landing permission was given, moves that must have been very significant to Washington observers. Unconfirmed reports also circulated that Peking had sidetracked Soviet shipments to paint out Soviet identifications and substitute Chinese markings and, in some cases, replace crated new Soviet fighter aircraft with used Chinese fighter aircraft.[178] If true, this was a phenomenon of immediate military significance as well as of mid-range political import.

Military assistance to Vietnam was closely connected to incidents on the Sino-Soviet border. By 1967 the Soviet press was reporting unpleasant incidents between Chinese train crews and Soviet customs officials in connection with its charges of Chinese obstructionism.[179]

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[176]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, December 23, 1965; Peking Review for January 1, January 15, May 6, July 15, 1966, January 27, 1967. The July 15 issue summarizes events until that time. For a list of other references, see Lisann, op. cit., p. 34.

[177]Edward Crankshaw in The Observer (London), November 14, 1965; Bernard B. Fall, "The Year of the Hawks," The New York Times Magazine, December 12, 1965, p. 48.

[178]See Bueschel, op. cit., pp. 90-91.

[179]Mikhail Maguta, "The Far Eastern Frontier," Novosti News Agency, March 13, 1967, in Survey, No. 63, April, 1967, pp. 53-54.

It has been suggested that Peking and Moscow eventually managed to routinize procedures for transshipment of war material across China that were so prominent in 1965.[180] If so, this did not stop polemics concerning Chinese obstructionism.[181]

Additionally, polemicizing on other subjects continued into 1967. Moscow accused Peking of selling steel to the U.S., a charge angrily denied by Peking.[182] Pravda said "Chinese policy was a stab in the back of the heroic Vietnamese people,"[183] in response to which Peking termed the Muscovites "New Disciples of Goebbels."[184] Pravda suggested that China had an understanding with the U.S. over the Vietnam War[185] and Izvestia accused China of agreeing to refrain from helping Vietnam in return for immunity from U.S. invasion.[186]

Peking responded to Soviet charges of U.S.-Chinese collusion by

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[180] Fritz Ermarth, "Continued Tight-rope Walking in Hanoi", Radio Free Europe Research, April 26, 1966, p. 3.

[181] Supra., p. 154.

[182] Peking Review, No. 1, January 1, 1967, pp. 33-34. The Soviet accusation was in Izvestia, December 20, 1966.

[183] Pravda, February 16, 1967.

[184] Peking Review, No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 25.

[185] "Concerning Events in China," Pravda, November 27, 1966, carried in CDSP, Vol. 18, No. 47, December 14, 1966, pp. 3-6, at p. 5.

[186] Izvestia, March 29, 1967.

reiterating charges of U.S.-Soviet collusion. Peking spoke of a "big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy"[187] and accused the Soviets of "trying to sow differences" between Peking and Hanoi.[188]

There was a variety of other aspects to the growing Sino-Soviet dispute as it was caught up in and amplified by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, including hostile demonstrations near the Soviet Embassy in Peking, Red Guards beating up Soviet personnel in Shanghai,[189] and a reciprocal expulsion of students in October, 1966. But the thrust of the major features of the dispute, the border problem and cooperation regarding Vietnam, well illustrated to Washington that Peking was neither changing positions nor giving in to Soviet pressures. As the dispute continued into 1967, CCP factional arguments were reflected and increasingly amplified in the Cultural Revolution. As a result, and upon the achievement of dominance by the Mao group, there was a great sharpening of Chinese policy against the Soviet Union.

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[187] "Observer," "Smash The Big U.S.-Soviet Conspiracy," Peking Review, No. 9, February 24, 1967, pp. 10-12.

[188] Peking Review, No. 11, March 10, 1967, p. 25.

[189] Pravda, September 17, 1966. Large wall posters called for the "burning and skinning of Soviet revisionist personnel." L. Andronov, "Behind The Chinese Cultural Revolution," New Times, December 14, 1966, pp. 11-13. The official Soviet protest over "outrages at the Embassy" was rebroadcast by Moscow Radio Domestic Service in Russian on October 27, 1966. There also were anti-Soviet incidents staged by Chinese students in Moscow. Accounts of these episodes make fascinating reading. See Survey, No. 63, April, 1967, and Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 88-91.

It thus can be concluded that Chinese intransigence toward the Soviet Union, which increased throughout the 1964-1967 period, was an element of major significance in the tacit exchange between Peking and Washington. The deduction by the U.S. was simple: so long as Peking intensified its dispute with Moscow, it would not seek war with Washington--in Vietnam or elsewhere in Asia.[190]

Washington's evaluation of the strategic picture in the Far East in 1964-67 can be regarded as a mirror image of Peking's evaluation. That is to say, if Peking were planning overt military action against the U.S., it probably would not be limited to the Southern perimeter. Rather, a simultaneous advance in the Southwest, South, East, and Northeast would present the U.S. with very serious problems. As the situation developed, prospects for this occurrence became very slim. Not only did the People's Liberation Army under Lin Piao become deeply committed domestically in the Cultural Revolution, it was preoccupied with events on the Sino-Soviet frontier. Peking's consequent unwillingness, or inability, to keep trouble stirring on the Himalayan frontier, to send more than 40,000 construction workers to North Vietnam, to institute effective harassment of

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[190]The following books are especially useful in providing a more detailed picture of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the period 1964-67: Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit.; Gittings, op. cit., pp. 232-86; Clemens, op. cit., Chapter 6, with notes; Robert A. Rupen and Robert Farrell, Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute, New York: Praeger, 1967; Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin, New York: Viking, 1970; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67, New York: Praeger, 1968.

Hong Kong,[191] or to rally with the North Koreans, constituted meaningful tacit signals to Washington that China fully intended to adhere to Mao's early statement that China would not fight unless attacked by American forces. By the end of 1967, Chinese actions had also seemed to substantiate the opinion of some Western experts that Lin Piao's famous speech "Long Live the Victory of People's War" was not as had been commonly accepted, an expansionist doctrine but, rather, a prescription for temporary retrenchment in the face of U.S. militancy and the growing Soviet threat.[192]

Remarks on the Chinese-U.S. Interaction, 1964-1967

The foregoing presentation verifies that Chinese-U.S. relations remained deep in a "hate" node of their historic "love-hate" cycle during the 1964-67 period. Had the Sino-Soviet dispute, a major factor in the tacit exchange, not been intensifying during the period, there is a distinct possibility that Chinese-U.S. interaction could have been much more

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[191]Peking did protest to London the port visits to Hong Kong of U.S. nuclear powered ships and submarines but more or less tolerated U.S. forces' use of Hong Kong as a rest and recreation center. U.S. purchases of material and supplies from Hong Kong vendors ostensibly scandalized Moscow, which used the situation as an example of Chinese-U.S. "collusion" and a Chinese "stab in the back" to North Vietnam.

[192]Lin Piao, op. cit., Cf., David P. Mozingo and Thomas W. Robinson, Lin Piao on "People's War": China Takes A Second Look At Vietnam, Rand Memorandum RM-4814-PR, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1965, and Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965, op. cit., pp. 110-12. These analyses point up Lin's emphasis on self reliance and caution as opposed to the inflammatory allegory of the speech to the effect that the rural areas of the world would encircle and conquer the cities of the world.

dangerous. As it was, events in the military engagement and in the three channels of political dialogue were characterized by continuing high but controlled tension.

The evidence from the military engagement and political dialogue sections of this chapter can be arranged in a simple international tension matrix. The arrangement process is lengthy and space-consuming; therefore the complete matrix will not be set out here. But impressions gained from the process, which has been conducted in draft, can be briefly portrayed.

The international tension matrix is established as follows:

	Perceived by U.S.		Perceived by China	
Tension Amplifying Actions	Date	Event	Date	Event
Tension Diminishing Actions	Date	Event	Date	Event

When events are entered in the matrix, it immediately becomes obvious that there were surprisingly few tension diminishing events in Chinese-U.S. interaction. Almost all entries fall in the tension amplifying row. Those events that objectively might have been described as tension diminishing often were not perceived as such by the opposing side. Their classification as fraudulent, subterfuge, or dissembling by the perceiver effectively moved them to the tension amplifying row of the matrix.

Nonetheless, the two sides were able to stabilize their interactive process at this high level of tension, slipping neither into a major

war nor back toward a more calm and reassuring mode of interaction. It has been shown that the stabilization was a result of considerable overt as well as tacit military and political maneuver by both sides.

Before proceeding to the Sino-Soviet case, it may be well to juxtapose at least the Chinese side of the Sino-American interactive process to the hypotheses on superpower behavior--a partial review prior to the next phase of the analysis. A complete review of both sides of the interactive process from both case studies will be made in Chapter 6.

Hypothesis I proposed in effect that as its nuclear weapons inventory increased, Peking would gauge its initiatives and responses to a level below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder. During the period 1964 to 1967, when the Chinese nuclear capability was small but beginning to grow, Peking cannot be said to have taken an initiative toward nuclear warfare or invoked the prospect of a nuclear response. Chinese military moves at no time seemed to pose the prospect of a surprise nuclear strike.

Although Peking regularly proclaimed the likelihood of a U.S. nuclear attack on China, a Chinese nuclear response was not specifically mentioned. As close as the Chinese leadership ever came to this was the issuance of ambiguous threats, such as "If war breaks out, it will have no boundaries," and "If a Sino-U.S. war breaks out, all Asian countries offering bases to the U.S. will be turned into battle sites...," or equivocal statements such as "The North Vietnamese appreciate our growing nuclear strength." Peking was neither overtly "rattling rockets" nor in-

voking serious threats of nuclear war in these statements, which mentioned neither timing nor method of retaliation.

Were Chou and Chen thinking of people's wars or guerrilla fighting near U.S. bases in the Far East rather than nuclear engagements? We do not know the answer for certain, but must evaluate it as "probably so." Thus, when the Chinese weapons inventory was small, and even after several years of its development, Peking was gauging its initiatives and responses below the nuclear threshold.

Hypothesis II says that as the Chinese nuclear capability grew, Peking would try to develop ready lines of communication with an opponent superpower. Since the Chinese nuclear capability was increasing during the period, it would be expected that Peking would at least keep the communication channels it did have with Washington open, and perhaps try to improve them. The evidence for this hypothesis is ambiguous, but we know that as far as diplomatic channels (the Warsaw ambassadorial meetings) were concerned, Peking publicly had closed them down by 1968 rather than taking steps to improve them.

On the surface, it seems that Peking was acting contrary to the hypothesis, but the facts that either ambassador in Warsaw could summon an emergency meeting at any time, and that both Washington and Peking also could rely on the irregular dialogue or the public dialogue to pass information may mean that Peking halted formal meetings as a political propaganda point in the knowledge that other channels were always open.

In short, Peking cannot be said to have really tried to maintain a ready line of communication. Instead, the Chinese were content to rely on less regularized procedures. By 1968 there was little indication that the larger Chinese nuclear capability had impressed Peking with the need for anything approaching the "Hot Line" concept.

Hypothesis III says that as superpower strategic weapons system inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly ready to undertake arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower designed to limit or reduce arms. There is little in the Chinese-American record during the 1964-1967 period that would tend to support this hypothesis. The Kennedy Administration conducted several "instructional" or "informational" sessions on the U.S. attitude toward arms control during the 1962-1963 Warsaw meetings with China. However, there is no available evidence to indicate that any of the philosophy of arms control or limitation, as opposed to the utopia of general and complete disarmament of nations, was ever assimilated by Peking. Thus in 1964, on the occasion of the first Chinese nuclear test, Peking called for general and complete disarmament. This position was maintained during the remainder of the period.

Hypothesis IV says that when there is a clear and present danger of nuclear warfare, Peking would try to lessen tensions with the opposing superpower through discussion of strategic postures or crisis control measures. Since China's nuclear capability had only begun to grow during 1964-1967, it might be expected that Peking would not really try

to lessen tensions. The political and military interaction has revealed that this is so. Peking, by almost any measure, seemed to prefer a high tension level. Chinese political initiatives and responses were demanding, provocative, and sometimes ambiguously threatening, constituting almost a "zero-sum" dialogue. Chinese military initiatives and responses, while cautious, were nonetheless often defiant and firmly accented the political position taken by Peking that China would fight if attacked. The policy of military restraint could be changed at any time. The overshadowing potential of Chinese military intervention in Vietnam was never long out of Washington's estimates. Although an arrangement was achieved between the two sides, it was not of such rigor or permanence that it could not be unilaterally altered at the whim of hostile Chinese government. Although Peking did not alter its restrained position, its public stance almost always indicated that it might do so. --And thus tension continued very high.

Having reviewed Chinese actions vis á vis the hypotheses in 1964-1967 during conflictive interaction with the U.S., we now turn to an examination of Sino-Soviet conflictive interaction in 1968-1970.

Chapter V

The Chinese-Soviet Interaction, 1968-1970

Introduction

Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction during the period 1968-1970 culminated a dispute with as numerous and complex a set of antecedents as the earlier Chinese-American conflictive interaction. The record of disagreement between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) can be traced well back into the period when Chinese-American intergovernmental relations were at least superficially good. Many Western scholars have looked at the early CCP-CPSU interaction; Mao's often disappointing experience with Stalin has been outlined with some precision, although details from Kremlin and Peking archives remain to be filled in.[1]

It was unlikely that, having gained power only in part through Soviet assistance, the Chinese Communists would forget Stalin's past slights, misinformation, blundering, and perhaps outright treachery, and permanently embrace Moscow as a great champion and brother. After all, Moscow's commitment to Mao had been so weak that Soviet diplomacy, whether or not specifically directed by Stalin, managed to insult Mao on the eve

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[1] Among the usually recommended presentations on the early CCP-CPSU period are Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963, and Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow, New York: Putnam, 1963. Aside from these and numerous standard historical accounts, some recent research by Barton Whaley, including Guerrilla Communications and Soviet Journalists in China, Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 1967 and 1969 (C-67/4 and C-69/31), provides fascinating insight, as, in another sense, does the novel Man's Fate by André Malraux, New York: Vintage, 1961.

of his triumph: the Soviet ambassador remained with the fleeing Chiang government after Mao was established in Peking, until Chiang left for Formosa.

But the trauma of the "loss of China" caused the West, particularly Washington, to discount the past CCP-CPSU record. As far as Washington was concerned, there was a Sino-Soviet monolith. The Korean War cast this view in concrete.

Chinese-Soviet Interaction in Perspective: Increasing Hostility Since 1956

Sino-Soviet relations in the 1950s were superficially quite good, although some indications of political disagreement commenced with the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. We now know that even in the early 1950s an incipient dispute lay just below the surface. Asked why Soviet leaders did not detect a strongly nationalistic and chauvinistic line in Mao's policies much earlier, an influential Soviet policy-maker has written that they did, but ignored it in the hope that over the long run the tendencies would be overcome.[2] Khrushchev, who seemed to be fairly forthcoming with Peking between 1954 and 1958, has revealed

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[2] Mikhail S. Kapitsa, People's China: Two Decades, Two Policies, Moscow: unpublished, 1969. Kapitsa is director of the South-East Asian department of the Soviet foreign ministry and a member of its collegium. His book, unflattering to Mao, reportedly was withheld in view of imminent Soviet-Chinese negotiations in Peking. See The Observer (London), January 11, 1970.

that the Chinese were very difficult to deal with, and that he "was never exactly sure I understood what he [Mao] meant."[3] By 1960 a split was imminent, but the parties themselves, and the knowledgeable membership of the international communist movement, managed to disguise it until 1962-1963,[4] when border clashes occurred[5] and both sides began to publicly air their grievances in now famous lengthy letters and often pungent statements.[6]

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[3]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, Chapter 18. The quote is on p. 466. A panel of experts convened by the State Department has termed these memoirs authentic although British experts have disagreed.

[4]Disguising the split perhaps was not as difficult as it would seem to be on the surface. The manifestations of the split were observable only to those members of the international communist movement who were delegates to major conferences. The delegates kept their own counsel, conference proceedings were closely guarded, and public reporting on the conference proceedings preserved the facade of unity for all but the most astute outside observers. The most extensive treatment of the conferences, with accent on the attempt to preserve the appearance of unity, is in Devlin, op. cit., Part I, p. 3, Part II, p. 8, Part III, p. 38, and Part IV, p. 6.

[5]The 1962 border clashes were mentioned supra., p. 145. We now know that during the 1962 disturbances a Chinese general officer of Turkic nationality, Gen. Zunun Taipov, and part of his Sinkiang Fifth Corps Army fled to the Soviet Union. Taipov subsequently organized the Turkestan Liberation Army and lately has been broadcasting from Alma Ata into Sinkiang Province. The New York Times, February 2, 1970.

[6]One of the more quotable statements was in the editorial "The Fearless Cuban People Are The Most Powerful Strategic Weapon," Renmin Ribao, November 5, 1962:

> The least that should be expected of a Communist is that he should make a clear distinction between the enemy and his own comrades; that he should be ruthless toward

From the border clashes of 1962 until the turn of the decade it has been obvious to everyone, and the Soviets have publicly admitted,[7] that Sino-Soviet relations steadily deteriorated. We have observed part of this deterioration, during the 1964-1967 period, in the previous chapter. Before continuing the examination of Sino-Soviet interaction into the 1968-1970 period, when it becomes of crucial importance to this thesis, let us digress momentarily to identify the underpinnings of the great dispute.

We have noted the ideological aspects of the Chinese-American conflict--the communism vs. "capitalist imperialism" struggle. It is plain that the ideological chasm between China and the Soviet Union is as intense and perhaps as insoluble. Yet it hardly can be postulated that ideology caused the Sino-Soviet split; rather, common ideology probably permitted the two powers to maintain a superficial amicability longer

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> the enemy and amiable towards his own comrades. But some people do just the opposite...They make "sensible compromises" and exercise "moderation" in the face of the sabre-rattling enemy, but refuse to be conciliatory towards fraternal Parties and fraternal countries. To be so "amiable" to the enemy and so "ruthless" towards fraternal socialist countries is obviously not at all the stand a Marxist-Leninist should take.

This paragraph did not appear in the Peking Review abridgement of the editorial. Peking Review, No. 45, November 9, 1962, pp. 12-13.

[7] Kapitsa, op. cit., and numerous speeches by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

than they otherwise could have. Once a split occurred, however, ideology intensified it.[8] Basic differences were, and continue to be, portrayed in ideological terms, whether they concern grand strategy, foreign or domestic policy, "socialist community" responsibilities, negotiating with capitalist states, or territorial boundaries. Ideology, therefore, can be seen as one of at least five major causes of the dispute, the others being, in broad terms (1) foreign policy issues, (2) nationalism issues, particularly irredentist issues, (3) differing stages of economic development, and (4) a dynamic escalation fed by a series of errors of judgment.[9]

Of these five causes, irredentist issues are of most interest to this study. Although compounded by each of the other causes, irredentist activities of several kinds became the proximate cause for the military crisis phase of the dispute in 1969. The two communist nations

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[8] Cf., Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, op. cit., p. 20; Uri Ra'anan, The U.S.S.R. in World Affairs: Problems of a "Communist" Foreign Policy, Cambridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, June, 1968, pp. 1-3; Benjamin Schwartz, "Ideology and the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in Howard Boorman et al., Moscow-Peking Axis, New York: Harper, 1957, pp. 112-41. The essence of the phenomenon is that for a true Communist, as for a true Christian, there should be no distinction between theory and practice.

[9] This reflects the conclusions of Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, (3d Edition), Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, Chapter 16.

share a 4,375 mile border[10] which remains governed by treaties drawn up in the 19th century between Tsarist Russia and the Manchu Dynasty. Since the turn of the century, successive Chinese regimes have regarded these treaties, of Tientsin and Aigun (1858), Peking (1860), and St. Petersburg (Ili) (1881), as "unequal." Through them China surrendered some 600,000 square miles to the Tsars. After the October Revolution, Lenin intimated that the treaties were unequal and in need of renegotiation. His authorship of the Karakhan Declaration of 1920 continues to provide Peking with priceless ammunition. Lenin was preoccupied with more pressing matters; Stalin and his successors conveniently forgot, or discounted, Lenin's "offer."[11] Moscow fell back on the argument that the treaties were the product of historic evolution, were not unequal, and could be modified or changed, but not discarded completely. Between 1949 and 1964, no attempts were made to redefine the border, and, as we have seen, the 1964 negotiations aborted when the Chinese walked out. In the latter half of the 1960s, then, Peking, more and more aggravated over the border

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[10]The Sino-Soviet border runs for 7000 kilometers or 4,375 miles, give or take a few, not including the Chinese border with Outer Mongolia. The Soviet-Outer Mongolian defense pact dates from 1966. If the Chinese-Outer Mongolian border of 4,000 kilometers (2500 miles) is added to the Sino-Soviet common border, each side is responsible for defending 6,875 miles of frontier.

[11]The Government of China and the Soviet Government did sign an agreement in 1924 to hold a conference "within a month" to "redemarcate national boundaries" and to annul and replace all treaties, conventions, etc. It was never held.

and events along it, had no readily available diplomatic recourse. Tension smouldered.[12]

Paralleling the tension between Peking and Moscow over their disputed common frontier was a historic discontent in China over Outer Mongolia, even though China had accepted the Mongolian border in 1962. Moscow's sponsorship of Mongolian independence after World War II rankled Peking; Mongolia's mutual defense pact with Moscow added insult to injury. Peking covets the great land area governed from Ulan Bator. If China and the Soviet Union should go to war, Mongolia might be the ultimate stake in the conflict. It may not be far off the mark to call Mongolia "the hinge of the earth."[13] But Peking's opportunities to turn back the clock on the Mongolian issue were nonexistent. Mongolia was a bone stuck in China's throat, and, in the 1960s, China could not dislodge it.

In the previous chapter, as part of the analysis of the tacit exchange between the U.S. and China during the period 1964-1967, we

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[12]The authoritative work on the territorial dispute is Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Maps and Analysis, Stanford: Hoover Institute Publications, 1965. Also see John W. Wolf, "The Bear and the Dragon," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 95, No. 11 (November, 1969), pp. 84-91; Robinson, op. cit., pp. 2-23; and the highly readable account by Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 54-63, 135-37. A capsule summary that lays the blame for the dispute on Genghis Khan, who "introduced" the Chinese to the Soviets, is in The Washington Post, November 23, 1969.

[13]Salisbury, op. cit., Chapter 1. Chapters 2 and 3 develop Russian and Chinese attitudes toward Outer Mongolia in detail.

chronicled clashes on the Sino-Soviet border that greatly increased tensions between the two powers. Clashes during those years also were shown to have dovetailed into the internal political process of China, including the great disturbance of the Cultural Revolution; and to have reflected significant policy differences between the two states over the best course of action in South-East Asia. In fact, the 1964-1967 period of the Sino-Soviet dispute is an excellent example of how the five major causes of the dispute mesh with each other, effectively reinforcing the dispute and making it a truly Gordian knot.

By the end of 1967 neither Peking nor Moscow had found an Alexandrian solution to their problem. They were deeply bogged down in mutual recrimination that had descended to gutter level. Each saw the other as a vicious slanderer guilty of shameless perfidy; comradeship had been forgotten.

To Moscow, Mao and company were leftist, dogmatic, adventuristic "splitters" who had wrecked the unity of the world communist movement. Moreover, they then had the insolence to proclaim themselves the rightful leaders of the movement! In Peking's view, Kremlin rightist revisionists had revived the line of Bernstein and Kautsky and thus had forfeited all rights to leadership. The Maoists, despite maltreatment at the hands of Stalin, considered themselves the true heirs of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. In Moscow's eyes, however, they were masquerading as Marxists and Mao was a petit-bourgeois with reactionary-utopian leanings who practiced social-chauvinism and glorified authoritarianism, the cult

of personality, and great-Han chauvinism. Moscow saw a threat of "new Khans" to the east while Peking, well aware of Soviet intransigence and opportunism in all border matters, spoke of the arrogance of the "new Tsars." Each seemed sure the other was colluding with imperialists (e.g., the United States). To Moscow the Maoists were "bourgeois provocateurs," while to Peking, Brezhnev and Kosygin had become "handmaidens of the capitalist-imperialists."

It is unnecessary to pursue the matter of mutual recrimination in greater depth at this juncture, for it continued deep into the 1968-1970 period of interaction. We will see more of it. It is important to recognize the severe strain on the Sino-Soviet relationships as the two states entered the period. Conflict potential between them was very high, perhaps higher than that existing between Peking and Washington at the outset of the 1964-1967 period. As in the first case, there was an existing record of conflict, albeit not including an equivalent to the Korean War, and not as yet to our knowledge involving aerial interceptions and casualties. Still, the threat of land battles involving major army units had hung over the borderlands for at least four years, and, unless a way was found to alleviate tensions, threat might become reality.

The most important factor in the conflict situation concerned possible use of nuclear weapons. By 1968, the Soviet decision to augment Red Army strategic and tactical nuclear forces, that probably had been taken some time soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was bearing

fruit. Soviet forces were armed with a variety of nuclear weapons that far outclassed the meagre nuclear stores of the PLA. By 1968, however, the Chinese nuclear arsenal also had grown. The PLA might have had available between fifty and one hundred nominal-yield weapons and a few thermonuclear weapons. Despite its comparatively primitive delivery capability, Moscow had to take the Chinese force into account.

Recrimination and argumentation were not a means for either side to cut their Gordian knot. Was force, even nuclear force, a better answer? Could astutely managed combinations of force and diplomacy solve, or alleviate, the problem? Could Peking achieve an arrangement with Moscow similar to that which apparently had been reached with Washington two to three years earlier? In view of China's increasing nuclear capability, would Peking want an arrangement or a final solution? Would nuclear forces help or hinder diplomacy in achieving an arrangement or a solution?

The examination of Sino-Soviet political-military interaction during the period 1968-1970, which follows, is designed to shed light on these questions. The format of this examination is the same as that employed in Chapter 4. Patterns and progress of military engagement will be examined initially, followed by a detailed account of the political dialogue between the two. The chapter will conclude with a chronicle of the Sino-Soviet tacit exchange. In carrying out this plan, as will be recalled, it is necessary to present a chronological account of events in each section and sub-section. At the end of a section or

sub-section, therefore, the reader must be prepared to flash back in time to the beginning of the 1968-1970 period to begin the next section. We are sub-dividing the total Sino-Soviet political-military interaction and examining each component with a view toward increasing our knowledge of the whole.[15]

I. Patterns and Progress of the Chinese-Soviet Military Engagement

The Conventional Engagement

The Chinese-American pattern of military engagement during the years 1964 to 1967 emphasized aerial activity. The Chinese-Soviet pattern in 1968-1970 is significantly different in that combat between ground units was the center of attention. This is not to say that air and naval forces (or merchant shipping) were not occasionally involved, for they were. But ground conflict predominated, and unlike the small, covert activities conducted by Chinese Nationalist and possibly U.S. intelligence organizations which came in contact with mainland defense forces, the Soviet-Chinese ground engagements often involved major units of uniformed troops sometimes supported by air, armor, and artillery.

In developing this account of the Chinese-Soviet military engagement, it has not been possible to derive a table similar to that in Chapter 4 because the data is much less specific. It has been possible

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[15] Supra., pp. 13-14, discusses the analog for this presentation.

to determine when most of the major engagements occurred with some, albeit imperfect, reliability. But accurate accounts either of the forces involved in those engagements or of the losses sustained by each side are not available. Yet it is surprising that we have even a little information from the two "closed" societies. As their dispute intensified in 1969, each side released information on military clashes for polemic purposes, making the Western researcher's job somewhat rewarding. Undoubtedly incomplete, it is believed that available Sino-Soviet data nevertheless is sufficient to provide legitimate assistance to this study.

There seems to have been a rather common impression that the major Sino-Soviet military clashes in the Spring and Summer of 1969 were a sudden phenomenon following a lengthy lull along the border.

There have been attempts to impute special significance to them for that reason only. For instance, the March 2, 1969 engagement at Chenpao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River has been analysed in light of the political dispute between East and West Germany over West German presidential elections in West Berlin.[16] The March 2nd engagement also has been described as the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations because it seemed to be the most serious battle between them thus far, therefore

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[16]Peter Mayer, Why The Ussuri? Reflections on the Latest Sino-Soviet Fracas, Waltham, Mass: Westinghouse Electric Corporation Advanced Studies Group, December 1969. ASG Monograph No. 1. The Soviets made the same connection: D. Volsky, "The Peking Anti-Sovieteers," New Times, No. 11, March 19, 1969, pp. 3-5.

requiring considerable speculation as to why it occurred.[17] This section attempts to place the 1969 incidents in context, after which it might be agreed that all the 1969 incidents, not simply the March clashes, constituted a nadir of Sino-Soviet relations.

The reader will recall the border clashes on the Ussuri River islands in December, 1967, mentioned in the previous chapter.[18] These eastern clashes evidently continued into January, 1968 when border units reportedly engaged each other with "cold weapons," knives, bayonets, and other blades.[19] Casualty figures are not available. In Sinkiang, also around New Year's Day, 1968, a contemptuous but not bloody clash occurred when Chinese officers in a jeep tried to ram a human chain of Soviet border guards. The guards did not move so the Chinese tied oily rags to the jeep and smudged the Soviet uniforms.[20] Incongruous as this incident might be, it exemplified the generally deteriorating situation. Reports from Hong Kong in February indicated that the frontier was deeply troubled.[21] In March, 1968, the Commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Military

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[17] Robinson, op. cit., pp. 41-74.

[18] Supra., p. 152.

[19] Kapitsa, op. cit.

[20] The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1968. Dispatch by Robert Keatly from Alma Ata entitled "Hate Thy Neighbor."

[21] The Washington Post, February 26, 1968.

District wrote that "the ceaseless provocations of the Mao Tse-tung clique now, more than ever, revive the real danger of a new world war..."[22]

Also in March, 1968, Sino-Soviet attention turned to marine matters. Chinese port officials detained the Soviet tanker Komsomolets Ukrainy in the Wampu River. After ten days' detention, Moscow registered a diplomatic protest.[23] Peking responded with a protest charging a Soviet mate with photo-espionage, which was hotly denied by Moscow.[24] The tanker was released on April 5, along with its alleged spy. Moscow retaliated by expelling a Chinese citizen who had "taken unauthorized pictures" near Tashkent.[25]

There were other marine problems. During the summer navigation season in the Amur Basin, Peking subsequently charged

> Their Soviet gunboats on the Heilung and Ussuri Rivers have more than once borne down at full steam on small wooden fishing sampans, overturning them...They have

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[22]Col. Gen. Losik, the Commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District originally published the statement in the Dalniy Vostok (Khabarovsk). It was broadcast by Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian on March 16, 1968.

[23]Moscow, Tass International Service in English, April 3, 1968; The New York Times, April 4, 1968. This was the third Soviet ship detained in 18 months.

[24]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, April 5, 1968; Le Monde, The Times (London), and The New York Times, April 6, 1968; The Washington Post, April 13, 1968; Izvestia, April 13, 1968.

[25]Moscow, Tass International Service in English, April 8, 1968; The New York Times, April 9, 1968.

> unbridledly intercepted Chinese ships going about their normal business. They went so far as to open fire on Chinese buoy boats...[26]

The summer of 1968 must have been tense. Chinese officials alerted all border patrols to guard against Soviet sabotage attempts.[27]

Soviet air activity seems to have become increasingly provocative during the summer. Whether either the PLAAF or the Red Air Force suffered losses during air battles is not known. Soviet air action may have been designed to deter or disperse Chinese demonstrations or other activity along the border. On September 16, Peking registered a diplomatic protest with Moscow charging 29 intrusions into Chinese airspace over Heilungkiang Province between August 9th and 29th, and 119 airspace violations during the preceeding year. Soviet aircraft, Peking said, penetrated three kilometers at the farthest, and five kilometers at the longest.[28] After a lengthy delay, Moscow categorically denied the Chinese allegations.[29] Chou En-lai mentioned the Soviet violations of Chinese airspace in a speech of September 30, 1968, stating that they "constantly created border tension." Moreover, he charged that Moscow was building-up massive troop concentrations on the Sino-Soviet and

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[26]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 27, 1969.

[27]Taipei, CNA in English, May 17, 1968.

[28]The Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1968.

[29]Moscow, Tass International Service in English, October 31, 1968.

Sino-Mongolian frontiers.[30]

Reflecting Chou's apprehension, General Wang-mao, Chinese Northeastern Sinkiang Regional military commander, said

> Should the Soviet revisionists dare to attack us, we will wipe them out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly, and completely.[31]

On the Soviet side of the border authorities also began to stress preparation for conflict.[32]

In the late fall, Sino-Soviet tension was manifested overseas. Chinese and Soviet sailors reportedly skirmished in Haiphong and North Vietnamese authorities had to schedule alternate liberty days.[33]

By year's end, Peking had become strident over an alleged continuing heavy Soviet military build-up, further airspace intrusions, and constant tension on the border.[34]

Winter brought heavy ice to the waterways of the Amur Basin and, with it, an opportunity for direct clashes between frontier forces. China charged eight Soviet "intrusions" on disputed Chenpao (Damansky)

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[30] The Washington Post, October 13, 1968.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Kazakhstan was alerted. The New York Times, September 8, 1968.

[33] The Washington Post, November 17, 1968.

[34] "Renegade Features of Soviet Revisionists Once Again Exposed," Peking Review, No. 52, December 27, 1968, pp. 21-22. The Christian Science Monitor, November 11, 1968.

Island during January and February.[35] Soviet helicopters, armored cars, and vehicles apparently also patrolled disputed Chili Ching and Kapotzu Islands, near Chenpao Island, during the winter, further aggravating Peking. Soviet troops allegedly assaulted and wounded Chinese frontier troops, seized arms and ammunition, demolished houses and destroyed their furnishings.[36] Moscow later charged "repeated" violations of the Soviet border by Chinese troops near the island in January and February.[37]

Before the Spring thaw, an armed clash on Chenpao Island resulted in more than bruised or wounded participants. On March 2, 1969, in what has since been commonly regarded as an ambush (echoing the argument of the Soviet press), but which Peking regards as a legitimate and heroic defensive stand, (the Chinese press gave much less informative and more hysterical coverage), a two hour engagement resulted in the death of thirty-one Soviet Border Guards and an undetermined number

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[35] Peking, NCNA, Film Report on Border, April 18, 1969.

[36] Ibid.; "Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique Directs Soviet Frontier Guards Flagrantly to Intrude Into Areas of Chenpao Island, Heilungkiang Province, China, and Open Fire, Killing And Wounding Chinese Frontier Guards," "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China," Renmin Ribao, March 4, 1969 (translation in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) 4372, March 10, 1969, pp. 19-20); "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969;" and "Down With The New Tsars," Renmin Ribao, March 3, 1969 (translation in SCMP 4373, March 11, 1969, pp. 17-19.) The cited incidents occurred before the March 2 clash which triggered the Chinese protest.

[37] Pravda, March 8, 1969; Sovetskaya Rossia, March 9, 1969.

of Chinese Frontier Troops. Fourteen Soviet guards and perhaps forty Chinese troops were wounded. About 300 Chinese camouflaged troops initially opposed a Soviet patrol of eight or nine men. However, the patrol was augmented by additional troops in armored cars after the battle started. Soviet forces apparently drove the Chinese off the island, and then vacated it themselves.[38]

After a fortnight during which Soviet forces in the Far East were put on alert and both sides rushed reinforcements to the area, Chenpao Island was the scene of a major battle. Armor and artillery was employed, and the units involved were of regimental size (around 2000 Chinese reportedly participated; a colonel commanded Soviet forces). The battle lasted seven to nine hours, after which casualties were about 800 Chinese and sixty Soviet soldiers (including the Soviet commander).[39]

Neither of these battles, as far as we know, involved the use of close air support. However, it was revealed in Washington sometime later that after the battles Soviet aerial reconnaissance of the border was markedly increased, to about 20-25 flights per day.[40]

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[38]A resumé of this incident has been compiled from a comprehensive list of Soviet and Chinese sources by Thomas W. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 35-37. U.S. coverage was in The New York Times, March 3, 4, and 5, 1969. A later summary, based on more data, is in The Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1970.

[39]Robinson, op. cit., pp. 38-40.

[40]The New York Times, March 30 and April 12, 1969.

Further eastern border clashes occurred, including another in March at Sui-fen-ho, where the Harbin-Vladivostok railway crosses the border, but the focus of conflict moved to the Sinkiang border. Whether these Sinkiang incidents, on April 16, 17, and 25, and May 2, 1969, were as bloody as those on the Ussuri River is not known. On May 12-15 action switched back to the Amur Basin: there was a major battle at Weipalao Island in the Heilungkiang River. Reverberations occurred on May 25 and 28. Back on the Sinkiang border, incidents occurred on May 20th near Yehhsikai and Tahcheng.

On June 10, 1969, near the north end of the Dzungarian Gates in the Barluk Mountains of Sinkiang Province, according to Peking, a Chinese shepherd was killed and another kidnapped. Moscow's version agreed on locale but said a Chinese citizen and a group of Chinese servicemen had entered Soviet Semipalatinsk Province illegally.[41]

Pacha (Goldinsky) Island in the Amur River near Khabarovsk was the scene of a battle on July 8, 1969. Soviet gunboats as well as troops were involved. Moscow announced the death of one river worker;

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[41] An official record of Sino-Soviet border clashes from March 2 through June 10, 1969 is contained in Chinese and Soviet diplomatic notes and official statements of mid-June. See "Chinese Protests to U.S.S.R. Over Border Incidents of June 10," Peking Review, No. 24, June 13, 1969, pp. 4-5, which contains Peking's diplomatic notes of June 6th and 10th; "Note of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Pravda, June 12, 1969, and "Statement of the U.S.S.R. Government," Pravda, June 14, 1969. These documents are translated in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 24, July 9, 1969, pp. 9-13. For U.S. reportage on the June incidents, see The New York Times, June 12 and 15, 1969.

three more were wounded. Chinese casualties were not reported, but Peking accused the Soviet landing party of burning a house.[42]

According to Peking, Pacha Island continued to be the scene of Soviet provocation. Red Army aircraft and Red Navy gunboats reportedly "harrassed" the island throughout July. Peking also complained of forty serious Soviet intrusions of Chinese airspace, and, in inimitable Chinese fashion, statistically recorded Soviet firing:

Date	Place	Firing Activity
June 1--July 31	Weipalao Island, Heilungkiang Prov.	1743 bursts, 1067 single shots
June 1--July 31	Chenpao Island	1116 bursts, 943 single shots
July 22--July 31	Chili Ching Island Heilungkiang Prov.	303 bursts, 18 single shots
July 26	Chili Ching Island	Heavy artillery fire

The month of July ended with a reported Soviet incursion into China in the Hochiaok area, Toli County, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. A Soviet helicopter, military vehicles, and approximately one hundred soldiers were said to have entered China and opened fire.[43]

Probably the greatest military engagement in the 1968-1970 period occurred on August 13, 1969 in the Tientiekti area of Yumin County, Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Chinese forces, attacked by two

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[42]"July 8 Protest Note," Peking Review, No. 28, July 11, 1969, p. 6; The New York Times, July 9, 1969; The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1969.

[43]"Chinese Government Lodges Strong Protest With Soviet Government," Peking Review, No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 4-5.

Soviet helicopters, dozens of tanks and armored vehicles, and several hundred troops, suffered many killed and wounded.[44] Had the Soviet striking force wished to go further, it probably could have done so.

After the August 13th engagement Peking accused Moscow of 429 provocative incidents on the border during June and July, ranging from flights of aircraft to attacks by troops.[45] Not to be outdone, Moscow charged 488 border provocations by China during July and August.[46]

While the opponents were exchanging these charges, however, major events in train on the diplomatic front soon halted the pattern of military engagement. (These diplomatic events will be examined below in the section on the political dialogue.) For all practical purposes military engagements had ceased by September. On October 1st, an authoritative source reported that both sides were withdrawing from "...neuralgic points on the Ussuri and Amur Rivers and on the Kazakhstan and

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44"Chinese Protest of August 13," Peking Review, No. 33, August 15, 1969, p. 7; SCMP 4479, August 20, 1969, p. 29; The New York Times, August 14 and 17, 1969. The best situation maps for following the March to August incidents are in the I.S.S.' Strategic Survey, 1969, p. 69. A number of The New York Times reports cited are accompanied by excellent maps.

45"Peking August 19 Note," Peking Review, No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 4-5; The New York Times, August 20, 1969.

46Tass International Service in English, September 10, 1969; The New York Times, September 11, 1969. In 1970, sources in Moscow referred to 6,000 incidents on the border from January through August, 1969. Koervendy, op. cit.

Sinkiang border."[47]

During the remainder of 1969 and through 1970 little information on Sino-Soviet military engagements can be found. There may have been a few clashes along the frontier, but their number and seriousness remains concealed from public view.[48] Military escalation, fed by a five-month series of infantry/armor firefights, with dead and wounded on both sides, was ended. This is not to say that tension automatically diminished. The possibility of further escalation, however, was greatly reduced.

One of several factors that pointed to continued high tension on the frontier was the apparently continuing large-scale reinforcement that had been conducted by both sides. In the earlier Chinese-U.S. case, we observed a tremendous build-up of U.S. forces in Vietnam that was not matched by a corresponding movement of Chinese troops or naval and air forces. In the Chinese-Soviet case, however, both sides conducted major force redispositions. (The redeployments, or what we know of them, will be examined more thoroughly below in the section on the tacit exchange.) As a result, by the end of 1969 the border confrontation involved much larger, stronger, and more versatile units glaring at one another

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[47] Belgrade, TANJUG International Service from Moscow, October 1, 1969.

[48] The Chrisitan Science Monitor, March 21, 1970. Charlotte Saikowski from Moscow. Ljubljana Delo (Belgrade), July 16, 1970, p. 4, a report by Moscow correspondent Marjan Sedmak. Koervendy, op. cit., reported 30 incidents between September 1969 and August 1970, none involving shooting. I have been unable to find any references to actual border combat in Soviet or Chinese sources since September, 1969.

across the frontier.

We must presume, in view of our inadequate information, that the force build-up included the introduction of new conventional weapons systems by a least the Soviet side, although Peking also may have upgraded Chinese forces wherever possible. It is fairly certain that the Red Army was completely re-equipped, sometimes twice, between 1960 and 1969.[49] In view of the deteriorating situation on the border during the 1968-70 period, Red Army commanders would have been unwise not to bring their latest equipment to troubled areas. On the other hand, the PLA was not completely re-equipped during the 1960s, largely because the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 seriously crippled Peking's armament industry. Even so, PLA commanders could be expected to position their best equipment in most crucial locales.[50]

Unlike the Chinese-U.S. pattern of military engagement during 1964-1967, when latest model U.S. equipment was not often placed in direct opposition to Chinese forces, it is highly probable that latest production line weapons systems, such as the Mach-3 MiG-23 interceptor and Sagger anti-tank missiles, were immediately deployed to frontier defense units. Available information does not reveal whether any of these new weapon systems were used in combat during the crisis of 1969.

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[49] I.S.S., The Military Balance, annual issues through 1970-1971.

[50] See The Military Balance, 1970-1971, pp. 99-101, for the I.S.S. estimate on current deployments on the Sino-Soviet border. China's most modern tank is a version of the Soviet T-54. Red Army armored units now have the T-62.

The Nuclear Warfare Option

Turning to the possibility of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the military engagement, we find, initially, an existing situation remarkably similar to that between Chinese and U.S. forces in 1967. Soviet forces included organic tactical nuclear-armed components[51] that completely overshadowed the small Chinese nuclear capability. In addition, there were Soviet IRBMs in the Far East. The existence of these missiles was revealed late in 1970, when some of them reportedly were taken out of service.[52] Their targets presumably included U.S. installations in Alaska, but if the missiles were designed with a 360° -azimuth launching capability, they also could be targeted on Chinese installations. At the apex of the Soviet nuclear capability were the Strategic Rocket Forces, which, it must be presumed, also could target Chinese as well as U.S. sites.

According to travelers on the Trans-Siberian railway, who observed major construction in progress in several Soviet areas, there is little doubt that missiles targeted on China were being installed. Other construction, in Mongolia near Choibalsan, in a limited-access area, also may contain launching sites.

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[51] The Military Balance, 1970-1971, p. 8.

[52] U.S. Department of Defense spokesman J.W. Friedheim, reported in The New York Times, December 17, 1970.

> It is difficult to believe that the Soviet and Mongolian missile installations which have been rushed into completion along the Chinese frontiers have not been armed with nuclear warheads...[53]

Concurrently, however, it was unknown whether there were Chinese nuclear missiles, even of short range, installed and targeted on Soviet installations. By 1968, China could have deployed such weapons, although aircraft nuclear delivery systems presumably remained more important to Peking.

> ...It is an intelligent guess that nuclear missiles are in place on the Chinese as well as the Russian side... The presumption on which Soviet plans are being made is that China has done just that [installed nuclear missiles].[54]

By the end of the 1968-1970 period, verification of a small but ready medium-range ballistic missile deployment by the Chinese came from "senior government analysts" in Washington.

> A small number of 600-1000 mile range missiles <u>have been</u> installed at long-active Chinese test-launch sites .....Except for the <u>recent discovery</u> of a few such missiles kept in readiness at test-launch pads, however, no broad deployment has been discovered.[55]

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[53] Salisbury, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 153. This report was published in the Fall, 1969. Salisbury's trip into Mongolia was in 1969.

[54] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 170.

[55] <u>The New York Times</u>, November 23, 1970. (Italics added.)

Therefore, there can be little question but that the pattern of Soviet-Chinese military engagement during 1968-1970 was distinguished by prominent nuclear overtones. The crucial questions, however, are "How willing was either side to use these weapons?" and "How near did the opposing forces come to firing them?" Obviously there was not a nuclear exchange. But did Peking offer Moscow a special "no-first-use" pledge, as it had done earlier to Washington? What about Moscow's posture? Were the Soviets leaning toward a premptive strike?

Military secrecy surrounds the answers to these questions. However, indications of the intentions of each party may be garnered from their political dialogue and the tacit exchange between them. We turn next to the Sino-Soviet political dialogue.

II. The Political Dialogue

Following the analog utilized in the previous chapter, our examination of the Sino-Soviet political dialogue during the 1968-1970 period will be conducted in three parts: the irregular dialogue; the public dialogue; and the diplomatic dialogue. Once again, it is emphasized that there is considerable inductance, or "cross-talk," not only between these three categories, but between them and the patterns of military engagement and the tacit exchange in the two-nation interaction.

The Irregular Dialogue

The irregular dialogue between Peking and Moscow has to be seen in much more complex terms than the irregular dialogue between Peking and Washington. This is not because our knowledge of what occurred is greater. Once again, only the tip of a great submerged iceberg of events probably is viewable. But the irregular Sino-Soviet dialogue has certain aspects absent from the Chinese-U.S. irregular dialogue. Among these are: (1) "mutual subversion," which, in its military aspects (occasional guerrilla activity) might be applicable in the preceeding section;[56] (2) two favorite means of esoteric communication between communist states, historic analogy and the use of surrogates to conduct an argument, both of which came into play during the 1968-1970 period; (3) actions by governing Communist hierarchies on party as well as state levels, a convenient facility in times of interstate crisis; and (4) Communist governmental expressions routed through easily disavowable "agents," which can include Western visitors to the Soviet Union, correspondents from socialist countries, or other once-or-twice removed personages.

Instances of the usage of each of these channels of the irregular dialogue by both sides will be brought out in the following presentation.

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[56]It will be recalled that certain U.S.-Chinese Nationalist covert military activities against China were mentioned in the military engagement section of Chapter 4.

Reports in 1968 indicated that both Peking and Moscow were backing clandestine political organizations in the other's territory. Peking supported a so-called "Stalinist Group" in the Soviet Union. This group circulated an article calling for a Cultural Revolution in all Communist countries. A Moscow-sponsored "Marxist-Leninist League" debuted in China at about the same time, circulating a ten-point anti-Maoist platform.[57] A "Ghengis Khan Combat Corps," which may have been in collusion with Moscow, was operating in Inner Mongolia (in China), allegedly caching weapons and asserting Mongolian nationalism. Its leader may have been (or is) Ulanfu, a previously pro-Mao Mongolian prince who had been deposed by Maoists in 1967. Dissident Chinese groups also began to operate in Sinkiang Province and Tibet, some of them from mountain lairs.[58] Whether or not these groups were linked to the Soviet-based Free Turkestan Movement, led by General Zunun Taipov from Alma Ata, is not known.[59] Inasmuch as Taipov's radio transmitters were telling listeners in Sinkiang about Chinese atrocities and oppression, the possibility of a connection is strong.

Between the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the

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[57]Ting Chu-yuan, "Organizations for Mutual Subversion in the Peiping-Moscow Conflict," Issues and Studies, Vol. 10, No. 12 (September, 1968), pp. 1-10; Peking Review, May 17, 1968, pp. 20-24.

[58]See The Washington Post, February 26, 1968.

[59]The New York Times, February 2, 1970, carries a lengthy report on the Free Turkestan Movement; Taipov's article, "Maoist Outrages on Uighur Soil," appeared in New Times (Moscow), No. 32, July 9, 1969, pp. 11-12.

activities of these Moscow-sponsored clandestine groups, turmoil was great throughout China during 1968. We do not know of equivalent disturbances in the Soviet Union during the same time period.[60] Chinese subversive efforts among the nationalities on the Soviet side of the border may not have paid off as well, or, if they did, Moscow successfully repressed publicity.

On Peking's part, however, there was comparatively less radio agitation of groups across the border,[61] a tactic heavily used by Moscow. In fact, Moscow, besides broadcasting enormous quantities of anti-Maoist, anti-Chinese polemics in Chinese during 1968 and 1969, made a fetish of reporting every Chinese domestic disturbance that came to its attention. Whether Moscow's radioed reports of riots and civil strife were meant as signals for further anti-Maoist unrest, or were simply Soviet gloating over Peking's problems, is not ascertainable,[62] but the Soviet practice

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[60] There was an armed uprising in Uzbekistan in 1962, a workers demonstration in Kazakhstan in 1967, and reports of worker unrest there in 1968.

[61] Peking did publish some agitation. E.g., "Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique is Biggest Exploiter and Oppressor of Central Asian and Kazak Peoples," Peking Review, No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 31-33.

[62] Soviet broadcasts, which easily could be regarded as inflammatory by Chinese authorities, originated not only in Moscow but from Tashkent, Alma Ata, and other transmitters along the border. Instances of Soviet "news" on Chinese unrest can be found in the reports of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service throughout the 1968-1970 period. Their peak frequency and intensity was during April-August, 1968, corresponding to the final great disturbances of the Cultural Revolution.

surely made Peking suspicious--and furious.[63] The fact that unrest was prominent in Sinkiang Province, the locale of Chinese atomic energy facilities, surely aroused Peking's concern. However, so far as can be ascertained, neither Soviet-sponsored subversion nor Soviet agitation of Chinese domestic difficulties significantly altered the Chinese nuclear weapons program. The Chinese test schedule proceeded normally.

On the other side of the border, Chinese subversive machinations have been studiously ignored in the Soviet press; we do not have reliable information on their extent or effectiveness, or how Soviet authorities have handled them.[64] Moscow has been seriously concerned, sometimes publicly, about Peking's attempts to establish "splinters" of Communist parties throughout the world, and has attempted to thwart these Peking-sponsored factions by any and all means.[65] Nevertheless Peking's efforts to subvert various national Communist parties have met with some success; there are numerous Maoist splinter parties of varying strengths in the world today.

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[63] Cf., Lisann, op. cit., pp. 33, 40. Lisann believes that, at least until February, 1967, the pacing and form of the Cultural Revolution probably owes more to Moscow than Peking.

[64] Radio Moscow once reported that Peking's budget for subversion was about $500 million a year, but on May 19, 1968 said that the so-called "Stalinist Group" existed only in Peking's imagination. Ting Chu-yuan, op. cit., p. 3.

[65] "James Bond, Peking Style," New Times, No. 8, February 26, 1969, p. 27.

The result of mutual subversion seems to have been some domestic discomfort and governmental aggravation, more so in China than in the Soviet Union. As far as its ultimate purpose was concerned, that is, bringing about change in the opposing regime, subversion has had little observable effect. Moscow and Peking presumably each know of residual sympathizers in the higher echelons of the other's goverment whose cultivation might have gone further toward bringing about governmental policy change than did any form of subversion. In fact, subversion unquestionably detracted from persuasive efforts of Russophile or Sinophile elements, and thus was counterproductive.

As the subversive aspect of the irregular dialogue was an element of aggravation, so was the use of disavowable threats against the opposing state. These threats appeared throughout the 1968-1970 period. They were more flagrantly employed by Moscow than by Peking.

Much of Moscow's pressure on Peking utilized the rationale behind the Brezhnev Doctrine as a lever of justification. This doctrine, promulgated as an ex post facto justification for the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, was a decree of limited sovereignty in the Socialist world. Brezhnev probably was not its author,[66]

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[66]The Brezhnev Doctrine, which, it should be noted, is a Western appellation, first appeared in an article by S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968, translated in CDSP, Vol. 20, No. 39 (October 16, 1968), pp. 10-12, and reprinted in Robin A. Remington, Winter in Prague, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, pp. 412-16 (Document 65).

nor was the premise of subordinating international law to the law of the class struggle anything new.[67] But the application of the doctrine was immediately obvious to those capitals who had cause to fear Moscow: Bucharest, Belgrade, Tirana--and Peking. Thus the Chinese leadership immediately denounced Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe, and the other capitals began to look to their defenses.

Moscow had earlier postulated a precursor to the Brezhnev Doctrine, and indicated its possible applicability in the Far East. In April, 1968, Kommunist, the CPSU theoretical journal, noted that

> Events in China are not exclusively an internal affair. The policies of Mao Tse-tung's group are detrimental to the cause of socialism and revolution in the whole world because, first of all, they draw China away from the Socialist System and convert her into a force hostile to the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries...[68]

Thus Peking quickly countered the possibility of a Soviet grand design through its surrogate, Tirana. On September 13, 1968, the Albanian National Assembly passed legislation condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact.

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[67] Pointed out by Remington, op. cit., p. 411. Dr. Remington's analysis includes references to several other authoritative commentaries on the Brezhnev Doctrine.

[68] "The Roots of Present Events in China," Kommunist, No. 6 (April, 1968), pp. 102-13. (Italics added.) The quote is on p. 102.

The outraged Albanians invoked Chinese help: Premier Hoxha noted that China's atomic weapons, hydrogen bombs, and guided missiles served to defend not only the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China "but also its allies."[69] Chairman of the Council of Ministers Mehmet Shehu said

> If you touch our borders, you must know that to defend Albania the aid which will come to Socialist Albania will not recognize state boundaries...[70]

The Albanian policy statements may be regarded as Chinese statements promulgated to Moscow "by indirection." They were echoed, of course, in the Chinese press.[71]

The Chinese-Albanian alliance involved more than words. A Chinese trade delegation visited Albania from September 29th to November 20th. The resulting agreement was termed "of extraordinary importance, not only in terms of volume, but...in terms of its political content and its high quality."[72] As a result of the agreement, "a number of important objects and new branches of industry will be

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[69]Press Release of the People's Republic of Albania Mission to the United Nations of October 15, 1968, the text of a speech by Enver Hoxha on September 30, 1968, pp. 3-4.

[70]Ibid., dated October 18, 1968, the text of Shehu's speech of September 12, 1968, p. 27. In this speech Shehu officially denounced the Warsaw Treaty.

[71]E.g., see Peking Review, issues 36-39, 1968.

[72]Information Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Tir.), 1969, pp. 57-68.

created."[73] There was some conjecture as to the nature of these "objects."[74] Speculation that they might be military in nature was enhanced by the November 28th visit to Tirana of the PLA Chief of Staff Huang Jun Shen and top-ranking staff officers. However, the extent of Chinese military aid to Albania in 1969 and 1970 has not been confirmed.

The irregular dialogue continued in this vein until after Sino-Soviet hostilities had commenced in March, 1969, when a major change ensued. After the initial clash, the Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) underlined the gravity Moscow saw in the situation by pointedly alluding to the Soviet nuclear capability in the Far East.[75] When border clashes increased in intensity toward the end of the Summer, 1969, Pravda, the party daily, warned "the Chinese people" that Mao was "courting nuclear war."[76]

Concurrently, rumors were rife that Moscow had bluntly queried Warsaw Pact member nations as to how they would regard Soviet use of

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[73] Zëri i Popullit, November 23, 1968.

[74] E.g., The New York Times, November 29, 1968 and The Boston Sunday Globe, December 8, 1968 speculated on Chinese military assistance to Albania including troops and missiles.

[75] Krasnaya Zvezda, March 8, 1969.

[76] "Peking's Adventurist Course," Pravda, August 28, 1969, also carried in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 35, September 24, 1969, pp. 3-5.

atomic weapons on China.[77]

Strangely enough, Moscow's threats in the irregular channel continued after China probably had agreed to negotiate the border dispute. In fact, nuclear threats were issued during a period when routine polemics had been phased down by both sides. On September 16, 1969 an unusually and significantly entitled article "Will Russian Rockets Czech-Mate China," datelined Moscow, appeared in the London Evening News. Its author was the unorthodox Soviet foreign correspondent who had visited Taipei for discussions with the Chinese Nationalists about a year earlier, Victor Louis.[78] The article reported a "common assumption" in Moscow that "Soviet nuclear rockets are pointed at Chinese nuclear installations" and continued

> There is no doubt that the tactic of scorched earth will be applied to Chinese territory whenever there is an attack by a small Chinese group...

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[77]To my knowledge, this Moscow query has never been seen in writing. However, there were numerous reports of the query, for example, Joseph C. Harsch in The Christian Science Monitor, September 2, 1969, who said that a high official of the intelligence community had mentioned the query during a "background luncheon"; Harrison Salisbury in The New York Times, September 18, 1969; Paul Wohl in The Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 1969, and Otto Zausmer in the Boston Globe, October 12, 1969.

[78]Victor Louis' distinctive mode of operation and life style indicate a KGB connection to some. For his personal view of this, see an exchange of letters between Louis and Abraham Brumberg in Problems of Communism, Vol. 18, No. 6 (November-December, 1969), pp. 68-69. Also see Herbert Gold, "Would You Buy A Manuscript From This Man?," The New York Times Magazine, January 31, 1970, pp. 12 ff.

> The Soviet Union has a whole gamut of rockets adapted to the terrain and circumstance...[79]

The statement concluded with the dark thought that although "...China was...many times larger...and might offer active resistance," that was no reason for not applying the Brezhnev Doctrine in the East!

In a subsequent article in The Washington Post Mr. Louis added, after repeating his ominous earlier observations, that anti-Maoist forces were gathering strength in China and that they might "produce a leader who would ask other socialist countries for fraternal help."[80]

Other sources indicated that planning was well underway for a lightning strike by the Red Army. Among these was the appearance in October of a historically analogous article concerning the Red Army victory over Chinese forces in 1929.[81] The account of General Blücher's smashing campaign was an obvious parallel to Soviet intentions forty years later. The October article elaborated on a theme enunciated in

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[79]Victor Louis, "Will Russian Rockets Czech-Mate China?," London Evening News, September 16, 1969, p. 7. Commentary in The New York Times, September 18, 1969, and The Christian Science Monitor, September 22, 1969.

[80]The Washington Post, October 8, 1969.

[81]V. Dushen'kin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, "Defeat of the Chinese Militarists in the Region of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929," Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal (Military History Journal), No. 11 (October, 1969), pp. 121-26.

August by General V.F. Tolubko, who also had written for the anniversary of the 1929 victory.[82] However, Tolubko's August article was considered more important at that time because it revealed his appointment as Commander of the Far Eastern Military District.[83]

By the Fall of 1969, there was serious world-wide concern over the seemingly imminent prospect of a Sino-Soviet war. This was accentuated by the appearance of a book by Harrison E. Salisbury, plainly entitled War Between Russia and China. Salisbury was positive that this war would be nuclear.[84] His recent travel in Outer Mongolia and Siberia lent authority to the prediction. Peking surely noted that Salisbury had been one of few correspondents allowed to visit these critical areas, and must have suspected Soviet sponsorship for his conclusions. Interestingly, when tension between the two nations lessened somewhat, Soviet reviewers deplored Salisbury's book.[85]

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[82] Gen. V.F. Tolubko, "The Glory of Heroes Lives," Krasnaya Zvezda, August 6, 1969. For an excellent analysis of the significance of the Tolubko article, and the Dushen'kin article (fn 81), see R. Waring Herrick, "USSR Resumes Rocket Rattling With Scenario for 'Shattering Strike' at China," Radio Liberty Research, CRD 407/69, December 2, 1969.

[83] See below, section on the tacit exchange.

[84] Salisbury, op. cit., pp. 9, 152-155.

[85] S. Tikhvinsky, "Geopolitical Fortune-telling," Pravda, February 15, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 7, March 17, 1970, pp. 7-8; Sovetskaya Rossia, April 10, 1970.

If Moscow had manipulated foreign newsmen for Soviet ends, so Peking manipulated them for Chinese ends. Thus, during the height of the tense summer, Peking invited the Australian Anglican Francis James to visit Chinese atomic production and testing installations. James' report,[86] widely circulated outside China, emphasized to all China's growing nuclear capability--and, perhaps, Chinese intentions.

But Chinese signals lacked the pointed quality of the Soviet method. In December, 1969, when it seemed that the Peking Talks were about to break down, General Tolubko again took pen in hand. On this occasion he claimed that Red Army troops were training actively with tactical nuclear weapons, whose use was inevitable in any major conflict. After their "intense" exercises with "modern" weapons, his men were given medical examinations and found to have suffered no adverse effects.[87]

On December 9, 1969 Krasnaya Zvezda published a picture of rockets being used in training in the Siberian military district. Ten days later the paper carried a photograph of a nuclear weapon exploding over a terrain model.

In response to this terrifying Soviet innuendo, Peking did not, so far as is ascertainable, resort to further statements about Chinese nuclear systems. Instead, the Chinese sought to justify their great

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[86] James, op. cit.

[87] Gen. V.F. Tolubko, "The Will To Victory," Krasnaya Zvezda, December 7, 1969. For analysis, see R. Waring Herrick, "USSR Signals Peking of Readiness to Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Radio Liberty Research, CRD 434/69, December 23, 1969.

defensive program. In response to Soviet criticism of their emphasis on defense, the Chinese said that the

> ...consolidation of the defense of the homeland, the preparation of the population to cope successfully with any kind of aggression which the enemies might unleash...is a component part of... revolutionary policy...

Once again, Peking's surrogate Albania was used to announce the position.[88]

Neither mutual subversion nor the threatening posture of the irregular dialogue were consistently reflected in the public political dialogue between Peking and Moscow. The divergence among Moscow's policy positions, however, was far greater than Peking's. On neither side was there much evidence of the threatening of major violence, with nuclear overtones, that characterized the irregular dialogue, although Soviet broadcasts to China sometimes accented the Red Army's nuclear capability.

In the following analysis of the public Sino-Soviet political dialogue, official statements of the national leaderships will be examined first, followed by a sample of the great Sino-Soviet polemics. Variance between content of the irregular dialogue and that of official statements, particularly on the Soviet side, is startling.

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[88]"The Policy of the People's Republic of China for the Defense of the Homeland and for Preparations Against War--A Correct Revolutionary Policy," Zëri i Popullit, January 31, 1970. An analysis of this editorial is contained in (1z), "Albanian Editorial Defends Chinese Military Preparations," Radio Free Europe Research, February 4, 1970.

The Public Political Dialogue

Official Statements

Throughout the 1968-1970 period the top leadership in the Kremlin maintained the posture of judicious and resolute world-statesmen. Their theme was unity in the Communist world. If unity was achieved, other problems would be much less difficult. As Czechoslovakia demonstrated, they would go far to maintain, or restore, unity. After August 21, 1968, they probably did not need to reiterate the theme.

Obviously apprehensive over the downturn in relations with China, especially after Chinese verbal blasts concerning Czechoslovakia, and more so after the border dispute had broken into bloody fighting, Messrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny continued to maintain a reasonable public approach to the Chinese problem. Their public posture was impeccable. They walked the "high road" while nearly all other machinery of the Soviet Union proceeded on the "low road" of subversion, hypercritical polemicizing, strong diplomatic protests, and extensive and rapid preparation for war.

Thus at the long-deferred International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969, in the midst of the Sino-Soviet military engagement, General Secretary Brezhnev's speech was only implicitly anti-Chinese. Its theme: strengthening the solidarity

of communists.[89] It should be noted that Brezhnev's posture on the Chinese question must have been in part determined by pressures brought from many Communist parties, ruling and non-ruling, to not excommunicate the Chinese party from the movement. The 1969 Conference procedures were much more relaxed than any of the earlier conferences (e.g., a less officious atmosphere, with delegates given the opportunity to mingle and issue daily reports on speeches, etc.), largely as a result of suggestions and persuasions of the non-Soviet parties. The influence of these parties on substantive issues was very notable.[90] Nevertheless, Peking quickly noted a long-range Soviet goal in the speech that could be detrimental to China, the development of an Asian collective security system.[91]

In October, 1969, in a speech given at a meeting with the Czech leadership in Moscow, Brezhnev was much more explicit. By this time border talks in Peking were underway. Brezhnev's comments were the epitome of reasonableness as he defined the goals of Moscow's policy toward China:

> ... to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China, to open the road to restoration of Soviet-Chinese friendship...

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[89] L.I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda and Izvestia, June 8, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 23, July 2, 1969, pp. 1-17.

[90] Devlin, op. cit., pp. 9-17, especially at p. 16.

[91] Infra., pp. 270-71.

He hoped

> ...that the positive realistic approach will be reigning at the talks. We are for solving borderline and other questions between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. on the first and just basis.....Solution will be possible if the Chinese side shows good will, too.

Once again, unity and solidarity were stressed. Moscow was

> ...consistently upholding the Marxist-Leninist line in questions of ideology, strategy, and tactics of the world communist movement and rallying for its cohesion,...always striving to settle differences and resume cooperation...[92]

Brezhnev's policy statement was re-echoed for widest consumption by President Podgorny on the 52nd Anniversary of the Russian Revolution.[93]

In the Chinese view, Moscow's formal policy line probably was entirely outweighed by other less reasonable signals from the Soviet Union. Therefore, as we have noted, and will mention subsequently, Chinese war preparations assumed tremendous proportions. Countering this move, Soviet official spokesmen denied that China needed to accent defensive measures. An important statement came from Marshal Yakubovsky, Soviet Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact

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[92]Moscow, Tass International Service in English, October 27, 1969.

[93]"Under the Banner of Lenin to New Victories in Communist Construction, Report by Comrade N.V. Podgorny at the Fifty-Second Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution," Pravda and Izvestia, November 7, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 45, December 3, 1969, pp. 8-9.

forces. It was the first such statement by a Soviet Marshal in most memories. Yakubovsky was apprehensive over

> The military psychosis fanned up by the Peking leaders....Heating up chauvinistic moods, they pile up anti-Soviet slanders and impress on the Chinese people that it must prefer war and hunger....To the agressive plans of international imperialism, the countries of the socialist community counterpose the principled policy of peace and friendship among the peoples...[94]

Shortly thereafter Moscow officially denied any plans for war against China. The official news agency Tass said

> Insinuations have been made recently in the bourgeois press and by ruling circles of certain imperialist States about the situation on the Sino-Soviet border....Rumors are being spread that the Soviet Union is preparing an alleged "attack..." Anti-Communist propaganda is attempting by this means to impede the Soviet-Chinese negotiations.....Soviet Armed Forces are carrying out normal duties...within the framework of regular plans and programs for strengthening the defense of the Soviet state in all its territory. The unchanged policy of the U.S.S.R. and its government is a striving for the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations...[95]

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[94] Sovetskaya Rossia, February 22, 1970, excerpted by Tass International Service in English, February 22, 1970.

[95] Moscow, Tass International Service in English, March 14, 1970.

On April 15, 1970, one week prior to the Lenin Centenary celebration, Brezhnev presented a definitive statement on Soviet policy toward China:

> A few words about our relations with China. The unvarying policy of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government is a policy of the restoration and development of friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic. It is not our fault that these relations have been damaged and brought to the point of extreme exacerbation. While waging a principled struggle against splitting activity in the international Communist movement and the propaganda of anti-Leninist views, we at the same time have constantly striven and continue to strive against the transfer of ideological disagreements to inter-state relations. The Communist and Workers' Parties, at their international conference in Moscow, again expressed their support for this course.
>
> As you know, the question of the normalization of the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border has become the subject of talks with the C.P.R. government. The Soviet Union holds a clear and unambiguous position in these talks. We deem it necessary to reach an agreement that would make the Soviet-Chinese border a line of good-neighbor relations, not of hostility. Not retreating from our legitimate and principled positions, and upholding the interests of the Soviet homeland and the inviolability of its frontiers, we shall do everything in our power to normalize inter-state relations with the Chinese People's Republic. Of course, as everyone realizes full well, this does not depend on us alone.
>
> We base our actions firmly on the premise that the longterm interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples not only do not contradict one another but in fact coincide. At the same time, we do not close our eyes to the fact that an atmosphere is being artificially

> created around the talks now taking place in China that can in no way contribute to their success. Indeed, who can seriously maintain that the whipping up of an anti-Soviet war psychosis and calls to the population of China to make preparations for "war and famine" promote the success of the talks? If this is being done to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, then it can be said in advance that these efforts will be in vain. The nerves of our people are strong, and it would not hurt the organizers of war hysteria in China to learn this. (Prolonged applause.) In the final analysis, the C.P.R. has as great an interest in a clear-cut settlement of the border question as does the Soviet Union, which has at its disposal everything necessary to stand up for the interests of the Soviet people--builders of communism. (Applause.)[96]

Much of this statement was repeated by Brezhnev in the Lenin Centenary speech. However, on April 22nd, Brezhnev suddenly included inflammatory remarks about the Chinese leadership. The Sino-Soviet situation

> ...is obviously the fruit of the nationalistic policy of the Chinese leadership and the result of its rupture with the principles laid down by Lenin....Only the enemies of socialism are served by the violent anti-Soviet campaign that has been under way in China for several years now. Recently it has been carried on under the cover of assertions about an imaginary threat posed by the Soviet Union. By their actions against the country of Lenin and against the world Communist movement,

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[96] L.I. Brezhnev, "Live and Work as Lenin Did," Izvestia, April 15, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 15, May 12, 1970, p. 4; excerpts in The New York Times, April 15, 1970.

> the initiators of this campaign unmask themselves before the broad masses as apostates from the revolutionary Leninist cause.97

Whether Brezhnev's public rancor was due to foreknowledge of the Chinese diatribe against Moscow on Lenin's Centenary, or was evidence of long-suppressed anger at Chinese intransigence is not known. Rancor did not perservere in the statements of the top Soviet leadership. In May, Kosygin emphasized the "constructive attitude" of Moscow, its "determination to settle the dispute," and its aspiration "to maintain and strengthen the friendly and good-neighbor undertakings with the Chinese people." Kosygin "regretted" that the Chinese leaders were refusing "to take this only correct road."[98] Regret, rather than rancor, may have reflected Kosygin's hope that as a result of Cambodia, Sino-Soviet relations would improve. If this was so, however, his position was not confirmed by the violent Soviet May 18th polemic reply to Peking's Lenin Centenary statement.[99] However, despite the May 18th polemic, Kosygin maintained the "reasonable" Soviet attitude. On June 10th he said that despite the complexity of the Peking talks, "which are hampered

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[97] L.I. Brezhnev, "The Living and Triumphant Cause of Lenin," Pravda and Izvestia, April 22, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 16, May 19, 1970, p. 14, and The New York Times, April 22, 1970. (Italics added.)

[98] Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, May 6, 1970, a report of a press conference held by Kosygin on the U.S. incursion into Cambodia.

[99] Infra., p. 239.

by the Chinese side," the Soviet Union intended to continue them.[100] Kosygin's remarks on Chinese-inserted stumbling-blocks may have been somewhat tempered by the anticipation that Peking and Moscow were preparing to exchange agrément on new ambassadors, a development which he confirmed on August 10, 1970.[101]

Premier Kosygin, representing the Soviet state, traditionally had been on better terms with the Chinese than General Secretary Brezhnev, who spoke for the party. This may explain Brezhnev's personal public condemnation of Peking. Since the Peking diatribe on April 22nd was directed against Brezhnev, he also may have insisted on Moscow's violent counterattack. Yet, in the final analysis, Brezhnev, with the one exception, hewed close to the line of reasonableness, good neighborliness, friendship, and a constructive and patient approach to China.[102]

By the end of the 1968-1970 period, the top Kremlin leadership truthfully could say that they personally had adhered closely to a statesmanlike policy; a few minor exceptions in their posture had not seemed important; and the policy had paid dividends: the trend in Sino-Soviet relations was upward. The fact that official Soviet policy was poles apart from Soviet signals in the irregular dialogue, from the

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[100] Premier Kosygin's speech was nationally televised in the Soviet Union, and reported in The New York Times, June 11, 1970.

[101] Patriot (New Delhi), August 10, 1970, p. 2.

[102] See his speech at Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 28, 1970, also referred to in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 39, October 27, 1970, p. 6.

tone of Soviet polemics (Soviet broadcasting to China was hardly "statesmanlike"), and from the tacit moves, many of which were still in progress, presents a startling paradox. It also raises an important question: Simply put, "Was improvement in Sino-Soviet relations in the latter half of 1970 due to a Soviet carrot or a Soviet stick?" More broadly, "Was the tentative rapprochement a result of Soviet policies or a reaction to external factors?"

Clues for the solution to these questions can be gathered from the policy statements of the Chinese hierarchy during the same time frame. It will become quickly evident that the positions of the Chinese leadership more closely corresponded to their military moves, polemics, and tacit maneuvers. Further, many Chinese positions vis à vis the U.S.S.R. were quite similar to those taken vis à vis the United States in the earlier period.

Shortly after Warsaw Pact divisions invaded Czechoslovakia, Premier Chou En-lai voiced Chinese alarm. "Social-imperialism," he said, "was matching its aggression in Eastern Europe and stepping up armed provocations against China." Chou further remarked that the Czech invasion was part of a "spheres of influence deal" between Moscow and Washington. He opined that as a repayment for not opposing the Warsaw Pact move, Washington would demand a "higher price" on Vietnam.[103]

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[103]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, September 2, 1968, rebroadcast by Radio Peking in Russian on September 4, 1968. The occasion for Chou's speech was a Vietnamese National Day reception.

Chou's position subsequently was supported by a telegram to Tirana in which China approved Albanian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and said

> Should American imperialists, Soviet modern revisionists and their servants dare to touch even a hair of Albania, they will meet with none other than total, disgraceful and inevitable defeat.

The telegram was signed by Mao, Lin Piao, and Chou En-lai.[104]

The outbreak of bloody incidents on the border in March, however, indicated to Peking that Moscow was intent on applying the Brezhnev Doctrine to China. If we accept the rather persuasive but still incomplete evidence to the effect that Peking initiated the first border battle on March 2, 1969,[105] one logical reason for the decision would be that Peking wanted to be sure Moscow understood that China would fight any attempt to impose the Brezhnev Doctrine, whatever the cost. When border incidents continued on a larger scale, Chinese suspicions that war was imminent seemed to be verified.

Lin Piao alerted the CCP membership to the threat of major war at the Ninth Party Congress in April, 1969. His "Political Report" to the Congress included a firm statement of Chinese policy toward Moscow:

> Since Brezhnev came to power,...the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been

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[104] Zëri i Popullit, September 19, 1968. It is possible to read "China" for "Albania" in this telegram.

[105] Cf., Robinson, op. cit., pp. 33-38.

practicing social-imperialism and social fascism more frantically than ever..... It has ...intensified its threat of aggression against China. Its dispatch of hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations against China on our territory Chenpao Island are two foul performances staged recently by Soviet revisionism.

In order to justify its aggression and plunder, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique trumpets the so-called theory of "limited sovereignty," the theory of "international dictatorship" and the theory of "socialist community." What does all this stuff mean? It means that your sovereignty is "limited," while his is unlimited. You won't obey him? He will exercise "international dictatorship" over you...in order to form the "socialist community" ruled by the new tsars...

...We firmly believe that the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in the Soviet Union...will certainly rise and overthrow this clique consisting of a handful of renegades...

We must on no account relax our revolutionary vigilance...and...ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations...against...a big war...at an early date,...a conventional war and...a large scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared.

We will certainly counter-attack. If they insist on fighting, we will keep them company and fight to the finish...[106]

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[106] Lin Piao, "Fearing Neither Hardship Nor Death," Political Report to the Ninth CCP Congress, April 27, 1969, Peking Review, No. 23, June 6, 1969, p. 12. Italicized sentences denote Mao sayings.

Lin's report was not widely publicized in China until June, by which time, of course, the border situation was even more threatening, and the party deemed that the populace should be fully appraised. Thus the remarks in the speech became the basis for Chinese polemicizing that continued through the summer, as well as for official internal briefings. For example, at a briefing of Communist Chinese senior officials in Canton, the briefer, who reportedly announced that he was speaking on behalf of "higher authority," said war with the Soviet Union was imminent--"World War III" would break out by October.[107]

Even in its vehemence and pugnatiousness, however, Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union was not completely intransigent. Lin noted that

> ...the Sino-Soviet boundary question is also one left over by history. As regards these questions, our party and government have consistently stood for negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable settlement. Pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be maintained in order to avoid conflicts.

and went on to say that China had concluded successful boundary negotiations with Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of Mongolia, and Afghanistan.[108]

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[107] Ian Stuart from Hong Kong in The New York Times, July 6, 1969. The information presumably comes from defector interviews.

[108] Ibid. It will be noted that border disputes with major neighbors India and the Soviet Union have not been settled.

Thus, as the dispute moved toward a negotiating phase in the Fall of 1969, and while the Soviet irregular dialogue was becoming more threatening, Peking could either adopt a pugnatious or a more conciliatory line. The latter position was selected. In a statement of October 7, 1969, the Chinese government said that

> there exist irreconcilable differences of principle...But this should not prevent China and the Soviet Union from maintaining normal state relations,.. China never has demanded the return of the territories czarist Russia has annexed by means of unequal treaties.

On the contrary, Peking wanted "restitution of some territories" the Soviets occupied "in violation of these treaties."[109] Concurrently, a Document of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, while condemning previous Soviet "nonsensical and preposterous arguments" and "absurdities," held that the essential thing was

> ...to maintain the status quo of the border, avert armed conflicts, and disengage armed forces from the disputed areas along the border...

After making a strong case for the Thalweg principle for international riverine boundaries, which the Chinese most assuredly wanted in the Amur Basin, the Document compromised itself:

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[109]"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (of October 7, 1969)," Peking Review, No. 41, October 10, 1969, pp. 3-4.

> ...There are exceptions to any principle of international law...adjustments... may be made...in consideration of the interests of the inhabitants.[110]

In the same time frame, Fall, 1969, China had "vigorously" conducted an H-bomb test and its first underground nuclear test. Following the conciliatory line, however, Peking took the opportunity to assure the world, and Moscow, that China's development of nuclear weapons was "for defensive purposes" and that "under no circumstances would China be the first to employ them."[111]

After talks commenced in Peking, however, the Chinese attitude hardened once more. The first indication that the discussions might be in difficulty came on November 29, 1969, when Chou En-lai, at a reception in the Albanian Embassy in Peking, spoke of "social-imperialism 's ...aggressive ambitions and war threats."[112] Chou's statement was seconded on November 29th by Hsieh Fu-chih, the political commissar of the Peking military district, who accused the Soviets

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[110] "Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (October 8, 1969), ibid., pp. 8-15. Analysis of this document and the previously cited Chinese statement may be found in R. Waring Herrick, "Sino-Soviet Border Negotiations Made Possible By Key Chinese Concession," Radio Liberty Research, CRD 362/69, October 31, 1969.

[111] "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, op. cit.

[112] Chou En-lai speech of November 29, 1969; Zëri i Popullit, December 2, 1969; Peking Review, No. 49, December 5, 1969, p. 11; The Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1970.

of getting ready for "a new military adventure."[113]

Thus, as the Sino-Soviet dispute entered the new decade, Peking's official statements, and also Chinese polemics, concentrated on the threat of imminent Soviet attack. Their basis was "Chairman Mao's great strategic thinking:"

> Heighten our vigilance, defend the motherland. Be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters, and do everything for the people.[114]

As Lenin's Centenary approached, even though border talks were still in session, Peking continued to fear a Soviet attack. However, the Chinese attitude was expressed semi-officially in editorial statements. The Chinese top leadership did not personally issue official statements. Thus the startling Chinese diatribe on the Lenin Centenary, April 22, 1970, was credited to the editorial departments of Renmin Ribao, Hongqi, and Jiefangjun Bao, not to Mao, Lin, or Chou. This editorial was a polemical masterpiece. It embellished each of the critical and vehement parts of Lin Piao's "Political Report" of a year earlier. (Some of the editorial's more picturesque and meaningful sections will be quoted in the following section on polemics.) The Chinese government, however, could disavow, discard, or forget the editorial at its pleasure.

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[113] Ibid.

[114] Mao Tse-tung, quoted in "Usher in the Great 1970's," the New Year's Day editorial of Renmin Ribao, Hongqi, and Jiefangjun Bao, Peking Review, No. 1, January 2, 1970, p. 6.

Much of the bitter edge of Peking's polemical statement seemed to have been forgotten within six months, as Chinese-Soviet relations began to improve. By June 1, 1970, official warnings of imminent war were no longer prominent in China. Instead, official statements were devoted to announcing diplomatic developments between the two nations. By November, the situation had warmed to the point that Peking's message to Moscow on the occasion of the 53rd anniversary of the October Revolution spoke of China's desire to maintain and develop "normal state relations" with the Soviet Union "on the basis of the five principles of coexistence." Peking wanted to

> ...take effective measures to settle important outstanding questions in state relations... so that ...relations between our two countries will become friendly and good-neighborly.[115]

On November 2, 1970, on the occasion of the eleventh Chinese nuclear test, the attitudes of officials in Peking apparently had relaxed to the point that they felt free to reiterate their earlier call for an international conference on the subject of general and complete disarmament.[116] Their crisis years were slipping into the background. They were able to give attention to less urgent, long-range problems

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[115]"53rd Anniversary of Great October Revolution Greeted," Peking Review, No. 46, November 13, 1970, p. 4+; The New York Times, November 8, 1970.

[116]The New York Times, November 2, 1970.

faced by China in the modern world.

Compared to Soviet official statements, which had hewed closely to a line of reasonableness throughout the 1968-1970 period, Chinese official statements much more closely reflected the deepening and lessening of the crisis. When the situation was tense, so were Chinese official attitudes. As the situation eased in 1970, so did Chinese attitudes.

Most importantly, the official statements of the top leadership of neither participant invoked the threat of nuclear weapons in the dispute. The official dialogue did not even invoke strong hints of nuclear war.[117] On the Chinese side, a major official statement specifically denied the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation.

However, as we have seen, this nuclear absention was not the case in the irregular Sino-Soviet dialogue. As we will see, it was not reflected in the exchange of polemics in the public dialogue, to which we now turn.

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[117] Mao's statement that if attacked, we will surely counterattack might be construed as a weak hint.

The Polemical Exchange

The public exchange of polemics between Peking and Moscow during the period 1968 to 1970 has a number of distinguishing characteristics. First, and most important, in volume and intensity polemics accurately reflected the fortunes of Sino-Soviet interstate relations. When the situation looked dark, polemics were strident and overwhelming. When moves toward rapprochement occurred, as after the Kosygin-Chou airport meeting in September, 1969, and after the U.S. Cambodian incursion in May, 1970, polemics became muffled and infrequent.[118]

Second, it will be noted that Soviet polemics differed remarkably from Soviet official statements while Chinese polemics, with a more varied official line to follow, can be said to have paralleled Peking's official statements.

Third, both Peking and Moscow utilized an almost unlimited polemical repertoire. It is difficult to say who surpassed whom in venom or sarcasm.

Fourth, each government polemicized in the printed media in approximately equal measure, but Moscow much more heavily emphasized

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[118] A major shortcoming in presenting Sino-Soviet politico-military interaction in the categories used herein is that it becomes difficult to relate the crescendos and diminishments of the polemic exchange to the progress of the diplomatic dialogue. If the reader will be patient, the diplomatic dialogue immediately follows this section. The polemic-diplomatic relation will become clear after both sections are read.

radio broadcasting. Moscow operates a more potent radio propaganda establishment than Peking, and took advantage of it.[119]

In this presentation, polemics from both sides will be consecutively intermeshed in order to bring out the intensifying challenge-response interaction. Almost any subject was "fair game."

During 1968, as tension on the border increased month by month, a favorite theme of both governments was the denigration of the opposing leadership. Peking repeatedly charged that the Kremlin had betrayed the Soviet people[120] while Moscow detailed the shortcomings of Mao's background and policies.[121]

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[119] In addition to Radio Moscow, the government service, the Kremlin has operated Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, which, as "the voice of Soviet public opinion," is sponsored by "Soviet public organizations." Radio Peace and Progress began broadcasting in Mandarin on March 1, 1967, and in Mongolian on October 17, 1967. Radio Moscow also broadcasts in Mandarin and Mongolian. Radio Tashkent broadcasts in Uighur and Kazakh.

[120] E.g., Peking, NCNA International Service in English, January 2, 1968; "Soviet Revisionists' Treachery Cannot Hold Back the Surging Tide of Revolution," Peking Review, No. 5, February 2, 1968, p. 29; "Revolutionary Soviet People Will Rise Up to Overthrow the Reactionary Rule of the Kremlin's New Tsars," ibid., No. 6, February 9, 1968, pp. 21-23; "The Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique is a New Pack of Vampires," ibid., No. 19, May 10, 1968, p. 25; "Flunkeys of Western Bourgeoisie," Renmin Ribao, June 17, 1968; "Observer," "Brezhnev's Renegade Features Revealed More Clearly," Peking Review, No. 30, July 21, 1968, p. 9; "Diabolical Social-Imperialist Face of the Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique," ibid., No. 43, October 25, 1968, pp. 8-10.

[121] E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, January 10, 1968, describing Mao's "rich peasant background"; ibid., April 30, 1968, indicating that Mao had deprived China of everything but Mao thought; B. Zanegin, "The Failure of Peking's Foreign Policy Course," Izvestia, May 23, 1968; V. Pasenchuk and V. Viktorov, "The Antipopular Policy of the Peking Rulers," Pravda, June 22, 1968;

Another mutually pursued theme was "sell-out" to the United States or its allies. On Peking's part, this often meant Soviet participation in arms control measures.[122] On Moscow's part, it often meant Chinese "inactivity" regarding Vietnam.[123] Peking also regularly deplored Moscow's dalliance with New Delhi and Tokyo and "exposed" the "Soviet sell-out" of Vietnam, the U.S.-Soviet consular treaty, and agreement on direct airline service.

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia triggered a barrage of polemics in August and September. Peking asserted that Soviet troops were "blatantly occupying" Czechoslovakia.[124] At a reception honoring Rumanian National Day in Peking, Chou En-lai virtually called for guerrilla resistance in Czechoslovakia--and preparations for one in Rumania.

Moscow in Mandarin to China, July 16, 1968; I. Andronov, "Mao and the Celestial Empire," New Times, No. 27, July 10, 1968, pp. 13-17.

[122]E.g., Peking, NCNA International Service in English, January 24, 1968, an anti-NPT polemic; "Commentator," "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military-Nuclear Alliance Nears," Peking Review, No. 12, March 22, 1968, pp. 31-32; "Soviets Have Long Been Following a U.S. Plot," ibid., No. 13, March 29, 1968, p. 31; "Commentator," "Another Big Exposure of U.S.-Soviet Counter-Revolutionary Collaboration," ibid., No. 28, July 12, 1968, pp. 56, ff. re NPT and SALT; Peking, NCNA International Service in English, June 11 and 13, 1968, re the NPT.

[123]E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia, January 20, 1968, an essay on collusion in Hong Kong; same source in Cantonese to China, April 3, 1968; Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, April 20, 1968; "The Political Course of Mao Tse-tung on the International Scene," Kommunist, No. 8, May 31, 1968, pp. 95-108; V. Georgiyev, "Bridge Across the Ocean," Krasnaya Zvezda, July 28, 1968, p. 5, re U.S.-Chinese coordination.

[124]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 23, 1968, carried in Peking Review, No. 34, August 23, 1968, supplement, pp. III-IV.

A Renmin Ribao editorial broadened these remarks to include all East European states.[125] Peking asserted that Moscow and Washington were collaborating as well as contending over Czechoslovakia,[126] a remark based on Moscow's crisis control steps mentioned in Chapter 1. Moscow, taken aback by Peking's vehemence, responded rather weakly.[127] Peking continued the pressure.[128]

The Czechoslovakian invasion resulted in postponement of the scheduled November International Communist Conference at which Moscow had intended, once again, to secure international communist condemnation of Chinese deviationism. Moscow seemed to have been laying the groundwork for this in a series of articles in Kommunist which explored the roots of developments in China from a very critical perspective.[129] The effort was not wasted, only postponed for ten months.

A major polemical barrage in late 1968 emanated from the Soviet side. The instant cause was the rescheduled 135th session of the Warsaw

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[125] "Commentator," "Total Bankruptcy of Modern Revisionism," ibid., pp. IV-VI.

[126] Peking Review, No. 35, August 30, 1968, pp. 19-20.

[127] Pravda, August 26, 1968.

[128] Peking Review, No. 36, September 6, 1968, p. 9.

[129] See Kommunist, Nos. 6-8, 1968. Cf., discussion in China Topics, YB497, August 23, 1968.

Talks.[130] Moscow's subject: Chinese-U.S. strategic collusion. This theme continued prominently until February, 1969, when China again postponed the Warsaw session. It reappeared a year later when Washington and Peking again decided to resume talks. In the interim, polemics of 1969 reiterated 1968 themes, added some new ones, and incorporated the language of violence.

As late as February 26, 1969, Moscow's polemicists were lampooning Mao,[131] but after the March 2nd clash on the Ussuri River, they proceeded in dead seriousness. Moscow accused the Mao Tse-tung "chauvinistic adventurist clique" of "expansionist ambitions,"[132] while Peking described Brezhnev and Kosygin as "more rapacious than the tsarist imperialists."[133]

Moscow presented China as the principal enemy of the Soviet Union at home and abroad. Gory details of the March clashes were highlighted. Yevgeny Yevtushenko's anti-Chinese poem, "On The Red Ussuri

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[130] V. Bolshakov, "Sacrifice to the Paper Tiger," Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 1, 1968, p. 3; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, December 4, in French to Southeast Asia, December 9, in English to Asia, December 19, 1968; B. Bulatov, "Peking and Washington--A New Round," Literaturnaya Gazeta, December 11, 1968, p. 9.

[131] "Mao The Medicine Man," New Times, No. 8, February 26, 1969, p. 22.

[132] Pravda, March 17, 1969.

[133] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, March 5, 1969.

Snow," was released on March 19th, further stirring passions.[134] The text was militant, if not blood-thirsty:

> ...you see in the smoking twilight
> The new Batu Khans,
> bombs rattling in their quivvers.
> But if they fire,
> the warning bells will sound
> And there'll be heroic warriors aplenty
> for new battlefields of Kulikovo!

Pravda on May 5 quoted one of the Soviet Union's foremost China experts as accusing the Chinese of using population pressures as an excuse for expansion.

Peking began to bear down on the U.S.-Soviet "collusion" and "imperialist and social-imperialist encirclement" themes. Thus the visit of Victor Louis to Taiwan the preceeding October became part of a "U.S.-U.S.S.R. plot."[135] Further evidence of the plot was seen when President Nixon entertained Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at a concert in the Rose Garden:

> ...now through the note of harmony between the United States and the Soviet Union struck at the White House concert, that U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, the two biggest tyrants in the world, are "natural friends" in opposing China...[136]

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[134] Yevgeny Yevtushenko, "On The Red Ussuri Snow," Literaturnaya Gazeta, No. 12, March 19, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 15, April 30, 1969, pp. 12-13.

[135] Peking Review, No. 11, March 14, 1969, p. 13 and No. 13, March 28, 1969, p. 30; The Washington Post, March 7, 1969; The Christian Science Monitor, April 1, 1969.

[136] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, May 30, 1969.

Peking denounced Moscow for aiding in the search for a Strategic Air Command tanker aircraft which disappeared over the Bering Sea on June 3, 1969. (One Soviet fishing vessel took part in the search.)[137] A Soviet shipment of titanium to the United States constituted further evidence of collusion. When the freighter Orsha docked in Seattle with the strategically valuable metal on June 26, China said "...while the Soviet revisionist renegade clique feigns anti-imperialism it is ganging up with U.S. imperialism..."[138] Even a Soviet reception for Apollo Eleven astronaut Colonel Frank Borman was denounced as symbolic of sinister U.S.-Soviet machinations.[139] Moscow was accused of hatching a "Middle East Munich" in collaboration with the United States at the expense of the Palestine guerrillas,[140] of sham support and real betrayal of the Vietnamese people ("The Soviet revisionist renegade clique and U.S. imperialism are jackals of the same lair,")[141] and of building up naval strength

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[137]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, June 8, 1969.

[138]"Anti-Imperialist Warrior Reduced to Size: Puny Clown Toadying to Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 27, July 4, 1969, p. 33.

[139]"Soviet Revisionist Chieftain Advocates Soviet-U.S. Friendship," Peking Review, No. 30, July 25, 1969, p. 28.

[140]"U.S.-Soviet Collaboration in Speeding Up Creation of 'Middle East Munich,'" Peking Review, No. 30, July 25, 1969, pp. 23-24.

[141]"Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman Lin, Premier Chou Warmly Greet 24th Anniversary of D.R.V.N. Independence," Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1969, p.3.

in the Indian Ocean to fill the vacuum created by departing Britain.[142] In late August Peking denounced Soviet aid to the Congo, collaboration with West Germany, aid to Suharto's Indonesia, aid and naval visits to India, naval visits to Japan, and, most vehemently of all, the Soviet plan for a system of collective security in Asia.[143]

Moscow's sponsorship of an Asian collective security system, coming at the time of violence on the border, assuredly triggered apprehension in Peking. The Chinese responded with great vituperation. The Moscow leadership was referred to as the expansionist "New Tsars," compared to President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in the 1950s, accused of "gangster logic," and of reaching the "height of absurdity."[144]

Moscow initially was restrained in responding to these diatribes. But personal denigration of Mao continued unabated,[145] and Peking was accused of "cultivating the Cold War spirit." Kommunist noted that Renmin Ribao alone had published more than 600 anti-Soviet attacks in 1968. Mao

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[142] The New York Times, May 19, 1969.

[143] "Soviet Revisionists Step-Up Collusion With Reactionaries in Counter-revolutionary Activities," SCMP, No. 4481, August 22, 1969, p. 29; SCMP, No. 4486, September 2, 1969.

[144] "Another Step in New Tsars' Expansion in Asia," Peking Review, No. 37, September 7, 1969, pp. 18-20 (also in SCMM No. 665, September 22, 1969, pp. 14-17); "Tear Off the Wrappings From Soviet Revisionists' Theory of 'Responsibility for Security'," Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1969, pp. 20-22.

[145] A. Kurov, "Big-Scale Maoism," Literary Russia, No. 32, 1969. The translation of this article available to me does not note page numbers. I have been unable to locate the Russian text.

was accused of working at party-splitting, and Chinese adventures in the Third World, trade with West Germany and Japan, and border provocations were denounced.[146] Moscow noted that China had nearly admitted being isolated from international communism and declared the de facto achievement of a Khrushchevian aim of 1963-1964.[147]

As their relationship became more strained by recurring border clashes, Peking denounced Moscow in ever more provocative terms:

> The Kremlin renegades are like prostitutes who want to have an arch of chastity erected for them..... They are flirting and stepping up the collusion with U.S. imperialism.[148]

The Brezhnev concept of collective security for Asia was roundly derided.[149] The Soviet leadership was called "the new disciples of Acheson"[150] and "New Tsars," the "mortal enemies" of people.[151]

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[146]"The Policy of Mao Tse-tung's Group in the International Arena," Kommunist, No. 5, March, 1969, pp. 104-16, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 15, April 30, 1969, pp. 7-8.

[147]A. Ter-Grigoryan, "Parting the Curtain," Izvestia, April 30, 1969, p. 2, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 18, May 21, 1969, p. 21.

[148]"U.S. Imperialism, Soviet Revisionism Step Up Collusion Against Chinese and World's People," SCMP No. 4481, August 22, 1969, p.30.

[149]For example, in commentary by Chien Shao-wen, "Soviet Revisionist's Gangster Theory for Expansion Abroad," Peking, NCNA International Service in English, September 3, 1969, and, from the same service, untitled commentary of August 15, 1969.

[150]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, August 19, 1969.

[151]Ibid., August 20, 1969.

Moscow countered by declaring that the August 13 clash in Sinkiang was instigated by Peking as a signal to Washington of interest in "direct collusion."[152] When the U.S. relaxed restrictions on trade and travel of Americans to China, Moscow said that while howling against imperialism, Peking in fact was giving a favorable reception to U.S. initiatives.[153]

Shifting ostensibly to arms control, on August 28, 1969 Moscow said that "constructive proposals" aimed at "the reduction of arms, controlling the race for ever more destructive means of attack and counter-attack, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons" had been positively received throughout the world, but that Peking had replied "in its own way." Chinese arsenals were filling with "all the latest weapons," and the Chinese army had "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery." Since Peking had derided Soviet arms control efforts and was arming itself rapidly, the Chinese people were warned that Mao was courting nuclear war![154]

At this critical stage, however, a diplomatic breakthrough occurred.[155] Premier Kosygin paid a flying visit to Peking. An airport

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[152] Pravda, August 17, 1969.

[153] Moscow in English to South Asia, August 23, 1969. Also see D. Volsky, "Bridge-Building, Peking Style," New Times, No. 36, September 10, 1969, p. 23.

[154] "Peking's Adventurist Course," Pravda, August 28, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 35, September 24, 1969, pp. 3-5.

[155] Infra., pp. 246-52.

conference with Premier Chou on September 11, 1969 evidently resulted in decisions of major import, for Sino-Soviet polemics were largely discontinued almost immediately. The day following the meeting observers in Moscow noted that the Soviet press did not publish articles about the dispute with China.[156] Moscow's weekly journals took somewhat longer to taper off.[157] Peking papers, which had been publishing diatribes against Soviet revisionist renegades trampling the Mongolian people on the day of the meeting, required several days to cool down. After a series of comments on the chaotic state of the Soviet food industry, a depression in Soviet oil and gas industry, and chaos in Russian transport and communications areas, Peking ceased commenting altogether on Soviet matters.[158]

From then on, Sino-Soviet polemics were closely tied to the commencement and progress of the Peking Talks. The hiatus brought on by the Peking Airport meeting was never complete. Rather, both sides greatly reduced polemic efforts. Thus, between September 11 and October 20, polemical statements may have been more noticeable. We have noted previously in the irregular dialogue that Soviet threats continued

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[156] Belgrade, TANJUG International Service in English, September 12, 1969.

[157] Reuters from Moscow, September 17, 1969.

[158] SCMPs 4498-4502 of September 18-24, 1969.

hrough this period. Some routine polemicizing also occurred.

On September 23rd Peking commented that the "Soviet Revision-ist Theory of 'International Worker-Peasant Alliance' Is Out and Out Gangster Logic," and a fig-leaf for a counter-revolutionary "Holy Alli-ance" of imperialism, revisionism, and reaction.[159] Several days later Mao posthumously honored ten soldiers of the People's Liberation Army who died battling Soviet "armed revisionism" during "frenzied enemy at-tacks" at Chenpao Island in March.[160] Peking periodically spoke of the "New Tsars," mentioned the "ring of encirclement," and, more often, referred to "social-imperialism," the popular phrase for Soviet posture. The popular song "Smash A New Tsar" remained on Peking's "Hit Parade."

For its part, Moscow was "convinced" that what was "going on in China" was "merely a tragic episode." The policy of the Chinese leaders was "totally contrary to the objective requirements of the coun-try's development."

> ...It is perfectly obvious that the Chinese people will sooner or later grasp the situation and will sweep away the obstacles raised on their path of advance...[161]

The sharpest Soviet personal attack on Chairman Mao, a book entitled Pages from the Political Biography of Mao Tse-tung, appeared in Moscow

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[159]Peking, NCNA in English, September 23, 1969; SCMP, No. 4506, September 30, 1969, p. 29.

[160]Peking Review, No. 39, September 26, 1969, pp. 12-13.

[161]"China: 1949-1969," New Times, No. 40, October 8, 1969, p. 22.

bookstores in late September, but was later withdrawn.[162] Moscow blamed the continuing Vietnam War, Laotian troubles, and "the tragedy in Indonesia" on Peking.[163] Two days before the Peking Talks commenced, Kremlin theoretician Suslov denounced the "adventurist and chauvinistic policy of the present CCP leaders."[164] The Red Army newspaper quoted Lenin:

> Everyone will agree that the Army that does not train itself to master all types of weapons, all means and methods of struggle that the enemy has or may have is behaving unwisely or even criminally.[165]

Polemicizing reached a low point as the Peking Talks got underway. Either the talks were not promising or Peking was disturbed over the Soviet decision to conduct SALT discussions with Washington simultaneously. The fact of the matter is that when SALT commenced in Helsinki in November, polemics increased. Peking laid down two polemic barrages, one against the U.S.-Soviet agreement on a draft Sea Bed Treaty,[166] a

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[162] The Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 1969.

[163] Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Africa, September 30, 1969.

[164] Moscow, Tass in Russian, October 18, 1969. Note that Suslov's denunciation was not beamed to China.

[165] A. Lagovsky, "Lenin and the Defense of the Gains of Socialism: The State's Economy and its Military Might," Krasnaya Zvezda, September 25, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 42, November 12, 1969, p. 5.

[166] "Intensified U.S.-Soviet Collaboration," Peking Review, No. 44, October 31, 1969, p. 30.

second specifically against SALT.[167]

Shortly thereafter, polemics increased in vindictiveness. Remembering the H-bomb test of September 29th and the first underground nuclear test of September 23rd, Peking decided the time had come to publish congratulatory messages. Tirana's congratulatory message declared that the evidence of Peking's nuclear prowess was

> ...another crushing blow to the nuclear blackmail and monopoly of the U.S. imperialists and the Soviet revisionist renegade clique...[168]

This was the first instance since September 11th that the Chinese had permitted the Soviet leadership to be called a "revisionist renegade clique." Although Peking was quoting Tirana, Moscow undoubtedly understood.

In response, Soviet voices began to speak of "some people," "this kind of politician," "certain foreign propaganda organs," "foreign anti-Soviet elements," and "certain foreign circles."

> ...<u>some</u> are obsessed by their own ideas on the question of war and peace and are drawing the most absurd and irresponsible conclusions on the nature of the means of modern warfare. They childishly compare nuclear weapons to a paper tiger...

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[167]"Intensified U.S.-Soviet Collaboration Against China, Essence of So-Called Preliminary Talks on 'Strategic Arms Limitation,'" <u>Ibid</u>., No. 46, November 14, 1969, p. 14.

[168]"Heavy Blow to Nuclear Monopoly of U.S. Imperialism and Social Imperialism; Warm Congratulations on China's Successful New H-Bomb Explosion and First Underground Nuclear Test," <u>Peking Review</u>, No. 47, November 21, 1969, pp. 18 ff.

> To this kind of politician, the outbreak of thermonuclear war in our epoch is not the greatest calamity for mankind, but rather a small squabble with imperialism...
>
> The governments of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with their constructive proposals and measures to ease international tension and prevent a new global war, have incurred the wrath of the adventurist elements of all shades...[169]

The atmosphere surrounding the border talks hardly could improve once polemics, however disguised, had resumed, and the reverse also held true. It seems probable that Soviet and Chinese negotiating teams were stalemated by late November. On December 12th Novoye Vremya (New Times) condemned the Chinese leadership by name as subjectivistic and adventuristic.[170] Radio Moscow told Chinese listerners of the errors and faults of Leftist opportunism.[171]

China countered by again condemning Soviet policies on disarmament. The draft treaty on the seabed was "a new hoax," SALT was "a vain attempt to maintain their bankrupt nuclear monopoly and conduct

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[169] "Imperialist Collusion Denied," Moscow in Mandarin to China, November 29, 1969; "Destruction of Modern War," Moscow in Mandarin to China, December 2, 1969. (Italics added.)

[170] "New Times Article Condemns CPR Leadership," Belgrade, TANJUG International Service, December 12, 1969. This article did not appear in the English version of New Times.

[171] "Errors, Faults of Leftist Opportunism Detailed," Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, December 12, 1969.

nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats."[172] The very low ceiling which Kosygin and Chou En-lai may have tried to establish for permissible polemicizing had been violated.

The Peking Talks adjourned in December under circumstances which raised the possibility of a breakdown. Polemics intensified. When the talks did reconvene in January, 1970, polemics did not diminish.

Peking accused Moscow of colluding with West German militarism,[173] of enforcing a fascist dictatorship at home, and of attempting nuclear blackmail on China.[174] China's New Year's Day editorial railed against the Soviet revisionist renegade clique and all its machinations.[175]

Moscow resumed character assassination of Mao[176] and denounced Chinese war preparations, which, it said, were designed to disrupt the border negotiations. Peking's "militarist fumings" and "war psychosis"

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[172]Peking City Service in Mandarin, December 7, 1969.

[173]"Commentator," "A Dirty Deal," Peking Review, No. 52, December 26, 1969, pp. 42-43. Also see pp. 44-45.

[174]"Victorious Years and Bright Prospects," ibid., No. 2, January 9, 1970, pp. 18-22, at p. 21.

[175]"Usher in the Great 1970's," op. cit.

[176]E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, December 28, 1969. Also see The Washington Post, January 4, 1970.

were repeatedly deplored.[177] "Total mobilization" and "preparation for aggression" in the Chinese frontier provinces were deplored.[178] There were increased references to the Brezhnev Doctrine, with ominous implications for Peking.[179] I. Aleksandrov, (pseudonym for a high official), one of Pravda's most anti-Dubček polemicists in 1968, joined those deploring Peking's dangerous "sabre-rattling."[180] This line seemed in consonance with Soviet governmental reassurances to Peking that an invasion of China was not contemplated (Supra., the record of official statements.) But Peking was unable to reconcile this position with Soviet insistence that if a war erupted, the Red Army could unleash very powerful nuclear strikes.

Moscow also commented adversely on the Chinese-U.S. Warsaw

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[177] E.g., Yu. Andreyev, "Militarist Fumings in Peking," Krasnaya Zvezda, January 21, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 10, April 7, 1970, p. 13; V. Korionov editorial in Pravda, January 6, 1970; "War Psychosis in China," Pravda, January 10, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 2, February 11, 1970, p. 20. Of these articles, Korionov's January 6th Pravda editorial was subjected to close analysis. See Christian Dueval, "'Pravda' Denounces China's 'Military Preparations,'" Radio Liberty Research, CRD 4/70, January 9, 1970.

[178] Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 14, 1970; Krasnaya Zvezda accused China of building military roads to the border, March 31, 1970.

[179] E.g., E.P. Sitkovsky, "Marksizm-Leninism--edinoe internatsional' noe uchenie rabochego klassa," Filosofskie nauki, No. 1, (January-February) 1970; Col. S. Lukonin in Pravda, March 7, 1970. I am indebted to Dr. Robin A. Remington for these citations.

[180] I. Aleksandrov, "To Please Imperialism--Concerning the Anti-Soviet Campaign of the Peking Propagandists," Pravda, March 19, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 11, April 14, 1970, p. 7; The New York Times, March 20, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1970.

Talks of January 20 and February 20, 1970. The Kremlin again invoked a spectre of Sino-U.S. collusion. A typical commentary was as follows:

> ...in fact, Washington seems to be flirting, so to speak, with Peking. It abounds in peaceful statements and, what is even better, they are almost friendly ones.....
>
> It would seem that Peking would not take this bait...but it did...Nearly all heavy artillery, more than 500 pieces, has been withdrawn from the Fukien front facing the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's troops. The best-trained units were also withdrawn from this front and transferred to the USSR border.
>
> This kind of policy of the Mao team conceals a mortal danger for the PRC... War is not threatening China from the north, from the USSR; however, the threat of war from U.S. imperialism is becoming increasingly serious.[181]

As the Lenin Centenary, April 22, 1970, neared, Sino-Soviet relations seemed bleak indeed. Polemics were rabid; Moscow was the more bitter of the two. Moscow seemed perturbed over the lack of progress of the negotiations in Peking. On April 22, as we have seen, Brezhnev personally lashed out at Peking.

The Chinese, however, may have been husbanding polemic ammunition. They fired it, in a great salvo, on Lenin's anniversary. "Leninism or Social-Imperialism," a joint editorial by Renmin Ribao, Hongqi, and

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[181]Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in French to Asia, April 15, 1970.

Jiefangjun Bao, will rank among classic polemics. After ignoring Lenin's birthday for two years, Peking said that the significance of the centenary celebration lay in exposing "the betrayal of Leninism by the Soviet revisionist renegades" and promoting "the great struggle of the people of the world against U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and all reaction."[182] This the editorial proceeded to do, with vigor.

According to true Leninism, as interpreted by Mao, the Khrushchev-Brezhnev renegade clique had carried out a counter-revolutionary coup d'etat. Revisionism in power meant the rise of the bourgeoisie, and the Soviet Union was now a bourgeois dictatorship of the German fascist type. The revisionists had turned the Soviet Union back into the prison of nations. They spoke of socialism but acted imperialistically. The Brezhnev Doctrine was an outright doctrine of hegemony, and the Soviet leaders, the new tsars, dreamt of a vast empire. They were as treacherous as talented. They indulged in nuclear blackmail and were plotting to unleash a blitzkrieg on China. However, the Chinese professed faith in their demise. Mao said

> ...the masses of the Soviet people are good,...they desire revolution, and ...revisionist rule will not last long.[183]

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[182]"Leninism or Social-Imperialism," Peking Review, No. 17, April 24, 1970, pp. 5-15. For U.S. commentary, see The New York Times, April 21 and May 3, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970.

[183]Ibid., p. 14.

Nearly a month passed before Moscow had prepared a suitable reply to the Chinese blast. It, too, proved to be a masterpiece, a virtuoso recounting of all Peking's sins and Mao's personal shortcomings.[184] By this time, however, the dispute in polemics had to take into account major events in Indochina. Moscow's polemic, therefore, implied that Peking was responsible for the U.S.-South Vietnamese strike into Cambodia:

> By acting this way [slandering the U.S.S.R.'s internationalist policy] Peking demonstrates to the imperialists that it does not intend to enter into joint actions with the U.S.S.R. and the other socialist countries against imperialist aggression. This position undoubtedly encourages the imperialist circles in the implementation of their antipopular schemes and plans, the recent events in Indochina are fresh evidence of this.[185]

In other words, Peking's Lenin Day blast was the go-ahead signal to Washington for the Cambodian incursion. Moscow put it quite baldly in propaganda broadcasts[186] and, on June 5, in an article which warned all

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[184]"Pseudorevolutionaries Unmasked," Pravda, May 18, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 20, June 16, 1970, pp. 1-7. For U.S. commentary, see The New York Times, May 19, 1970; The Washington Post, May 19, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, May 27, 1970.

[185]Ibid. In the CDSP translation, at p. 6.

[186]E.g., Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, May 2, 1970; Moscow in Mandarin to China, May 9, 1970. The latter broadcast was very explicit:

> ...Mao Tse-tung, at the time of the Cambodian crisis at the end of April

communists in Indochina against Peking.[187]

However, events in the diplomatic dialogue suddenly outran polemicizing. Mao moved personally to keep the Peking Talks in session, and in succeeding months they began to show results. Polemics then faded in color but all the main themes could still be heard.

Peking continued to express alarm over Soviet troops massing on the border.[188] Moscow continued to remind Peking of its naval power[189] and tank might:

> Even if the enemy employs massive nuclear weapons, Soviet tank corps can retaliate against the enemy's fierce attack and strongly safeguard its base.[190]

In September polemics began to catch-up with events on the diplomatic front. Moscow began to comment on the need for better Sino-

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> this year, stepped up anti-Soviet hysteria and thus in this explicit and simple fashion told the Washington politicians that Peking's hands were tied in the north...

[187] M. Ukraintsev (pseud.), "Asia and the Peking Khans," New Times, No. 23, June 5, 1970, pp. 14-16.

[188] "Heighten Our Vigilance, Defend the Motherland," an editorial by Renmin Ribao, Hongqi, and Jiefangjun Bao in commemoration of the 43rd Anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Peking Review, No. 32, August 7, 1970, pp. 6-7.

[189] Pravda, July 26, 1970. (Red Navy Day.) See R. Waring Herrick, "China Subtly Reminded of Soviet Naval Power," Radio Liberty Research, CRD 305/70, August 19, 1970.

[190] Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, September 13, 1970.

Soviet ties. Commentators were unsure of Peking's response to Soviet good-will, but they seemed determined to further improved relations.[191] China reciprocated.[192] During the closing months of the year, after newly designated ambassadors had presented their credentials in Moscow and Peking, polemics indicated that while past sins were neither forgotten nor forgiven, the disputants were concentrating on putting state relations on an even keel.[193] Party disagreements were relegated to second priority. For practical purposes, the days of polemical bombast at least temporarily had come to a close.[194]

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[191] E.g., Ibid., September 10, 1970, and October 3, 1970; Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, October 3, 1970; M. Domogatskikh, "The 21st Anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic," Pravda, October 1, 1970, also in CDSP, Vol. 22, No. 39, October 27, 1970, p. 6.

[192] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, November 7, 1970; The New York Times, November 8, 1970. The occasion was the 53rd Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

[193] See Premier Kosygin's replies to questions posed by Asahi (Tokyo), Pravda, January 3, 1971, also in CDSP, Vol. 23, No. 1, February 2, 1971, p. 7.

[194] Polemics soon revived in 1971, particularly in broadcasting, and particularly on the Soviet side. See Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin to China, March 4, 1971. However, Peking took Moscow to task on numerous occasions, including remarks on the worker unrest in Poland. On the Centenary of the Paris Commune, March 18, 1971, Peking published "Long Live The Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat!," Peking Review, No. 12, March 19, 1971, pp. 3-13. The worsening of the Sino-Soviet polemical exchange in 1971, when coupled with Peking's initiative in "ping-pong diplomacy" with the United States in April, 1971 leads one to believe that Sino-Soviet relations may be seriously deteriorating once again.

To check on diplomatic developments which, as has been noted, seemed to be behind the polemic fluctuations, we turn now to examine the diplomatic dialogue.

The Diplomatic Dialogue

The analysis of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue must be conducted on the basis of severely limited data. Unlike the Sino-Soviet public political dialogue, in which analysis was complicated by super-abundant data, the diplomatic dialogue is shrouded in secrecy. Neither Moscow nor Peking has revealed any great degree of explicit information about the detailed substantive content of its diplomatic activity vis à vis the other. We are forced to proceed by inference from the meagre public information available.

The circumstances in which the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue has been conducted differ widely from those of the Chinese-U.S. diplomatic dialogue. Neither Peking nor Moscow has withdrawn recognition from the other. When each government ordered its ambassador home to emphasize its displeasure over rude and provocative activities staged against the respective embassies in 1966 and 1967, substantial embassy staffs nevertheless remained in place. The Soviet staff in Peking remained fairly large, in part because of its interest in checking--and

expediting--Soviet military assistance shipments to North Vietnam.[195]

Therefore, while the Chinese-U.S. diplomatic dialogue was conducted in comparatively unconventional fashion, the Chinese-Soviet diplomatic dialogue benefitted from regular diplomatic instrumentalities.

A substantial amount of normal interstate business was conducted in these regular Chinese-Soviet diplomatic channels throughout the crisis period. During the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations in the summer of 1969, trade talks between the two nations commenced in Moscow. From a June beginning, these talks continued until December. The resulting trade agreement was not outstanding--it duplicated the minimal Sino-Soviet trade of 1968. Nevertheless, it exemplified the fact that all things were not abnormal between the two capitals.

Another instance of continuing normal diplomacy during the border crisis is found in the incongruous session of the Commission on Shipping on the Border Rivers of the Amur River Basin that had been meeting annually since 1951. Commission members convened in June, in what initially seemed to be a normal session, although they subsequently were caught up in border crisis developments, as will be noted below.

Last, diplomatic communications were used by both sides throughout the border crisis. Each major military engagement of the hot 1969

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[195]As of September 1, 1966, before ambassadorial recall, the Soviet embassy in Peking had a "considerable staff...of diplomats, military attaches, commercial and technical experts, transportation specialists, and air liason officers." Radio Free Europe Research, Communist Area, September 1, 1966.

summer was followed by an exchange of formal diplomatic protests, which often were polemical in tone. As we have seen, the protest notes were regularly published by both sides as a means of publicly justifying their positions.[196]

Our primary focus, however, is on the Chinese and Soviet diplomatic sequence toward crisis control, and not on their often overstated self-justifications. To this we now turn. It quickly will become apparent that the Soviet diplomatic position closely coincided with, and even forecast, the "reasonable" official statements of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny. On the opposite side of the border, Peking initially played the part of a "reluctant dragon."

After the border clash on March 2, 1969, Moscow made no diplomatic initiatives pointing toward crisis control. Following the much larger battle of mid-March, however, the decision apparently was taken to try to open a top-level dialogue with Peking. Accordingly, on March 21, Premier Kosygin contacted Peking, presumably by telegraph or radio, saying that he wanted to discuss the border dispute personally on the telephone. The next day the Chinese replied that under the circumstances telephone discussions were not suitable. If Moscow had anything to say, it could be said through diplomatic channels.[197]

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[196] It is important to realize that there probably were numerous diplomatic messages between Moscow and Peking during the period that were not published and whose content will remain hidden in the archives for years.

[197] Lin Piao, Political Report to the Ninth National CCP Congress, op. cit.

Somewhat taken aback, Moscow nevertheless accepted Peking's suggestion and proposed through diplomatic channels on March 29th that the two nations negotiate their territorial differences. Peking did not respond immediately to this initiative.[198] Moscow reiterated its offer on April 11th, suggesting that negotiations commence on the 15th.[199] By this time, additional border clashes had occurred. Six weeks later, on May 24th, Peking accepted Moscow's March 29th offer in principle, but appended a familiar precondition that the Soviet Union must recognize the Treaties of Aigun and Peking as "unequal." The Soviets did not respond directly to this Chinese counteroffer.

However, on a local level, the Soviet member of the Amur River Basin Commission had invited his Chinese counterpart to an annual meeting. His invitation of April 26th suggested convening sometime in May. There is some possibility that the Kremlin had directed this move when Peking failed to reply to its March 29th and April 11th negotiation offers. However, the Commission meeting invitation was ignored by the Chinese member.

On May 23, 1969, the Soviet Commission member suggested a June 18th meeting. This time the invitation was accepted, and the

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[198] Ibid. Lin said the Chinese leadership was "studying" the Soviet proposal.

[199] The New York Times, April 12, 1969.

commission convened.[200]

The frequency and content of the Commission meetings in Khabarovsk is not known. The sessions were interrupted on July 8th, when a battle at Pacha (Goldinsky) Island adjacent to the city of Khabarovsk ostensibly caused the Chinese member of the Commission to break off discussions. Walking out on July 12th, he unexpectedly returned the next day, and the Commission continued its deliberations.[201]

The members signed a protocol on August 8th that called for carrying out measures to improve the shipping situation during the 1969 navigation season[202]--which was nearly half over!

The Amur Basin protocol of 1969 was regarded as a harbinger of improved Sino-Soviet relations by Western observers.[203] This optimism was rudely shattered by the major Soviet-Chinese battle in Sinkiang on August 13th. The situation seemed darker than before. Moscow's diplomatic initiatives were not yielding favorable results.

In these ominous circumstances, an unexpected event resulted in an opportunity for Sino-Soviet summit diplomacy. Ho Chi Minh's death required that both Peking and Moscow send high-level delegations to the

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[200] Chronology from New Times (Moscow), Volume 12. There are some indications that the Chinese intended to use the Amur Basin Commission as a base for broader territorial discussions, as they had attempted to do in 1967.

[201] The New York Times, July 14, 1969.

[202] Ibid., August 9, 1969, quoting Tass.

[203] Ibid.

funeral. The delegates might indeed consult in Hanoi. The last testament of Ho, who in life had tried to reconcile the Sino-Soviet dispute on two earlier occasions, again urged that Peking and Moscow pursue unity.[204] However, it seemed that the funeral delegations of the two parties would avoid each other at the North Vietnamese memorial services. The Chinese delegation to Hanoi, led by Chou En-lai, made a one-day visit on September 4th, probably so as to have departed before the Moscow delegation, led by Kosygin, had arrived. But the Soviet delegation unexpectedly landed at Peking when it should have been returning to Moscow. Kosygin spoke to Chou at the Peking Airport on September 11, 1969, and Moscow Radio reported the next day that "Both sides stated their positions and had a useful talk."[205] It began to look as though Ho Chi Minh indeed had been effective in death.

However, a closer examination of events reveals other forces at work. The activities of the Rumanian delegation to Hanoi are of special interest. This delegation, led by I.G. Maurer, stopped in Peking en route to Hanoi on September 7th, while the Soviet delegation had arrived in Hanoi on the 6th after a refueling stop in New Delhi. On the 10th the Soviet delegation departed Hanoi for Moscow via Calcutta and Dushanbe in Soviet Tadjikistan, where their aircraft was located when

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[204]The text of Ho's testament may be found in The New York Times, September 10, 1969.

[205]Moscow domestic service in Russian, September 12, 1969; Pravda and Izvestia, September 12, 1969, also carried in CDSP, Vol 21, No. 37, October 8, 1969, p. 13.

information was received that Mr. Kosygin could, or should, proceed to Peking. When the Soviet aircraft reached Peking on the 11th, the Rumanian delegation was there. The timing implies that the Rumanians may have arranged the Peking airport conference, either on their own volition[206] or at the request of another party, which could well have been Moscow. In any case, by the time Premier Kosygin finally returned to Moscow, he had flown considerably further than probably had been planned initially. The flight from Dushanbe to Peking was about the same distance as from Hanoi to Dushanbe, but away from Moscow. The itinerary revision nearly doubled the mileage of the total trip.

Some weeks later, Brezhnev indicated that the Peking meeting had been arranged "at our initiative."[207] Soviet pride in this achieve-

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[206]Bucharest obviously had been benefitting from playing the role of an honest broker between Moscow and Peking since the early days of the Sino-Soviet dispute. First Georghiu-Dej and then Ceaucescu had been able to maneuver Rumania into a markedly improved position vis a vis Moscow, achieving a great degree of international independence and thorough internal autonomy, in part because of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It was not so much that Bucharest was able to play Peking off against Moscow and vice versa as that both Peking and Moscow were willing to "pay" for Rumania's support. Moscow's "payment" was acquiescence in Rumanian demands for autonomy.

Were the Sino-Soviet dispute to break into open war, however, Rumania would be required to take sides with Moscow. The latter would not tolerate a neutral in the rear. This of course would end Bucharest's independence. Therefore, it indeed would be in Rumania's interest to arrange a Sino-Soviet meeting. For a detailed analysis of earlier Rumanian maneuvering between Moscow and Peking, see Devlin, op. cit., Part VI, pp. 33-40, 43.

[207]"Speech by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev," Pravda and Izvestia, October 28, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 44, November 26, 1969, p. 5.

ment led to repeated usage of the statement in Soviet polemics.

The first important question about the Peking Airport meeting is "Why was the meeting held?" If the meeting had been sought by Moscow, was its purpose to try to ameliorate the border dispute through reasonable persuasion? Or was Kosygin's real purpose to deliver an ultimatum to the recalcitrant Chinese? In the first case Moscow's "statesman" image would be enhanced. After a meeting, if the border situation did further deterioriate, the Kremlin could not be accused of not trying harder to settle the dispute than did Peking. In the second case, much the same logic would apply providing the ultimatum aspect of the meeting were kept secret--and Peking, even if bowing to an ultimatum, would be unlikely to publicize it.

Since it takes two sides to hold a meeting, we should inquire why Peking, if it did not seek the meeting, agreed to attend it. Indications are that the Chinese in fact were as reluctant to have a meeting as the Soviets were eager to have one. (Protocol would have required that Chou En-lai visit Moscow to confer with Kosygin rather than vice versa, since they had last met in Peking in 1965, yet this, too was changed.) Thus the Chinese might have withheld their agreement to host a meeting until Kosygin was over half-way home from Hanoi, thinking he would not be ordered--or agree--to reverse course for Peking. Further, their traditional Chinese hospitality was sadly absent. Chou did not invite Kosygin into the city for a few hour's relaxation; the two paid close attention to business.

Peking's actions point almost inescapably to the conclusion that the Chinese, much as they disliked holding discussions with the Soviets, had concluded that unless they did agree to talk they were about to bring a catastrophe down on themselves. Perhaps one reason behind the inhospitable nature of the meeting was that part of the Chinese hierarchy continued to oppose it, and Chou had been sent to the airport to try to ascertain the severity or leniency of the Kremlin's intentions before making any final decisions on China's next moves. Thus it would be over a month before any of Peking's responses to Moscow's initiative were officially revealed.[208]

Therefore, the second, perhaps equally important question was to what had Kosygin and Chou agreed in their brief conversation? On September 18th, sources in Moscow reported that they had agreed to border talks, but official verification was not available. Finally, on September 30th, through a visiting Japanese labor leader, it was authoritatively revealed in Moscow that the Soviet Union did expect to hold border talks and that Kosygin's proposal to Chou had included that (1) border talks should be resumed, (2) trade and economic ties reconsidered, (3) polemics halted, (4) troops withdrawn from both sides of the border,

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[208]For more detailed information on the twists and turns in Kosygin's itinerary and some initial speculation on the purpose of the Kosygin-Chou meeting (some of which proved to be rather weakly based, e.g., that polemics were continuing unabated) see Christian Dueval, "Kosygin's Surprise Visit to Peking," Radio Liberty Research, CRD 309/69, September 12, 1969 (one day following the meeting).

(5) and a "no firing" order be given.[209]

A retrospective report by an enterprising Hungarian journalist who was allowed to visit the Amur Basin and interview Soviet Chinese experts in 1970 holds that the Japanese labor leader's account was substantially correct, but incomplete. According to this report, Kosygin proposed (1) (4) (5) "normalizing" the situation on the border, (2) "normalization" of commerical ties, (3) serious scientific discussion, at appropriate forums, of ideological differences, (6) appointment of new ambassadors, and (7) reestablishment of a "hot line" between Moscow and Peking.[210]

An authoritative Communist newspaper in Hong Kong has held that a less ambitious agenda was proposed and that Kosygin and Chou agreed to (1) maintain the boundary status quo, (4) disengage armed forces in disputed areas, and (5) avoid armed clashes before proceeding to (1) an all-around settlement of the boundary question.[211]

In any case, Kosygin's proposals constituted a full agenda for

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[209] London, Reuters dispatch by Robert Evans, September 3, 1969.

[210] The first five numbers here are keyed to those used in numbering the proposals in the preceeding paragraph. The Hungarian journalist Istvan Koermendy published his report "Soviet Union-China" in Magyarorszag, Nos. 31-35, August 2, 9, 16, 23, and 29, 1970. His account of Kosygin's proposals appeared in the August 2nd issue, pp. 10-11. An analysis of the Koermendy articles can be found in j.c.k. (Joseph C. Kun), "The Sino-Soviet Conflict--A Hungarian View," Radio Free Europe Research, September 4, 1970.

[211] Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), January 9, 1970. Once again, the numbers are keyed to those used initially.

a conference.

However, there was no official announcement of the impending talks for some time. The first official indication supporting the view that talks might occur came with Peking's much more reasonable document of October 7th and statement of October 8th, which have been discussed.[212] Finally, on October 19th, both capitals announced that talks would commence on the following day in Peking. Deputy Foreign Ministers would be the official representatives.[213]

Agreeing to discuss border issues and actually discussing them to mutual benefit proved to be only distantly related. Little is known of the substance of the talks. Before discussions began, Peking disclosed only that the matter of "20,000 square kilometers (7,722 square miles) in the Pamir area" and "over 600 islands" in boundary rivers, comprising another 100 square kilometers, were at issue.[214] There is a minor possibility that the 66,000 square mile Tuvinian Autonomous Province of the Soviet Union also might be at issue. Before 1911, this Soviet province had been the "independent republic of Tannu-Tuva," owing allegiance to the Manchu emperor. However, this mineral-rich area has no common boundary with contemporary China, and Peking could not assert much pressure to regain it.

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[212] Supra., pp. 215-16.

[213] For Moscow, V.V. Kuznetsov and 29 experts; for Peking, Chiao Kuan-hua and a large staff.

[214] "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969," Peking Review, No. 22, May 30, 1969, pp. 1-9, at p. 5.

If Peking said little, Moscow was completely silent on Soviet negotiating positions.

Once the Peking talks had commenced, they were shrouded in secrecy. It has been reported that the delegations met on alternate Thursdays and that they quickly reached a state of ennui.[215] Increased polemicizing toward the end of the year indicated that the talks were going badly. This seemed to be substantiated by the return of the Soviet delegation to Moscow, on December 14, 1969, for "consultation."[216] It was reported that the negotiators had not managed to agree on an agenda, a "must" for Communist negotiators.[217]

However, the Soviet team returned to Peking in January, and the talks struggled on. Of some significance to the Chinese must have been the Soviet decision at this time to permit dependent wives and children of members of the permanent Soviet mission to return to Peking. (They had been evacuated in February, 1967.) Reportedly some wives of the negotiating team also moved to Peking to be with their husbands, and the Soviet mission's school for dependent children reopened.

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[215] Stanley Karnow from Hong Kong, The Washington Post, February 9, 1970.

[216] The return of the Soviet delegation to Moscow was linked to the imminent session of the Supreme Soviet, but this may have been done to limit speculation that the talks were stalemated. As a normal practice, Moscow rarely discloses when a diplomat has been recalled for consultation.

[217] The Washington Post, January 4, 1970. The agenda is as important as the negotiations themselves in Communist eyes. Iklé, op. cit., pp. 95-99, 218-24.

It was reported that Peking had made territorial agreement a prerequisite for the discussion of commercial relations and an exchange of ambassadors.[218] However, Moscow apparently wanted to discuss "easier" questions of trade and cultural relations before tackling the border issue.[219] Concurrently, it was rumored in Moscow that Mr. Kuznetsov had been authorized to offer certain islands in the Far East to Peking, including Chenpao (Damansky) Island, but that Peking had not accepted a conditional aspect of the Soviet proposal, which was renunciation of any Chinese claims to the Soviet Far East.[220] The Chinese voiced displeasure over the alleged Soviet failure to withdraw Red Army troops from disputed areas to a previously agreed distance and said that Moscow in fact had refused to put any restraint on them.[221] The Red Army apparently could not withdraw 100 kilometers from the border, as could the PLA, without baring parts of the vital Trans-Siberian rail supply route to Chinese interdiction.[222] Moscow in fact may have reneged

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[218] The Christian Science Monitor, January 7, 1970.

[219] The New York Times, March 20, 1970.

[220] Bombay, PTI in English, January 13, 1970; The Observer (London), January 18, 1970.

[221] Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong), January 9, 1970.

[222] The Observer (London), January 18, 1970. The New York Times, March 18, 1970, had the withdrawal distance as 60 miles.

on a Kosygin condition to Chou.[223]

The border talks seemed about to collapse. A report from Moscow in January held that Kuznetsov would be recalled in February unless some progress was made.[224] In early February Victor Louis speculated that "some participants will leave and new visitors of less political importance will take their places" and opined that "The Soviet deputy foreign minister cannot be expected to attend such a mad hatter meeting much longer."[225] Kuznetsov's presence at the talks continued to be the subject of speculation in March,[226] for Kuznetsov did not return to Moscow in February as had been speculated. But public lecturers in Moscow told audiences that the Peking talks were very disappointing and that the Chinese were demanding 12,000 square miles of Soviet territory and 440 islands in border rivers.[227]

The possibility of an exchange of ambassadors apparently had been addressed. On April 1st the Western press noted rumors in Moscow that the Kremlin had asked for Peking's agrément for V.I. Stepakov

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[223]Chou's remark, in November, about Russian "treachery" may be indicative.

[224]The Observer (London), January 18, 1970.

[225]Victor Louis, "This Mad Hatters' China Tea Party," London Evening News, February 11, 1970, p. 6.

[226]E.g., The New York Times, March 20, 1970.

[227]The Times (London), April 1 and 20, 1970. Dispatches from Moscow by David Bonavia.

as the new Soviet ambassador.[228] The rationale for this nomination is not clear. On its face the appointment was insulting to Peking. Stepakov, a Khrushchev protegé, was at the time director of Agitprop, where he had been supervising the Soviet side of the Sino-Soviet polemic exchange.[229]

Mr. Kuznetsov returned to Moscow sometime prior to the Lenin Centenary celebration, April 22, 1970.[230] At this juncture, with publication of the Chinese diatribe, prospects for the Peking talks were slim indeed. Then U.S. and South Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia. The Southeast Asian strategic picture changed rapidly. Complex politico-strategic developments in Indochina resulting from the Cambodian incursion need not be detailed here, for they should be fresh in most memories. However, one development of highest significance to this presentation must be singled out: the Cambodian action seems to have been at least one motivating factor for Peking to move, at the highest level, to

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[228] Ibid., April 1, 1970.

[229] See r.r.g. (Richard Rockingham Gill), "The New Soviet Ambassador to Peking," Radio Free Europe Research, April 24, 1970, pp. 1-6, for an analysis of this Soviet move that emphasizes its domestic (intraparty) as well as foreign ramifications. The author speculates that Moscow may have hoped for a refusal by Peking prior to the Lenin Centenary. Also see The New York Times, April 10, 1970.

[230] The Times (London), April 21, 1970, reported that Kuznetsov was "temporarily" in Moscow and could not say when he'd be returning to Peking.

keep the Peking talks in session.

On May Day, 1970, Mao Tse-tung sought out the senior Soviet representative, V.G. Gankovsky, at a reception in Peking and expressed his personal hope that negotiations between the two countries would be successful.[231]

Mr. Kuznetsov returned to Peking on May 3rd, probably in response to Mao's initiative. Thenceforth, interstate relations improved, slowly at first, but consistently in the last half of the year. In June, Premier Kosygin said that the Peking talks had failed to make any appreciable progress but that Moscow intended to continue them.[232] In July it was reported that Peking had accepted Mr. Stepakov as the new Soviet ambassador.[233] The Soviet negotiator, Mr. Kuznetsov, returned to Moscow in July due to illness (which had plagued both the Soviet and Chinese delegations) but was replaced by L.F. Ilyichev, the next-ranking deputy foreign minister.[234] Ambassador-designate Stepakov reportedly was

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[231] The Observer (London), May 10, 1970. In The New York Times, May 10, 1970, Harrison Salisbury reported that Mao had urged that the Sino-Soviet talks "resume," indicating that they might have been broken off prior to, or immediately following, Peking's great Lenin Day polemic.

[232] The New York Times, June 11, 1970; also see the Patriot (New Delhi), August 10, 1970 for a parallel Kosygin statement.

[233] The Times (London), July 3, 1970.

[234] Ilyichev, a former editor of Izvestia and Pravda, had been party secretary for ideological matters under Khrushchev, and had negotiated with the Chinese in Moscow in 1963.

stricken with a heart attack but agrément was arranged for V.S. Tolstikov, the Party Secretary in Leningrad, as his replacement.[235] The Amur Basin Commission met again in July in Heiho, China, and in August Sino-Soviet trade talks began in Khabarovsk.

Agreement apparently was reached at the Peking talks during the summer on the operation of a direct telephone line, similar to the Moscow-Washington "Hot Line," between Peking and Moscow. It is not clear whether the "Hot Line" had been established or would be established soon.[236]

By the end of the year a new Chinese ambassador, Liu Hsin-chuan, was in Moscow, Tolstikov was in Peking, a trade and payments agreement had been signed in Peking, and the Peking border talks continued.

It is legitimate to inquire why the U.S.-South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia seemed to result in pushing Peking and Moscow somewhat closer together when all previous U.S. escalations in Indochina seemed to have driven them apart. It should first be understood that the two were not pushed very much closer together by the incursion. They have not agreed to support the same elements in Indochina. Moscow continues to recognize the Lon Nol government in Phom Penh while Peking

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[235] Both Kosygin and Tolstikov rose to prominence in the Leningrad party organization.

[236] Borba (Belgrade), August 20, 1970. Report by Pedrag Vuković.

has adopted the exiled Prince Sihanouk. They both continue to vie for Hanoi's favor.

It is possible that Mao made his May Day move in 1970 because the increasing tendency toward unpredictability evident in Washington decisionmaking indicated that a small measure of added security on the North might be valuable to China in the long run, especially if the U.S. began to throw its full weight into the Indochina problem. Second, Mao probably knew that a slight move on his part toward Moscow as a result of Cambodia would make Washington think twice before initiating similar escalations. Third, Mao may have believed that a slight warming toward the Soviet Union would garner additional support for China among the neutral or pro-Soviet parties in the international communist movement. Mao had little to lose and much to gain by his initiative.

Nevertheless, the Chinese were hardly prepared to move far toward the Soviet position on substantive matters. At year's end progress on the border issue seemingly still eluded the negotiators. However, both sides probably were pleased that sixteen months had passed without resort to gunfire to settle border issues. If Sino-Soviet border talks were still far from achieving a "big payoff," neither side seemed ready to discount their crisis control benefit or the small positive steps that had been taken.

While this comprehensive Sino-Soviet political dialogue was proceeding in the irregular, public, and diplomatic channels, both sides were extensively engaged in moves at home and abroad which, while not

necessarily requiring a direct response from the opponent, were of significance to him. We turn now to the tacit exchange between Peking and Moscow.

III. The Tacit Exchange

In the model of the political-military interaction "cable," the strand carrying signals or events of the tacit exchange is composed of filaments that repeat the main strands of the cable itself: the tacit military and political filaments. In the Chinese-Soviet case, tacit moves or events are perhaps more difficult to fathom than those of the Chinese-U.S. case. For instance, there is abundant room for speculation about whether a certain move by the Soviets was perceived in Peking as it was in the United States. Since many details of a given military or political move by either Moscow or Peking are lacking in the West more so than they may be lacking in the opposing capital, our analysis must proceed much as a driver does on a foggy night. His vision must try to pierce one or more veils of fog, or, in this case, penetrate a compound veil of uncertainty. Nevertheless, certain information does filter through the veil and we are able to examine a few of the more obvious tacit moves with fair assurance.

Major tacit military-strategic moves of significance to the opponent will be examined first, followed by an examination of tacit political moves.

Tacit Military-Strategic Moves

A prerequisite for understanding and evaluating tacit military-strategic moves is an estimate of how much the other side really knows about them. In the Sino-Soviet case it may be presumed that both Peking and Moscow make it their business to keep appraised of what the other is doing. Moscow, of course, is able to benefit from much more sophisticated reconnaissance equipment including the Cosmos series of earth satellites and high performance photographic aircraft. Peking also may operate some sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft--U-2 technology is available for Chinese engineers from American aircraft wreckage in their possession. But both governments unquestionably rely on espionage networks on the other side of the border. These networks presumably must be fairly well developed, if for no other reason than that each side has been working for many years among sympathetic nationality groups across the frontier. The Chinese, and perhaps the Soviets, have taken steps to restrict the mobility of these groups across the frontier, and Peking has attempted to settle large numbers of Han near the Western border, displacing indigenous peoples to the interior. Whether moves of this nature effectively narrowed the intelligence capabilities of the opponent is unknown.

During the 1968-1970 period of high tension, however, Moscow purposely publicized some of its military moves, in general terms, as

part of a calculated war of nerves against Peking.[237] The Chinese did not publicize their military moves in a reciprocal manner; as we have seen, Peking emphasized war preparations but did not publicize military redispositions. Nevertheless, knowledge of some Chinese military moves became available. Between their intelligence information and this public knowledge, each side deduced an increasing threat. As far as military moves were concerned, the tacit exchange therefore became an engine of reciprocating escalation that may or may not have reached a climax at the close of the period under examination.

The series of moves commenced during 1967 when Moscow moved major troop units into Mongolia and, according to the Chinese, redeployed thirteen divisions from Eastern Europe to the Sino-Soviet border.[238] The estimated six Soviet divisions in Outer Mongolia were highly visible in late 1967, parading and conducting maneuvers.[239] Not long after the maneuvers, Hong Kong sources reported a number of PLA divisions shifting northward to the border. These four to five divisions were accompanied by significant numbers of artillery moved from Fukien Province, opposite Taiwan. Peking also began to deploy increasing numbers of Production

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[237] Highlighting, once again, the great degree of overlap between our analytical categories.

[238] The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1968; The Washington Post, October 13, 1968.

[239] Neue Zürcher Zeitung, January 4, 1968.

and Construction Corps personnel into frontier zones.[240]

Presumably a Soviet response to the Chinese moves was delayed by a commitment of troops to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. As we have noted, Peking quickly realized that this Soviet action, and particularly the political doctrine accompanying it, could be pointed eastward as well. Although Moscow later made the point crystal clear, Peking probably regarded the clarification as superfluous.[241]

Following the bloody clashes on the Ussuri in March, 1969, border reinforcement moves began in earnest. In May, 1969, the Soviet press announced Red Army maneuvers on the Sino-Soviet border. It was reported that between one and two hundred thousand Soviet soldiers, including rocket troops, had moved into Siberia and Mongolia. Nine Siberian airfields were being enlarged, and travel was banned to Khabarovsk on the Amur River and to Irkutsk near Lake Baikal.[242] In June the Trans-Siberian railroad was closed to passenger travel for a time, and it was revealed that the Soviet troop redeployment was closer to the 200,000 figure: sixteen divisions with ample support reportedly had been moved to the border. Red Army strength had been increased to 28 divisions on

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[240] See Robinson, op. cit., pp. 30-31, for additional information on the 1968 Chinese build-up.

[241] Cf., The New York Times, September 8, 1968; The Washington Post, October 13, 1968.

[242] Harrison E. Salisbury, "Soviet Expands Airfields in Far Eastern Build-up," The New York Times, May 24, 1969.

the border.[243]

First reports of Chinese border reinforcement to counteract the Soviet redeployments appeared in July, although troop movements unquestionably began months earlier. The PLA reportedly formed many new units in Inner Mongolia and Heilungkiang Provinces, established additional Production and Construction Corps paramilitary units in the Lanchow Military Region, and moved two armored and three anti-aircraft divisions to the vicinity of Lop Nor.[244]

Moscow brought the Red Navy into the tacit escalation, announcing in July that sailors from the Soviet Pacific Fleet were holding exercises on the Amur River.[245] In August Moscow revealed the appointment of General V.F. Tolubko, longtime Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, as Commander of the Far Eastern Military District.[246] The significance of this appointment was apparent to Peking. By the end of August a major Chinese summer military build-up had become obvious to Hong Kong observers, who also reported a suspension of rail traffic in Hupeh Province to facilitate heavy troop movements northward

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[243] The Washington Post, June 23, 1969.

[244] The New York Times, July 6, 1969; Tokyo Shimbun, February 6, 1970, p. 8.

[245] Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), July 13, 1969.

[246] General V.F. Tolubko, "The Glory of Heroes Lives," op. cit.

and westward.[247]

In September, 1969, despite movement on the diplomatic front to bring the border dispute to the negotiating table,[248] escalation in the tacit mode continued. Reports, albeit of modest reliability, circulated that some air force units of the Warsaw Pact nations (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany) had been transferred to the Sino-Soviet border,[249] augmenting the already potent strength of the PVO, the Soviet air defense command. In November the existence of revised Soviet military command arrangements for the western sector of the China frontier area was disclosed.[250] The new command ostensibly was oriented toward defense, but heavy reinforcement of Soviet units during the summer logically could be regarded by Peking as an offensive threat. Intelligence on the build-up, when combined with Soviet statements in the irregular dialogue, could hardly admit another conclusion.

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[247]Report from Hong Kong by Tillman Durdin, The New York Times, August 30, 1969.

[248]Supra., pp. 246-52.

[249]Don Cook from West Berlin in the New York Post, September 13, 1969.

[250]The Central Asian Military District, comprising the republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tadzhikistan, was formed with headquarters in Alma Ata. Reuters, from Moscow, in The New York Times, November 19, 1969.

By year's end, 1969, it was estimated that reciprocal reinforcements of border military units had resulted in a Soviet troop disposition of 558,000, augmented by 100,000 border guards. Facing them were some 564,000 regulars of the PLA plus 150,000 Chinese frontier troops and an estimated 100,000 militiamen.[251] Sophisticated weapons systems gave the Red Army a tremendous firepower and mobility advantage over the PLA and must have indicated to Peking that any Soviet attack, conventional or nuclear, might penetrate deeply into China. Accordingly, toward year's end, the Chinese accent moved heavily to civil defense. In late 1969 and well into 1970, the Chinese populace was digging. Reports of new shelters and tunnels were numerous,[252] and, inasmuch as shelters could greatly enhance the survivability of Chinese defenders, of significance to Soviet decisionmakers.

As we have seen, Soviet-Chinese negotiations, once activated, continued in a perfunctory manner at best. Initial optimism was quickly

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[251] Strategic Survey, 1969, pp. 71-72.

[252] E.g., The New York Times, December 28, 1969; London, Reuters Service in English, January 16, 1970; various Chinese City, Provincial and Regional Broadcast Services broadcasting circa 10-15 January, 1970; Tokyo Shimbun, February 6, 1970, p. 8; Asahi Evening News (Tokyo), February 17, 1970; The Times (London), February 22, 1970. The philosophy behind the monumental Chinese Civil defense program was contained in two articles, Hu Hui-pao, "Chairman Mao's Military Thinking is the Magic Weapon in Defeating the Enemy--Fight No Battle Unprepared," and Wang Ta-kuo, "Achieving Real Superiority Through Full Preparation," in Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, January 9, 1970, pp. 15-17.

overtaken by many signs of disagreement and disappointment. Whether slow progress resulted in further military moves by each side, or vice versa, is not ascertainable. It is clear, however, that both Moscow and Peking continued to reinforce their frontier well into 1970.[253]

In February, 1970, it was reported that the PLA Navy was on 24-hour alert[254] and that the PLA was calling up reservists.[255] Military defense exercises were held.[256] Not to be outdone by Moscow, Peking reshuffled the PLA command establishment along the border.[257] As late as July, 1970, Western intelligence sources indicated that the Soviet build-up showed no signs of stopping. The Red Army reportedly had emplaced "many hundreds" of tactical nuclear missiles along the border, including the first deployment of a mobile solid-fuel missile called

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[253]By late summer, 1970, according to one estimate, the Red Army was up to 35 divisions on the border, with 25 more divisions in ready reserve, a total of 800,000 men. Harrison E. Salisbury in The New York Times, August 30, 1970.

[254]Djakarta (Indonesian) Domestic Service in Indonesian, February 3, 1970.

[255]Taipei, CNA International Service in English, February 12 and 15, 1970.

[256]Budapest, MTI Domestic Service in Hungarian, February 17, 1970.

[257]Taipei, CNA International Service, February 23, 1970; Tokyo Shimbun, February 6, 1970, p. 8; The New York Times, July 22, 1970.

Scaleboard, which is thought to be capable of hurling a one megaton warhead 500 miles. Additionally, Red Army Frog (30 mile range) nuclear rocket battalions were augmented with an extra, fourth, company.[258] In March, 1970, the Red Army conducted the largest maneuvers it had held in several years. These "Dvina" maneuvers were held in European Russia, ostensibly not to irritate Peking.[259] However, since some participating units immediately were sent to the border, the exercises probably were regarded as a Soviet pressure tactic by the Chinese.[260] The "Dvina" maneuvers were followed by "Ocean" worldwide exercises by the Red Navy geared to the Lenin Centenary celebration. The Soviet Pacific Fleet's amphibious exercises on this occasion implicitly threatened China. Finally, of less immediate but perhaps ultimately greater significance to Peking, it was reported that Soviet defense appropriations for border areas had been increased by twelve percent.[261]

Little is known of the Chinese budget process through which

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[258] The New York Times, July 22, 1970.

[259] Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, March 12, 1970; The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1970.

[260] Thus in the first week of April, French correspondent Alain Bouc reported a steady movement of military convoys eastward on the Trans-Siberian railroad at a rate of four trains every six hours. Le Monde, April 2, 3, and 4, 1970.

[261] The Times (London), June 19, 1970.

resources are allocated to defense, but in 1969 and 1970 it was obvious to Moscow that Peking had embarked on a major program to accumulate strategic materials. Heavy Chinese buying kept world demand for steel unusually high. Peking also increased orders for nickel, aluminum, and copper, while restricting exports of antimony and tungsten.[262] Moscow knew, of course, that Peking would not be able to convert these raw materials into weapons systems overnight, but their long term significance was serious.

These moves in the military side of the tacit exchange seemed to indicate, at best, that neither side was hopeful over their diplomatic dialogue or, at worst, that both sides were using the talks to buy time until they had prepared for a determinative military engagement.[263]

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[262] The Times (London), February 22, 1970; The New York Times, December 28, 1969, January 28, 1970, and May 17, 1970, (p. F-12); The Observer (London), March 1, 1970.

[263] Imperialism, social imperialism, and all reactionaries often use peaceful negotiations as a cover to launch surprise and large-scale aggressive wars.....We must face this with high vigilance and be ready at all times to wipe out the invading enemy.--Nanking Radio, October 21, 1969, quoted in The New York Times, October 22, 1969. In a policy speech on December 15, 1969, Premier Brezhnev reportedly said it was not certain "whether the Chinese side really seeks to arrive at a durable detente between the two countries or merely wants to obtain a respite." The speech, "On The Practical Activities of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee in the Sphere of Foreign and Home Policy," was given to a plenum of the CPSU C.C., but the full text has never been released. The quote is in The Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970. Also see The Washington Post, January 4, 1970.

Moreover, the Sino-Soviet tacit strategic picture was entirely dissimilar from the Chinese-U.S. tacit strategic picture of a few years earlier. Whereas Chinese-U.S. force dispositions seemed to rule out, for both sides, the possibility of a coordinated three-pronged attack in Southeast Asia, the Formosa Strait, and the Northeast, Sino-Soviet force dispositions seemed mutually to envisage warfare on three sectors of the border, in Sinkiang, in the Outer Mongolia area, and in the Far East. The Soviets outnumbered the Chinese in the West but the PLA outnumbered the Red Army in the East. The possibility of an attack by one side in one sector being countered by the other side in another sector seemed prominent.

If this interpretation of Chinese and Soviet perceptions is correct, the next logical question that both would seek to ask would be "Do the opponent's diplomatic moves complement his military moves?"

Tacit Diplomatic Moves

As they observed Moscow's diplomatic performance, the Chinese reasonably could have concluded that the Soviet Union was intent on completing an encirclement of China and, concurrently, of coming to an agreement with Washington to act to the detriment of China.

Soviet diplomatic moves pointing toward the encirclement of China were evident in 1968, although an explicit policy statement was not forthcoming from Moscow until 1969. Thus Moscow repeatedly tried to establish diplomatic links with Manila, attempted a commercial agree-

ment with Bangkok, established a booming trade with Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, recognized Suharto's government in Jakarta, continued to recognize Souvanna Phouma's government in Laos, and continued to extend aid to Delhi. As noted in the irregular dialogue, Moscow's representatives even were in contact with the Chinese Nationalists.[264]

Meaning was added to these Soviet diplomatic moves when Premier Brezhnev publicly enunciated a "long-range task" for the Soviet Union of creating "a system of collective security in Asia."[265] How far Moscow intended to go along this line, and what implementing steps actually were taken by Soviet diplomats, is not known. The task was extremely difficult: the king pin of any such security scheme, India, was not readily available for it. Even if initially unrealizable, however, Brezhnev's "long-range task" remained an implicit threat to Peking, and was so regarded.[266]

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[264]The prospect that any nation, especially the Soviet Union, would promote a "two-China" policy has always been abhorrent to both Peking and Taipei. For evidence of Peking's sensitivity, see The Christian Science Monitor, January 14, 1970; Peking Review, No. 11, March 14, 1969, p. 13, and No. 13, March 28, 1969, p. 30.

[265]Leonid I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda and Izvestia, June 8, 1969, also in CDSP, Vol. 21, No. 23, July 2, 1969, pp. 3-17.

[266]An Chun-tao, "Another Step in New Tsars' Expansion in Asia," Peking Review, No. 37, September 7, 1969, pp. 18-20; "Tear Off the Wrappings from Soviet Revisionists' Theory of 'Responsibility for Security,'" Peking Review, No. 36, September 3, 1969, pp. 20-22.

Peking's major attention, however, presumably was on Moscow's relationship with Washington. Chinese concern over Soviet-U.S. "collusion," which had grown constantly since 1963 (after the Test Ban Treaty), continued well into the 1968-1970 period. Moscow's initial willingness to accept President Nixon's drive for "an era of negotiations" meant to Peking an increasingly menacing dialogue between the superpowers.

As noted earlier, Chinese reaction to the Soviet-U.S. decision to negotiate a Non-proliferation Treaty[267] in 1968 was entirely negative. Peking maintained this pose as the NPT moved through the dual ratification and signature process. U.S. Senate ratification in March, 1969, Soviet legislative ratification in August, 1969, formal simultaneous governmental ratification in November, 1969 and final implementation of the agreement in March, 1970, were each regarded by Peking as a further big-power move against China. Peking also took Soviet acceptance and initiation of talks on strategic arms limitation (SALT) as an anti-Chinese move.[268] Peking undoubtedly noted with chagrin that Chinese acquiescence

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[267] Supra., p. 222.

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> ...disarmament conferences and talks on limiting nuclear missiles...are nothing but deceptive tricks. Under the signboard of disarmament, they are actually engaged in arms expansion to oppose China and the people of the world.--Peking, NCNA International Service in English, June 8, 1969.
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> ...Talks with U.S. imperialism on strategic weapons to step up nuclear blackmail against the world's people.....Continued sell-out.....--"Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique's Ugly Performance of Self Exposure," SCMP 4479, August 20, 1969, p. 29. Also see SCMP 4480, pp. 27-29.

to border discussions with Moscow was immediately followed by a Soviet-U.S. decision to commence the SALT Talks. As long as Moscow was preoccupied with the border, SALT was deferred.--Once China had seemed willing to stabilize the border situation, however, Moscow immediately recommenced its collusive schemes with Washington.[269]

But the NPT and SALT were only two among many items which Peking regarded as evidence of Soviet-U.S. collusion. The new but redundant official diplomatic communication system inaugurated on March 20, 1969; visits by high Soviet defense ministry officials to the Pentagon in April, 1969; Soviet shipments of titanium to the United States; agreement on the text of a draft treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed[270]; a U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange agreement consummated in thirteen days; "crisis control" in the Middle East[271]; and even the Soviet-West German friendship treaty; all these diplomatic events were regarded as evidence of Soviet machinations against China, although China was not directly affected by any of them.[272]

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[269]See William A. Platte, "Peking, Moscow, and the SALT TAlks," Naval War College Review, Vol. 22, No. 9 (May, 1970) pp. 93-111 for a detailed analysis.

[270]"Intensified U.S.-Soviet Collaboration," Peking Review, No. 44, October 31, 1969, p. 30; Peking City Service in Mandarin, December 7, 1969.

[271]"U.S.-Soviet Collaboration is Speeding Up Creation of 'Middle East Munich,'" Peking Review, No. 30, July 25, 1969, pp. 23-24.

[272]Not to say that Middle Eastern developments in 1970 did not severely hinder the Palestinian guerrillas that Peking backed, or that West Germany might not be pressured by Moscow to curtail trade with Peking.

Similarly, Chinese diplomatic moves would be regarded by Moscow as anti-Soviet machinations even though they had no direct effect on the Soviet Union. Although Chinese moves in the Middle East, East Africa, vis à vis North Vietnam and Pakistan, and, more recently, as the Cultural Revolution receded into the background, improved Chinese diplomatic ties with Italy, Yugoslavia, and Canada were regarded as potentially detrimental to Soviet interests, Peking's relations with Washington occupied Moscow's center of attention. For quite some time during the 1968-1970 period it seemed that Peking and Washington might be giving Moscow something to worry about.

Early in 1968, and especially after the suspension of bombing in North Vietnam, Washington began to show serious interest in dampening Peking's hostility. On April 22, Vice President Humphrey called for building "peaceful bridges to mainland China." Not once in his speech was the phrase Communist China used--an unmistakeable signal to Peking. On May 21, Under Secretary of State Katzenbach assured Peking that Washington appreciated China's "legitimate security interests," said that the exchange of journalists and related questions of travel should be pursued, invited Chinese newsmen to witness the November elections, and indicated that the U.S. embargo had not achieved anticipated results. The same evening, Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow repeated the U.S. welcome for Chinese newsmen, scientists, and scholars. Further, he added that Washington was willing to consider the sale of food and pharmaceuticals to China.

These initiatives did not provoke a response from Peking. However, when presidential candidate Nixon also seemed interested in opening a new dialogue with Peking, the Chinese attitude changed. After the election, on November 26th, Peking apparently decided the time was opportune to convene the long-delayed 135th session of the Warsaw Talks.[273]

Moscow immediately regarded Peking's move as attempted collusion with Washington,[274] a view enhanced by U.S. acceptance of the proposal within four days.[275]

However, the Chinese-U.S. talks were not held in February, ostensibly because of Peking's furor over Washington's handling of an important Chinese defector at The Hague,[276] but probably because of revised Chinese perceptions of the attitude of the Nixon Administration.[277] Moscow, of course, was pleased that the Warsaw Talks had suddenly self-destructed, but the Soviets assured their readers that the Maoists were

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[273] Peking proposed that the talks convene on February 20, 1969, and suggested an agenda that included an old topic, evacuation of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and a new topic, agreement on the "principles of peaceful coexistence."

[274] See Charlotte Saikowski, from Moscow, The Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1969; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English to Asia, December 19, 1968; in French to Southeast Asia, December 9, 1968; and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, February 17, 1969.

[275] The New York Times, November 30, 1968.

[276] Peking, NCNA International Service in English, February 18, 1969.

[277] The Washington Post, June 2, 1969, a report from Hong Kong by Stanley Karnow.

capable of holding secret talks with Washington at any time.[278]

Such Chinese-U.S. liaison as there was in 1969 must have been deeply hidden--there is no trace of it until October. This is not to say that there was no observable action, for there was. But it was largely one-way, and initiated by Washington.[279] By early October, Washington's persistence in keeping the door open to Peking, probably combined with China's crescendoing dispute with Moscow, brought revived Chinese interest in the Warsaw Talks. Administration officials said they had received "signals" from Peking of a softening of Chinese hostility.[280]

It has been noted in the preceeding section on the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue that by early December the Peking Talks seemed to be stalemated. Peking unquestionably viewed the border situation as extremely grave. On December 11th the Chinese chargé in Warsaw held an "informal chat" with U.S. Ambassador Stoessel. They may have discussed a

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[278] A. Dronov, "Peking's Undercover Contacts," New Times, No. 9, March 5, 1969, pp. 20-22.

[279] In the summer Secretary of State Rogers announced a relaxation of restrictions on travel and tourist purchases in China. On September 5th Under Secretary Richardson said

> We do not seek to exploit for our own advantage the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China ...We are not going to let Soviet apprehensions prevent us from bringing China out of its angry, alienated shell...,

and, on September 15th, added

> Long-run improvement in our relations is in our own national interest.

[280] The New York Times, October 9, 1969.

pending U.S. decision on trade, for on December 19, 1969, Washington entirely removed monetary limits on tourist imports of Chinese goods, relaxed restrictions on bank and insurance company transactions with China, and allowed foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms to trade with China in non-strategic materials.

On January 9, 1970, Peking and Washington jointly announced their decision to resume the Warsaw Talks on January 20th. Once again, Moscow was seriously concerned about collusion. On each occasion when U.S. and Chinese representatives met, Moscow published a new diatribe against Chinese-U.S. collusion.[281] But Soviet apprehension of a Chinese-U.S. "deal" was put to rest when, as a result of the U.S. incursion into Cambodia, the Warsaw meeting of May 20th was postponed indefinitely.

As mentioned during our examination of the Sino-Soviet diplomatic dialogue, events in Cambodia caused a Chinese turnabout and revival of the nearly collapsed Peking Talks. Concurrently, and perhaps equally as valuable from Moscow's viewpoint, the Cambodian incursion resulted in suspension of the developing Peking-Washington dialogue once again. This dual development conspicuously favored Moscow in the superpower arena, even though it seemed to consolidate Peking's influence in

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[281] Meetings in the 1970 series of talks were held on January 20 (No. 135) and February 20, 1970 (No. 136). For Moscow's comments, see D. Volsky, "U.S.-China Talks Resumed," New Times, No. 4, January 27, 1970, pp. 23-24; M. Borisov, "Dangerous Calculations," Life Abroad, No. 5, signed to press January 28, 1970, p. 15; Moscow Radio in Mandarin to China, February 20, 1970; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in French to Asia, February 21, 1970; The Times (London), February 23, 1970.

Southeast Asia somewhat at Moscow's expense.[282]

By the end of the 1968-1970 period, Peking must have considered its international position sufficiently improved (or possibly because Foreign Ministry officials felt more secure after the end of the Cultural Revolution) to reiterate, after a long silence, its proposal for a world summit conference to discuss banning and destroying all nuclear weapons. The controversial requirement in the 1970 proposal was that, pending a summit conference, all nuclear powers should adhere to a generalized "no-first-use" statement.[283] The obvious implications of this were not lost on Moscow, which, so far as is known, did not reply. (Neither did Washington).

To summarize, the pattern of military activity in the tacit exchange of Sino-Soviet interaction was one of constantly increasing tension. Each side's military reinforcement of the border was perceived as a threat by the other, even though its actual primary purpose may have

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[282]Peking backed a new coalition of North Vietnam, the Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, Prince Sihanouk's N.U.F.K., and the Pathet Lao, while Moscow continues to recognize the Lon Nol government in Pnom Penh and the Royal Laotian government of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

[283]Peking, NCNA International Service in English, November 1, 1970, in the Peking Review, No. 45, November 6, 1970, p. 15; The New York Times, November 2, 1970. There is some possibility that the Chinese resurrected their proposal at the urging of a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, which had been visiting in Peking from October 22 to November 3, 1970. On the other hand, the Chinese may have revived their proposal in the presence of the Japanese delegation knowing that they would gain immediate strong support.

been defensive. If the opponents had not known what the other was doing, or had decided not to respond to a particular move (it will be recalled that the tacit exchange, by definition, is one in which a response is not necessary), tension might not have reached such a high level. However, Moscow pointed out Red Army moves for the Chinese, and Soviet intelligence capabilities kept Moscow abreast of Chinese moves. The result was a detrimental mutual provocation that might have been avoided.

The pattern of political activity in the tacit exchange of the Sino-Soviet interaction also tended to heighten tension, at least until May, 1970. The record indicates that both Peking and Moscow were continually weighing the activities of the other with the United States or its allies, and that each saw the other colluding with the opposing camp whether there was collusion in fact or not. A less suspicious, more objective view of the other side's performance also would have lessened tension, but under the crisis circumstances prevailing, it was not to be.

Remarks on Chinese-Soviet Interaction, 1968-1970

The record of Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction during the period 1968-1970, as revealed in patterns of military engagement, three channels of political dialogue, and the tacit exchange, seems markedly different from that of Chinese-U.S. interaction during the previous three years. Yet the aggregate impression somehow is one of similarity. That is, in each case, the participants were able to surmount

a crisis of open conflict and achieve a degree of stability at a continuing high, but less deadly, level of tension.

The difference lies in the fact that Chinese-Soviet interaction seemed much more apocalyptic than did Chinese-American interaction. Military engagements were violent clashes of ground force units that employed deception, not high-speed engagements of sophisticated aircraft that occurred by accident rather than design. The political dialogue was one in which both sides spoke with forked tongues and the violent, irascible, threatening, provocative forks nearly obliterated the more reasonable signals that were sent, as opposed to the Chinese-U.S. political dialogue, where voices of restraint seemed stronger than the voices of chauvinism. Even the Chinese-Soviet tacit exchange seems more dangerous in that both sides conducted force build-ups of strategic significance that quite obviously were aimed directly at the other. This did not occur in the Chinese-U.S. interaction.

Moreover, Chinese-Soviet interaction, in all channels except that of the official statements in the public political dialogue, shows a much greater proclivity to invoke the use of nuclear weapons than did the Chinese-U.S. interaction. From the evidence it seems that Moscow used this tactic much more blatantly than did Peking. Soviet "nuclear rocket rattling" is an outstanding feature of the irregular dialogue, the polemics, and the tacit exchange. But Peking, too, seemed ready to use nuclears if forced to do so (speaking "by indirection" through Tirana), and, toward the end of the period, as noted in the patterns of military engagement, proceeded to deploy nuclear-tipped MRBMs. In

the Chinese-U.S. case, nuclear "rattling" was much less specific. It occurred in rumors, not in easily traceable statements or observable military activities.

The Chinese-Soviet record can be viewed as similar in the aggregate but markedly different in detail from the Chinese-U.S. record. The differences seem to be those of intensity.

Chinese-Soviet conflictive interaction was conducted in a much more intense manner throughout. This may be attributed to ideology and proximity, which perhaps were not as prominent in the Chinese-U.S. dispute.

If the information from this chapter is inserted into the international tension matrix described in Chapter 4,[284] a surprisingly similar configuration appears. That is, there were comparatively few tension diminishing actions by either Moscow or Peking during the entire three year period. Those tension diminishing signals/moves that did occur were nearly obliterated by the many tension amplifying actions that concurrently were in progress. Moreover, there was once again a mutually shared readiness to declare tension diminishing actions to be fraudulent or deceitful, which objectively moved them to the tension amplifying row.

Thus Peking, in the months between March 21, 1969, when Kosygin first requested a top-level telephone conversation, and October 19, 1969, when both capitals announced that talks would be held, unquestionably was

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[284] Supra., pp. 91-93.

seriously concerned over whether Kosygin's persistent initiative was itself a deadly ruse. The belligerent and provocative Soviet stance in military engagements, the irregular dialogue, polemics, and the tacit exchange could powerfully persuade Peking that the Soviet request for talks was either an attempt to buy time while a strike was being planned or, worse, an attempt to set up a "Pearl Harbor" for China along the lines of the Japanese diplomatic deception in 1941.

It is entirely possible that the aggregate Soviet political-military posture, even though dichotomous, constituted a coordinated Kremlin "grand design." In this line of thought, Moscow, fully aware of Peking's belligerent intransigence, decides single-mindedly to orchestrate a dazzling political-military-psychological warfare campaign designed to bring Peking to the negotiating table where, finally, the Soviets can "talk sense" to the Chinese. Thus the voices of the top Kremlin decisionmakers would exude evenhandedness, emphasizing Soviet responsibility and the reasonableness of Soviet positions. But the ominous pattern of military moves by the Red Army, the threatening Soviet polemics, and the terrifying innuendos of the irregular dialogue emphasized the deadly seriousness behind Moscow's moves. Moscow was making itself look quite unpredictable to Peking, and therefore quite dangerous. As far as the Chinese were concerned, Moscow's nuclear threats were probably unnecessary, inasmuch as Red Army conventional strength would be able to overrun the PLA in some places. As a result, Peking faced a choice of accepting the offer of talks or, apparently, of fighting off

a Soviet attack. If this is actually what happened, there is no denying that the Soviet plan was successful. Increasingly heavy pressure by Moscow well could have persuaded the Chinese leadership that acquiescence in negotiations was imperative.[285]

If this was the case, was it necessary for Moscow to continue to apply pressure after negotiations in Peking were in progress? Would pressure at that stage bring negotiating success, or would it then become counterproductive? The indications are that Moscow kept applying pressure after negotiations had started, that a few positive accomplishments were achieved, but that major problems remained unsolved. There are no firm case-specific answers to these questions. It may well be that continued Soviet pressure, after negotiations had started, was counterproductive and that Moscow should have relaxed somewhat.

This suggests a second school of thought: that the Soviets had not really mounted a dazzling politico-military-psychological warfare campaign against China, with a single grand purpose in mind, after all. Instead, Moscow's forked tongue was really two separate Soviet voices, each singing its own song. The fact that Peking decided to heed the lilting soprano voice calling for negotiations had little effect on the thundering basso, who kept right on singing.

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[285]The "pressure" school would also hold that Moscow used the same tactics in the Middle East in 1970 in order to bring a belligerent, intransigent Tel Aviv to the negotiating table with Cairo and Amman. Once again, if this was the Soviet design, it was successful.

What we are saying, of course, is that Moscow unquestionably is inhabited by hawks and doves in foreign policy matters, and that for any nation who is the object (on the receiving end) of Moscow's policy, it is highly uncertain which of the aviary ultimately will be most influential in setting final policy. In Peking's view, the Czechoslovakian invasion decision probably indicated that the hawks in the Kremlin were currently predominant, and Chinese decisions were taken accordingly.

Conversely, Moscow probably had been persuaded that Peking was inhabited by Chinese eagles and pigeons, particularly as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, and that the chief eagle was Mao himself. In this view, initial Chinese acceptance of Kosygin's negotiating proposal, after a lengthy display of intransigence, was either a fluke or a strategem, in which case Moscow hardly could trust the Chinese. This powerfully accents the significance of Mao's personal intervention to keep the Peking talks in session, on May Day, 1970. It has been reported that Mao had not spoken to a Russian in some years. Suddenly he had sought out the Soviet deputy chief of mission in Peking. There was a possibility that the chief eagle was reversing his classification of China's primary enemy.

The Sino-Soviet record of the last seven months of 1970, however, does not substantiate the conjecture that Washington, and not Moscow, had become the prime threat in Chinese eyes. Rather, it seemed to indicate that Peking had come to believe that neither Washington nor Moscow was worse than the other. Both were equally bad. Thus Moscow's

negotiations with Peking could take only small steps, just as the Nixon Administration's policy of improving relations with China was limited to small steps. Peking was not to be easily persuaded to accept either a definitive border settlement or an agreed common ideological guideline regardless of whether eagles or pigeons predominated in the CCP leadership, for both the eagles and pigeons ultimately were concerned with defining short and long range dangers to China. For a time in 1969 the Chinese probably were persuaded that Moscow posed the major short term danger to China. After Cambodia, and despite negotiations in progress in Peking, chances are that the consensus in Peking continued to be that Moscow posed the major short term danger. But the U.S. move may have indicated to the Chinese that the American long range danger might be changing, moving back at least partially into a short range threat category. Mao's move, then, could have reflected this estimate.

Thus we must turn once more to our initial and basic consideration of China as a unitary international actor. It will be useful, before proceeding to the final analysis of superpower interaction on the basis of the behavior of both actors from both case studies, to review Chinese initiatives and responses in the Sino-Soviet case and juxtapose them to the four working hypotheses.

It will be recalled that Hypothesis I proposed in effect that as its nuclear weapons inventory increased, Peking would gauge its initiatives and responses to a level well below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder. During the period 1968 to 1970, when China's nuclear capability had reached modest proportions, we have not

detected hard evidence that Peking intended to act contrary to this hypothesis. Rather, at the height of the crisis in 1969, just before border negotiations convened in Peking, the Chinese government once again reiterated its earlier policy statement on "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, several of Peking's actions seemed to indicate that the Chinese leadership might be moving somewhat closer to the nuclear threshold than it had been earlier. Thus the Chinese were willing to "rattle rockets" "by indirection": Tirana was permitted to invoke the threat of a Chinese retaliation in case the Warsaw Pact nations crossed the Albanian frontiers in late 1968.

During the Sino-Soviet border crisis in 1969, however, Peking's direct statements were much less specific. In fact, they were highly reminiscent of the statements Peking had used earlier during the height of the Chinese-American crisis: their belligerence was highly ambiguous. There is no way to ascertain whether or not the phrase "If we are attacked, the war will know no boundaries" implies an intention to use nuclear rockets. Information on the deployment/redeployment of PLA or PLAAF nuclear delivery units during 1969, which might give more solid evidence of an actual Chinese military response to the Soviet threat, is not available in the public domain. Moscow leaked information on the redeployment of nuclear-armed units, perhaps as part of a prearranged and synchronized psychological warfare campaign, but Peking was much more secretive, or circumspect, about the activities of units in its command that could deliver nuclear weapons. Only after the 1969 crisis had eased,

and, in fact, after the Peking talks were beginning to indicate a few signs of progress, was it revealed that China probably had had a few operational MRBMs ready for launching at test sites during the crisis, and that the PLA was deploying more MRBMs or IRBMs. Even then, the revelation came from U.S. intelligence sources, not from Chinese releases.

A reasonable evaluation of these Chinese actions seems to be that although the expansion of Chinese nuclear striking force levels automatically moved Peking to a position where crossing the nuclear threshold was much less difficult, the CCP leadership nevertheless refrained from activities that might be interpreted as involving other than development and improvement of a Chinese deterrent. China's political-military initiatives and responses, while more involved with the management of a larger Chinese nuclear force, cannot, so far as we know, be said to have heedlessly flirted with the nuclear rung of the warfare escalation ladder.

Hypothesis II proposed that as the Chinese nuclear capability grew, Peking would try to develop ready lines of communication with a superpower opponent. The evidence for this hypothesis is ambiguous and uncertain in the Soviet-Chinese case. Ambiguity arises from the fact that since the Chinese embassy in Moscow and the Soviet embassy in Peking remained staffed and operative during the crisis, and that diplomatic protests were rapidly transmitted after the military engagements, it can be said that ready lines of communication were maintained with a superpower opponent.

On the other hand, if the definition of ready lines of communication is limited to those of "hot line" genre, it must be said that an increasing nuclear capability initially did not persuade Peking that a "hot line" was especially necessary. Lin Piao stated that China had refused Kosygin's request to talk things over on the telephone. China apparently was adamant in avoiding such "hot line" conversations until well into 1970, when agreement was reached on a Moscow-Peking top-level communications link. Istvan Koermendy's report does not dispel all ambiguity in its statement that the Moscow-Peking "hot line" had been established, or reestablished. If this rapid communications link had existed, and been severed by Peking during the height of the crisis when it might have been needed most, the action could be said to have contravened the hypothesis.

Conversely, if there had not been an earlier "hot line" link, or if one takes a broad view of the total thrust of the Sino-Soviet interaction, it must be concluded that Peking ultimately did move to accept the "hot line" concept despite serious initial reservations and reluctance. If this view is accepted, Peking's actions seem to support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis III stated that as their strategic weapons system inventories increased, superpowers become increasingly ready to undertake arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower. The Sino-Soviet experience in 1968-1970 reveals little information that would tend to support this hypothesis. Although Peking and Moscow did conduct negotiations during the period, there is no overt indication that arms control,

in the sense of limiting nuclear missile inventories (or conventional inventories, for that matter), was a topic under consideration.

In fact, Peking demonstrated little interest in arms control during the period. Chinese spokesmen denounced progress on arms control elsewhere (e.g., NPT and SALT). At the end of the period of inquiry, Peking reiterated continuing interest in general and complete disarmament once again. Even this renewal of a historic Chinese People's Republic position seemed to be announced without great conviction, and it was surrounded by an aura of impracticality under prevailing conditions.

Therefore, we must conclude that the Sino-Soviet experience regarding arms control does not, as far as can be ascertained, support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis IV proposed that when there is a clear and present danger of nuclear warfare, Peking would try to lessen tensions with the opposing superpower through discussion of crisis control measures or strategic postures. Since China's nuclear capability had achieved much higher potential by the 1968-1970 period, it would be expected that Peking would make a serious effort to lessen Sino-Soviet tensions. The record of politico-military interaction indicates that this is not straightforwardly so.

Peking in fact acted to maintain or even heighten tension until the last seven months of the period, when the Chinese adopted a slightly less intransigent attitude. It was Moscow, not Peking, who urged, albeit amid a plethora of militancy and threat, that discussions pointed toward the relaxation of tensions were of paramount importance. Dragging

their feet nearly all the way to the negotiating table, the Chinese even then refused to be very forthcoming and continued to voice displeasure at an alleged Soviet failure to withdraw Red Army troops an agreed distance from disputed border areas. Events in the tacit exchange indicate that Peking, although finally agreeing to talk with Moscow, had little faith in the outcome of those discussions. Chinese war preparations therefore amplified tension while the talks were trying to diminish it. This evidence detracts from the hypothesis.

However, the hypothesis seems to be supported by more recent evidence. After May, 1970, the Chinese did see fit to allow the Peking talks to show positive results. Thus Peking ultimately can be said to have discussed crisis control measures with an opponent superpower, and to have agreed to a few steps, at least, that lessened tensions.

In short, for a disproportionate period it seemed that the Chinese-Soviet record in 1968-1970 would not support Hypothesis IV. Then, in a sudden twist of circumstances, Peking did act in a manner that tends to give credence to the hypothesis.

Having made these estimates on Chinese actions vis $\bar{a}$ vis the hypotheses in 1968-1970, during conflictive interaction with the Soviet Union, we are now ready to juxtapose them to the estimates made on Chinese actions vis $\bar{a}$ vis the hypotheses in 1964-1967, during conflictive interaction with the United States. The concluding analysis will attempt to highlight changes in Chinese behavior that occurred during the period of development of the Chinese nuclear force, as well as changes in American and Soviet behavior toward China in light of the same development.

Chapter VI

The Weighing of Evidence

In this concluding chapter the evidence generated in the case studies will be compared to the hypothesized behavior of nuclear superpowers.

The preceeding examination of very large-scale and very contemporary events has been conducted on the basis of incomplete information. This is not to say that the information was insufficient. If anything, there is such abundant information that ordering becomes a major problem. It is to say that governmental disclosure regulations, whether they are in effect in Peking, Moscow, or Washington, result in valuable substantiating data being withheld, with consequent degradation in the quality of the evidence. As a result, the case study evidence must be regarded as circumstantial, or indicative, at best. Even circumstantial evidence can be persuasive, however, and the evidence in the case studies may point up important strengths or weaknesses in the hypotheses.

Most assuredly, the behavior recorded in the Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet case studies will not exactly conform to hypothesized superpower behavior, if only because the Chinese nuclear weapons systems inventory is still far smaller than the inventories of the Soviet Union and the United States. However, it should be remembered that we are searching mainly for early indications in superpower behavior involving China that might be interpreted as tending toward hypothesized superpower behavior in the future. Thus, tendencies supporting or detracting from

the hypotheses probably will be the limiting definitions of the analysis. As noted earlier, even should some parallel behavior occur, it would not be in order to consider a hypothesis to be even tentatively validated.

Following the analysis of the evidence in the case studies vis à vis the four working hypotheses, and using that analysis as a foundation, it should be possible to offer revised and additional hypotheses. Improvements on the four working hypotheses, and additional hypotheses generated by the case studies, will be presented for consideration. These follow-on hypotheses are offered as a possible basis for further examination of superpower interaction.

In conclusion, several issues raised by the study regarding China specifically, and superpower interaction generally, will be presented. Hopefully these issues also will be subjected to research. Unlike the follow-on hypotheses, which can be derived from within this study, the issues raised are derived by combining evidence from the study with information external to it.

I. Hypotheses - Case Studies Comparison

In this comparison, changes in China's mode of international conduct, as the PLA's nuclear weapons inventory increased along lines described in Chapter 3, will be ascertained if at all possible. Soviet and U.S. behavior towards China also will be monitored to ascertain whether it differed from their behavior toward each other. The extent to which either Moscow or Washington acted differently toward China, their nu-

clear inferior, than toward each other, will be significant.

Hypothesis I

Hypothesis I suggested that

> As their strategic weapons system inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly willing to gauge their initiatives and responses to a level below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder.

Evidence from the pattern of military engagement, the political dialogue, and the tacit exchange in both case studies will be weighed in this analysis.

In the Chinese-American interaction, on the Chinese side there was no appreciable evidence of serious preparation for offensive war with the United States in either the conventional or nuclear sense. (Some civil defense preparations were made and civil defense exercises were held.) On the American side, although massive conventional and nuclear forces were deployed in the Far East, neither U.S. military activity in Vietnam nor the general pattern of U.S. deployment indicated a U.S. tendency to approach the nuclear threshold vis à vis China.

Generally, the impressions generated by Chinese and American military postures were reinforced in their political dialogue and by their political activity with third powers. On the Chinese side, a few ambiguous threats that conceivably could have been interpreted as a promise of nuclear retaliation in case of attack by the U.S. were noted. But Peking's rubbery phraseology equally could have meant retaliation by

Chinese-supported guerrilla activity or even Chinese-encouraged domestic uprising.

Not ambiguous was Peking's offer to exchange "no-first-use" pledges with Washington. The latter's disregard of this Chinese initiative indicated, if anything, that the United States might be more likely to move toward nuclear war than would China. This seems to have been supported by indications in the irregular dialogue that the U.S. may have employed, or at least permitted, rumors of a preemptive strike against Chinese nuclear production facilities as part of a psychological warfare campaign against Peking in the early stages of their conflictive interaction.

However, the generalized, predominating impression of Chinese-American interaction in the period 1964-1967 is one which the disputants were operating well below the nuclear threshold. We have noted little disposition on the part of either Peking or Washington to run any risks inherent in the introduction of nuclear weapons into the conflict situation.

In the 1968-1970 period, however, Peking's interaction with Moscow presented a quite different picture. Here we did find evidence of serious preparations for both conventional and nuclear war. Both offensive and defensive preparations were made by both sides, and Peking closed out the period under study by commencing a deployment of nuclear MRBMs. Yet in the actual border battles of March-August, 1969, little evidence was unearthed that either side was prepared to permit escala-

tion across the nuclear threshold. There seems to have been a definite reluctance to employ air power in the border engagements, which heavily accented infantry and artillery. (Although neither the Soviets nor the Chinese have developed tactical air power to the extent that American armed forces have, the Red Air Force must be considered very proficient in the close air support role, and a useful tool in the border conflict if so desired by the Soviet leadership.) There were no solid indications that the Red Army ever fired, or intended to fire, even a Frog tactical nuclear rocket at Chinese dispositions.

On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet political dialogue, in its irregular and polemic channels, did emphasize nuclear threat and counter-threat. Peking's dialogue once again was highly ambiguous. Moscow did not necessarily have to put a nuclear interpretation on Peking's more belligerent statements. Yet Peking, speaking by indirection through Tirana, did indulge in some "rocket rattling." However, Peking also made it clear that Chinese nuclear weapons were to be used only in a retaliatory mode. The unilateral Chinese "no-first-use" statement of 1969 placed the burden of crossing the nuclear threshold squarely on Moscow.

For its part, Moscow threatened Peking with the possibility of nuclear war in nearly every possible signalling channel between the two capitals except that of the official statements of the top leaders in the Kremlin. Often verbally, and in the military activity on its own side of the border, Moscow seemed prepared to go nuclear. Yet the Soviet official position was one of "reasonableness."

In sum, Peking's initiatives and responses, while remaining below the nuclear threshold, were considerably closer to it than they had been during the Chinese-American interaction. Moscow, however, seemed to be pushing the nuclear threshold much harder than did Peking, and the totality of Soviet conduct toward Peking was much more pugnacious than Washington's had been in the earlier period.

Whether Moscow actually expected to have to cross the nuclear threshold, either before or after Peking crossed it, is a moot point. To the outside observer, Moscow's performance might have seemed to be one of borrowing trouble, if not in fact one of devil-may-care riskiness. Yet to the CPSU Politburo the Soviet posture, in all its dichotomy, may not have seemed particularly risky or dangerous if the situation seemed to those decisionmakers to be firmly under control.

Similarly, an outside observer might regard Peking's initiatives and responses toward Moscow as very chancy, perhaps as flirting with the holocaust. Yet to the Chinese leadership the course of events may have been regarded as an astute handling of a difficult situation that involved little danger because they were capable of controlling the course of events. Additionally, the Peking decisionmakers probably could see definite advantages on the home front in overemphasizing crisis aspects of the border situation. Mobilization of spirit and increasing unification and national identity of the diverse Chinese population well may prove to be beneficial resultants of the border crisis as far as the CCP Central Committee is concerned.

Thus the evidence on the Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet experience between 1964 and 1970 hardly lends much support to Hypothesis I. It is clear that the nuclear threshold was not crossed during the examination period, yet the superpower trend seemed to be one of pressing the nuclear threshold much more closely toward the end of the period than during the early stages. This, by and large, may be attributed to Soviet activities vis à vis China, for it is fairly clear that the Kremlin's willingness to push the nuclear threshold, if only for political gain, is of an order of magnitude greater than either Peking's willingness, or Washington's willingness, to do so. Both Peking and Washington seemed to emphasize the retaliatory nature of their nuclear capabilities. Moscow, on the other hand, seemed more willing to emphasize the preemptive nuclear mode, thus unilaterally moving the conflict nearer to the threshold.

This has important implications for Hypothesis I, because it indicates that a modification of the hypothesis will be required to reflect international political reality more accurately.

Hypothesis II

Turning to Hypothesis II, it will be recalled that this hypothesis postulated that

> The larger the strategic weapons system inventory available to a superpower, the greater the proclivity of that superpower to develop ready lines of communication with an opponent superpower.

Evidence from the diplomatic dialogue is particularly important

in this analysis.

In both the Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet case studies the evidence is somewhat ambiguous because of the possibility that many or most of the crisis decisionmakers concerned believed that irregular or even public channels of communication were sufficient to the task, even in the crisis situations described. That is, while a "hot line" might indeed be necessary between Moscow and Washington, the senior nuclear superpowers, it was less necessary between either of them and Peking, whose nuclear force was less sophisticated.

Nonetheless, it is readily evident that both Washington and Moscow desired a continuing dialogue with Peking, whether or not it was conducted over a "hot line." Moreover, it seems likely that Moscow, if not Washington, did desire a "hot line" to Peking. The latter's reluctance to engage in meaningful dialogue with either superpower must have mystified, aggravated, and disappointed both Washington and Moscow.

In fact, Peking's readiness to discontinue the Warsaw Talks, the only available official channel of communication between China and Washington, even as the Chinese nuclear force was coming into being, would seem to detract from Hypothesis II. Similarly, Peking's intransigence toward negotiations with Moscow, in the face of Moscow's early request for conversations in March, 1969, and in the face of what must be considered a threatening Soviet posture, seems to be another powerful factor tending away from the concept of the hypothesis.

Yet, in the final months of the examination period, Peking did

develop--or restablish--ready lines of communication with Moscow, and did move to keep the Sino-Soviet Talks in Peking in session. These belated Peking-Moscow decisions lend at least tentative support to the aggregate thrust of Hypothesis II. Moreover, the timing of these events, coming late in the 1964-1970 period when the Chinese nuclear force was taking on more meaningful stature, seems to support the trend aspect of the hypothesis.

However, these same events, particularly the phenomenon that the neighboring Soviet Union established a permanent ready line of communication with China while distant America did not, also indicate that Hypothesis II needs modification.

Hypothesis III

Turning to Hypothesis III, it will be recalled that this hypothesis dealt with arms control negotiations:

> As their strategic weapons system inventories increase, superpowers are increasingly ready to undertake arms control negotiations with an opponent superpower designed to limit or reduce arms levels.

Evidence for this hypothesis once again can be expected to derive from the diplomatic dialogue of superpower interaction, with some additional evidence from the public political dialogue.

However, evidence on this hypothesis from the record of Chinese-American and Chinese-Soviet interaction is sparse indeed. There is no evidence whatsoever of Chinese participation in an arms control dia-

logue with either Moscow or Washington. On the contrary, Peking both began and concluded the period of inquiry with calls for general and complete disarmament, but was apparently not interested in specific arms control measures. Moreover, Peking's calls, which occurred at opposite ends of a six and one-half year silence, were for a major multilateral conference on general and complete disarmament. Peking evidently did not contemplate bilateral superpower conversations on either disarmament or arms control matters.

It is fairly obvious that Peking's calls for general and complete disarmament were oriented toward persuading public opinion that China was not an entirely irresponsible international actor. The calls came concurrently with Peking's atmospheric nuclear test detonations of 1964 (number one) and 1970 (number eleven), and seemed basically designed to counteract or offset adverse world reaction against continued atmospheric testing by any nation, whether or not it had adhered to the three environment Test-Ban Treaty. Thus it seems fair to conclude that Peking was not sincerely motivated toward general and complete disarmament discussions, at least in the short term, and even less toward bi- or tri-lateral arms control negotiations.

Ambassador Young documented that the Kennedy Administration went into considerable detail with Peking on the U.S. philosophy and activities in arms control matters at the Warsaw meetings in 1962 and 1963.[1]

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[1]Young, Negotiating..., op. cit., pp. 252-68; Supra, p. 132.

However, a meaningful Chinese-American dialogue on arms control did not ensue. In 1964, the Chinese call for general and complete disarmament indicated that partial arms control steps toward that ultimate goal were not acceptable to Peking.[2]

Available information on the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Peking does not indicate that arms control negotiations were a topic of concern. Yet there is always some possibility that Moscow may have attempted in some way to interest Peking in missile limitations, be they geographic, size, range, or numerical in nature. The reported Soviet dismantling of IRBMs in the Soviet Far East in 1970 must have had obvious implications for Peking, but whether the Soviet move either was related to or had any bearing on the Peking discussions falls in the category of sheer speculation.

It seems reasonable to conclude that there is no evidence in the 1964-1970 period of interaction that tends to support Hypothesis III. Consequently, a modification of Hypothesis III seems to be necessary. This is based on the impression that the growth of Peking's nuclear force has not yet achieved a level sufficient to activate meaningful Chinese arms control negotiations with either Moscow or Washington. As Andrei Gromyko told the Chinese in 1969, quoting an old Russian proverb, "Don't spit in the well, you may someday wish to drink the water." Accordingly,

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[2]Alternatively, Peking might have been stating a strong opening position for negotiations that did not occur for other reasons. These could include not only apprehension over the situation in Southeast Asia but also resentment at exclusion from the United Nations.

a modified hypothesis on superpower arms control endeavors will be presented later.

Hypothesis IV

The fourth hypothesis derived from Soviet-U.S. experience was not predicated on a long-term trend. Rather, since it was concerned specifically with superpower crisis control behavior, the hypothesis stated

> Superpower conflict situations which pose a clear and present danger of nuclear warfare (such as when general purpose forces are engaged and escalation seems imminent, or strategic forces are arrayed against each other and a dispute seems insoluble by other than military means) stimulate the superpowers to a dialogue designed to lessen tension through crisis control measures or explanation of strategic postures.

Evidence for this hypothesis is derived from the pattern of military engagement and the political dialogue as examined in both case studies.

In the Chinese-U.S. case, it is readily evident that general purpose forces were engaged, but the possibility of escalation, although present, was not necessarily imminent. Regardless of Peking's loud alarms about an American attack, a U.S. transgression of the nuclear threshold was not a likely possibility even though transient rumors to that effect were recorded early in the period. At the strategic level, U.S. nuclear forces certainly were arrayed against China but the reverse did not hold true.

Under these circumstances, U.S. conduct toward China seems to have supported the hypothesis: Washington desired a continuing dialogue to enable the powers to lessen tensions, especially through the delimitation of crisis control measures. However, Chinese conduct toward Washington was not reciprocal. Thus the Chinese were unwilling to engage in anything but sporadic private negotiations, were prone to polemical exaggeration, and before the 1964-1967 period ended, altogether ceased talking publicly to Washington. Thus, in its apparent disinterest in a continuing dialogue at that time, Peking's behavior tends to detract from the hypothesis.

The case study permits further analysis which, although not reversing the perhaps superficial aggregate impression of Chinese behavior, tends to discount it. Thus while the diplomatic dialogue was finally discontinued by Peking, the move was not taken until both sides probably had thoroughly detailed their positions and intentions through diplomatic meetings, in the irregular dialogue, and even in the public dialogue. In this view, a Chinese-American crisis control "arrangement" was achieved. Thereafter, the necessity for further tension-lessening dialogue was not crucial.

Therefore, although the evidence is highly ambiguous and actual events do not completely conform to the hypothesis (e.g., a "continuing dialogue..." was not held), it is submitted that the record of Chinese-American interaction has displayed several characteristics tending to support the hypothesis.

Turning to Sino-Soviet interaction in the 1968-1970 period, much the same sort of highly tentative support for the hypothesis is revealed. Moscow and Peking, while far from solving their dispute, in fact seem to have commenced a dialogue and to have diminished tensions on their borders.

At the height of the Sino-Soviet border crisis in 1969, it was questionable whether a mutual withdrawal from the brink could be accomplished. At this stage, Moscow was acting in a manner that can be construed as supporting the hypothesis at the level of official statements although not at any other level. The Kremlin seemed intent on establishing a continuing dialogue designed to alleviate Sino-Soviet tension. However, Peking's refusal to engage in negotiations with Moscow for six months detracts from the hypothesis. Meanwhile, the escalatory military engagement pattern, provocative signals in the irregular and polemic channels, and ominous events in the tacit exchange initiated by both disputants must have aggravated rather than alleviated tension. As noted earlier, Moscow's behavior pattern was much more frightening than Peking's during the instant case, and, moreover, than Washington's behavior during the earlier case. The developing behavioral trend seemed destined to be one that, if continued, would mean invalidation of the hypothesis.

Yet this dark picture changed. Peking did decide to conduct a continuing dialogue with Moscow. A Sino-Soviet crisis control arrangement for the border, particularly its neuralgic areas, seems to have been consummated although its exact terms are not known. The two powers ultimately did lessen tensions even though their wide-ranging dispute remains a

serious mutual problem.

Therefore, it seems reasonable to regard the evidence gathered as tentatively supporting the hypothesis. After some consideration of the evidence on this hypothesis vis à vis the evidence on the other three hypotheses, it is submitted that Hypothesis IV is in fact rather persuasive.

This consideration of the evidence concerning the hypotheses forcefully illustrates that these three great international actors hardly can be said to act consistently with at least this--and perhaps any--set of hypothesized behavior. In some cases a superpower pair has seemed to behave, at least tentatively, as hypothesized from the Soviet-U.S. experience. In other cases, this parallel behavior cannot be found.

Insofar as the evidence seems to support only two of four initial working hypotheses, it would seem that the acquisition of increased numbers of strategic nuclear weapons systems does not--at least on the basis of presently available information--have the degree of explanatory power for superpower behavioral interaction that was initially estimated. Cultural, ideological, political, geographic, and nonnuclear military factors inexorably continue to exert their collective and sometimes dominating effects.

However, this result also indicates the likelihood of weaknesses in the initial hypotheses. The evidence in the case studies permits some rectification of these deficiencies.

II. Hypotheses Derived from the Study

Hypothesis III has been shown to be least satisfactory of the four initial hypotheses. It was not supported by the evidence. However, we noted that future development of the Chinese nuclear force might result in the generation of further evidence regarding superpower willingness to undertake arms control negotiations.

Accordingly, Hypothesis V, revising Hypothesis III, is offered:

> As a superpower's nuclear weapons system approaches parity with that of a competing superpower, the two become more inclined to negotiate a limit on, or reduction of, their nuclear force levels.

Hypothesis V more definitively states Hypothesis III. However, the more strict definition has two inherently serious problems.

First is the problem of defining "parity." It is by no means certain that a satisfactory definition of parity, in the connotation of exactly equivalent nuclear force structures, can be written. There is an exceptionally large number of variables to contend with in calculating the possibilities of a nuclear stand-off; thus there is no assurance when actual "parity," as opposed to numerical parity, has been achieved.

Assuming for the sake of argument that some sort of definition of "parity" is agreed, (we might call it "working parity"), the second problem is one of timing. It is unlikely that China will achieve either working parity or numerical parity with either Moscow or Washington until late in this century. Hypothesis V, therefore, becomes a subject for testing only in the distant future.

Hypothesis I, concerning superpower willingness to gauge diplomatic and military initiatives and responses below the nuclear threshold, also was regarded as not well supported by the evidence. It was suggested that the hypothesis could be modified to reflect international political realities more accurately.

This modification must take into account Soviet behavior toward China during the 1968-1970 period, when Moscow's initiatives did not seem to be gauged appreciably below the nuclear threshold. In fact, Moscow's initiatives vis à vis Peking had no parallel with Soviet initiatives vis à vis Washington since 1962.

The essence of the phenomenon lies in the fact that superpowers, like powerful states in the pre-nuclear era, occasionally may be willing to "bully" a weaker nation in a manner they would not contemplate in their relations with an equal. Accordingly, Hypothesis VI, modifying Hypothesis I, if offered:

> Superpowers are willing to gauge their initiatives and responses at a level well below the nuclear threshold of the warfare escalation ladder in their relations with an equally strong superpower, but not necessarily in their relations with a weaker nation.

The problem with Hypothesis VI, as with Hypothesis V, is one of defining terms. Hypothesis VI depends on notions of superiority, parity (or equality), and inferiority in the strategic sense, all of which are not susceptible to precise definition. Numerical superiority, parity, and inferiority of course may be discerned; this may be quite different from realizing an accurate result from the calculation of a nuclear exchange

between competing strategic forces of different composition.

Additionally, if parity could be satisfactorily defined, there is the problem that parity between two national force levels often is a highly transitory phenomenon. If we agree that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had achieved "working parity" in their strategic forces in 1971, will we continue to agree in 1972 or 1973? National strengths are relative and dynamic. As nations grow and decline, wax or wane, their strategic force levels occasionally may seem to be in parity. Parity may be the exception rather than the rule.[3] Finally, notions of superiority, parity, and inferiority in Hypothesis VI probably must be discounted by the McGeorge Bundy thesis,[4] a consideration further complicating straight-line testing of the hypothesis.

Following the evolution of Hypothesis VI from Hypothesis I, and similarly deducing from the record of Soviet activity vis à vis China in the 1968-1970 period, it is possible to offer Hypothesis VII:

> The acquisition of large nuclear weapons systems will not necessarily cause a nation to refrain from international risk-taking so long as its government believes that control of the crisis situation can be maintained through unilateral restraint but also through good communication with affected nations.

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[3] Cf., William R. Kintner, "Comparative Costs of Security," Draft, mimeographed, Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 26, 1971, p. 19: "In two-power relationships parity of power has always been a temporary condition; it never has been a lasting state of affairs."

[4] Bundy, op. cit.; Supra., p. 74.

Hypothesis VII is believed to reflect the reality of recent decisionmaker thinking in Moscow with fair accuracy, (e.g., Soviet actions on the China border in 1969; in the Middle East in 1970) and which may to a lesser extent reflect thinking in Peking (e.g., the initial Ussuri engagement) and earlier thinking in Washington (e.g., Dienbienphu; Quemoy, 1958). If this is so, the continuing danger of an unexpected nuclear exchange must be granted a finite probability of occurring, because hypothesized "assured governmental belief" in crisis controllability, since it is in part subjective, may be erroneous. Thus two superpowers involved in a crisis situation, each of whom believes in its ability to control the crisis ultimately by its own restraint and its ability to inform the opponent of this decision, may suddenly find themselves in an accidental war.

Consideration of Hypothesis II (regarding ready lines of communication) indicated that even though the hypothesis seemed to be supported to a degree by the evidence, it needed modification. Accordingly, Hypothesis VIII, an equally brief but hopefully more accurate reflection of both Soviet-U.S. and Sino-Soviet experience, is offered:

> When mutually imminent and threatening nuclear strike capabilities are achieved by superpowers, they will move to institute "hot line" communications.

This phraseology points up the fact that superpower decisionmakers tend to want to talk to each other after a certain point is reached on the nuclear weapons system deployment curve. This point may be when a nuclear exchange becomes a thinkable reality for both sides.

This leads to a suspicion that the definition of parity which troubles Hypotheses V and VI may be less difficult than indicated, providing that some imprecision can be tolerated. A working definition of parity, implicit in Hypothesis VIII, might be that when a nuclear exchange becomes a mutually perceived realistic threat, parity has been reached.

Hypothesis VIII may be tested within the next few years when China deploys ICBMs. At that time, if a Washington-Peking "hot line" is established, we may consider the hypothesis validated.[5]

Since Hypothesis IV was believed to have been better supported by the evidence than any of the hypotheses initially set forth, it will not be modified.

As a result of the evaluation of evidence collected in the case studies of superpower interaction during the period 1964-1970, we have offered:

(1) Hypothesis V in lieu of Hypothesis III. Hypothesis V has a definitional problem but seems superior to Hypothesis III, which was unsatisfactory.

(5) Hypotheses VI and VII in amplification of, if not in lieu of, Hypothesis I. Hypothesis VI has definitional problems, but should be val-

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[5] In the U.S. preliminary agitation for a Peking-Washington "Hot Line" already has occurred. See Jes Gorkin, "U.S.-China Hot Line--A Call for Action," Parade, April 5, 1970, reprinted in Current, June, 1970, pp. 58-59.

uable. Hypothesis VII is quite specific and may be difficult to validate, but is deemed valuable to understanding.

(3) Hypothesis VIII to better define Hypothesis II. Hypothesis VIII may be tested in the next few years as China deploys ICBMs.

III. Issues Meriting Future Research

In addition to providing evidence on which the initial hypotheses might be evaluated, and on which modified or new hypotheses might be generated, this inquiry has developed information which, when combined with background knowledge, can add to our understanding of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and their interrelated international political activities. The issues raised will be discussed in this concluding section. Three major issues, concerning Chinese behavior, superpower governmental preoccupations, and superpower conflict will be addressed, in that order.

A. Issues Regarding China

(1) The case studies, when juxtaposed, show a number of similar characteristics in Chinese behavior toward a threatening superpower. Not only is Peking's use of similar terminology and similar phrases in its invective against Washington and Moscow rather startling, but Peking's performance vis à vis Moscow, as compared to earlier performance vis à vis Washington, may have varied in detail but not in major thrust.

A continuing fundamental thread is traceable in Peking's policies and actions during the 1964-1970 period. This thread seems to be that of Maoist doctrine originated three decades ago. In developing a strategy against the Kuomintang, Mao reported to a meeting of senior CCP cadres in Yenan in 1940:

> We must pay attention to the following principles in waging struggles against the die-hards. First, the principle of self defense. We will never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we will certainly counterattack... We must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the die-hards, we must resolutely, utterly, and completely smash them.
>
> Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle.
>
> Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them. Then on our own initiative seek unity [i.e., peace] with the die-hards and, upon their own consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle.

> In other words, the three principles are "justifiability," "expediency," and "restraint." Persisting in justifiable, expedient, and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive force, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hard chary of heedlessly attacking us...And we can in this way win a favorable turn in the situation.[6]

In a current global context, the die-hards may be considered as both the Soviet social-imperialists and the American capitalist imperialists and their camps, while the progressive forces are China, its allies and sympathizers, and the middle-of-the-road forces are all other nations, organizations, and peoples. China, through the 1964-1970 period, emphasized defense and the return of a blow. China did not fight extensively since victory was hardly assured--defeat probably seemed more certain. Chinese leaders emphasized preparation for war. Peking tried to emphasize the contradictions between the die-hard leaders (Moscow and Washington are contending as well as colluding). Peking exercised the principle of truce (at the September 11, 1969 Peking Airport meeting) and appears to have sought to establish temporary peace with the Soviet Union (Mao's May Day, 1970, initiative). Last, Peking tried to make the die-hards chary of attacking China by proceeding with strategic weapons system development.

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[6]Mao Tse-tung, "Questions of Tactics in the Present Anti-Japanese United Front," Selected Works, Vol. III, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954, p. 198, quoted in Tang Tsou, The Embroilment Over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Institute of International Studies, 1959, p. 4. The die-hards were the Chinese-Na-

This accumulation of parallels seems to indicate that at least in the case of China under Mao, doctrine may be considered as predictive of international behavior. This postulate seems worthy of further testing, either against future Chinese behavior or against the behavior of other nations which ostensibly operate on a doctrinal base.[7]

(2) However, it should be noted that in the modern world Peking has experienced major difficulty in selecting the most reactionary section of the die-hards. This selection is essential to Mao's 1940 doctrine, because the section of most reactionary die-hards must be the first object of the party's attention.[8] To Peking in the 1960s, there was great difficulty in determining whether Moscow or Washington should be the primary object of attention. It has been noted that this was a principal issue of the Cultural Revolution. At least until May, 1970, it seems apparent that Mao regarded Moscow as enemy number one, as did his close associates. Even so, they seemed to draw a somewhat narrow distinction between Moscow and Washington. Chen Yi said

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tionalists, the middle-of-the-road forces were the middle bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry, and groups independent from Chiang, and the progressive forces were the proletariat, the peasantry, and urban petty bourgeoisie. This Maoist doctrine foreshadowed Mao's strategy of the "one-by-one solution." See his speech "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," Current Background, No. 534, November 12, 1958, p. 11.

[7]Michel C. Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao Tse-tung," Comparative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April, 1971), pp. 323-60, at p. 327, asserts that while not always successful, Mao has attempted to make policy-making procedures conform to his doctrine. Following from this, it might be presumed that Mao in fact tried to have policy itself, not only policy-making procedures, conform to doctrine.

[8]Cf., Ibid., p. 348.

> The Americans are bastards, but honest bastards. The Russians are liars and traitors.[9]

However, after the Cambodian incursion by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, which may have made Peking less willing to regard Americans as honest, Moscow may have had to share equal billing with Washington as enemy number one.[10]

This raises another issue worthy of further study: what activities by a nation predict or lead to a change in its classification by another nation as a friend or an enemy? Put another way, what are the accepted bounds on international political activity by superpowers, middle powers, and lesser states which permit them to maintain their current relationships?

(3) The preceeding discussion emphasizes that Chinese strategy under Mao has been one of achieving political gain from positions of military inferiority. Reducing the Maoist phenomena to this essence and measuring it against Chinese gains, the conclusion that Mao may someday be ranked as one of the great strategic genuises of history is inescapable.

Some mainland Chinese, of course, apparently already hold Mao in this regard, partly as a result of regime agitation and propaganda, but partly because they realize that despite many breakdowns and short-

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[9] Chen Yi, quoted in "Bastards, Traitors, and Heretics," The Economist, (London), March 8, 1969. I have been unable to find a direct citation for this statement by Chen in Chinese translations or sources available to me.

[10] The opposite case can be made, of course. This is that the Cambodian incursion solidified communist forces in Southeast Asia and

comings Mao has managed to coalesce a contankerous, divergent, but talented populace to a degree heretofore unknown. The same realization seems to be filtering among overseas Chinese.

In his quest for unity, power, and resurgent glory for China, even if these be only by-products of his inner vision of an improved life for the long-suffering Chinese peasant and workman, Mao's strategy for making political gain from a position of military inferiority seems to compare favorably with the contemporary but shorter-lived effort of Charles de Gaulle and to the historic but equally protracted effort of Bismarck. This suggests that a detailed comparison of these three leaders, including their methods, attitudes, and milieu, would be valuable to an improved understanding of the impact of great men on the international political process.

B. Issues Regarding Superpower Governmental Preoccupations

The categorization scheme selected for presenting the case studies has singled out the importance of events in the tacit exchange, highlighting the fact that superpowers observe opponent interaction with third powers with great intensity. Therefore, it is possible to list three major preoccupations of superpower governments:[11]

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pushed them into Peking's arms. If Peking perceived the situation in this way, it would not have been particularly aggravated by Cambodian events.

[11]These preoccupations of course are applicable across the board, in varying degree, to the governments of all nations.

1) Problems or requirements of the domestic scene.

2) Problems or requirements directly posed by opponent superpowers, particularly tension amplifying activity in the military or political channels of interaction.

3) Problems or requirements posed by opponent superpower interaction with the third superpower.

The case studies illustrate that each of the superpowers seems to place a different priority on these governmental preoccupations. Thus the governing stimuli for Chinese responses throughout both periods seemed to come from the following sources, in order of priority:

(2) Opponent political-military tension amplifying activity (first the U.S., then the Soviet threat).

(1) Chinese domestic political requirements.

(3) Developments in the tacit exchange.

Peking was shrewdly persistent in linking one solution to the first two preoccupations. Thus Chinese-proclaimed threats of Soviet or U.S. aggression, whether or not factually-based, helped mobilize and unify the populace and perhaps distract it from everyday irritants. Admittedly it is questionable whether domestic requirements occasionally were not at first priority over all foreign problems in Peking's view. Certainly they may have been so considered at the height of the Cultural Revolution. As far as the third priority for developments in the tacit exchange is concerned, this seems correct despite the great Chinese proclivity to denounce all so-called evidence of Soviet-U.S. collusion. It is

suggested that Peking's rationale for this may be less concerned with actual collusion than it is with scoring points in the dispute with Moscow.

In contrast to the Chinese situation, the same governing stimuli for Soviet responses seem to be acted on in a different priority:

(2) Opponent political-military tension amplifying activity, particularly Chinese.

(3) Developments in the tacit exchange.

(1) Soviet domestic political requirements.

Soviet leaders also have shrewdly linked foreign developments to the domestic scene. They are aware that foreign threats or diversions can unify and mobilize the U.S.S.R. behind their programs. It is also true that the Kremlin has been giving increasing priority to domestic requirements, moving to satisfy demands of the consumer sector. Nonetheless, it seems evident that the CPSU remains in such firm control over Soviet society that it can afford to concentrate on the foreign scene, particularly on Chinese and U.S. activities. The total picture of Soviet resource allocation, even though in the process of change, continues to emphasize military power.

In the U.S., a startling reordering of priorities is noted after 1967. In the 1964-1967 period, U.S. preoccupations can be regarded as ordered in this priority:

(2) Chinese politico-military tension amplifying activity.

(3) Developments in the tacit exchange (the Sino-Soviet dispute).

(1) U.S. domestic political requirements.

According to President Johnson, there were no priorities assigned. All stimuli were regarded equally. The U.S. would have guns as well as butter. In 1968 and subsequently, however, it is obvious that U.S. governmental preoccupational priorities have been

(1) U.S. domestic political requirements.

(2) Opponent political-military tension amplifying activity (primary concern: U.S.S.R.; secondary concern: China).

(3) Developments in the tacit exchange (the Sino-Soviet dispute).

It should be noted in passing that the U.S. tendency to turn inward as a result of the trauma of Vietnam (the "Vietnam Syndrome") may be regarded as a delayed substantiation of Mao's prediction of 1965, making his attempt at prophesy appear somewhat more favorable.[12]

However, the significance of this phenomena, in which each of three superpowers can be said to differently order its priorities of preoccupation between foreign and domestic requirements, may be that so long as the superpowers do not achieve a parallel ordering, world stability is unlikely. Should Moscow, Peking, and Washington simultaneously decide to give first priority to their domestic situation (e.g., if all were to "turn inward"), a more relaxed period in world politics might follow. This hardly seems a likely prospect without some sort of superpower ar-

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[12] Supra., p. 102.

rangement or understanding on "spheres of abstention."[13] Such an understanding when one or more superpowers is exhibiting expansionist tendencies, in influence if not in attributable territorial aggrandizement, is remote.

However, another possibility for simultaneous superpower ordering of preoccupational priorities, which might also promote a more relaxed period in world politics, can be posed. Each of the three powers might begin to act predominantly according to its perception of developments in the tacit exchange. That is, if each power were to move so as to counteract moves made by the other two which tended to coalesce their aims and programs to the detriment of the first, a triangular balance might be achieved.

The case studies have marked a tendency for each of the three powers to play a balancing role. We have been repeatedly reminded that Peking regarded Moscow and Washington in collusion against China. Our account contains numerous Soviet assertions that Washington and Peking were colluding against Moscow. We have been made well aware of the U.S. perception of a Sino-Soviet anti-imperialist monolith. More important to the analysis than these propagandistic assertions or stereotypes, however, are actual moves made by each of the three nations in regard to both the others.

Peking's moves are perhaps the most interesting. Briefly, it

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[13]Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1969, pp. 351, 412.

has been illustrated in the case studies that whenever the Sino-Soviet situation seemed especially threatening, as after the Warsaw Pact invation of Czechoslovakia during the fall and winter, 1968-1969, and again in the winter of 1969-1970 when Soviet political and military pressure on Peking was high despite the fact that negotiations with Moscow were in progress, the Chinese moved to resume formal discussions with the United States in Warsaw. One can question Peking's timing--why did China not request reopened discussions at Warsaw during the outright border conflict of spring and summer, 1969?--but not Peking's political tactics. The Chinese were emphasizing to Moscow that they, too, were able to deal with Washington, possibly to Soviet disadvantage.

A similar phenomenon has occurred quite recently. In the spring of 1971, as increasingly sharp Sino-Soviet polemics indicated a down-turn in their relations, Peking initiated a political gambit at the people-to-people rather than state diplomatic level. China's "ping-pong diplomacy" with the United States must have been a meaningful signal to Moscow, and in any case can be regarded as a tour de force in the annals of diplomacy.

On the other hand, we have recorded that Peking's expression of disapproval and perhaps a feeling of apprehension over increased American unpredictability over the Cambodian incursion in May, 1970, was accompanied by an ever so slight, and, as it turned out, temporary Chinese move toward Moscow. Less than a year later, Peking had moved away from Moscow and toward Washington again.

Moscow's activities during the period encompassed by the case studies can be viewed as attempts, by fair means or foul, to restore the

once vaunted Soviet-Chinese partnership, to reaffirm the socialist alliance against the United States and its allies. Because of the drastically changed Sino-Soviet relationship, it is possible that at least some in Moscow may not have believed the prospects for this restoration to be very favorable. It is also possible that because of greatly increased Soviet strategic strength in the late 1960s, the Kremlin is no longer placing as high a priority on the alliance.

Nonetheless, a pattern in Soviet political moves can be discerned: when Soviet-Chinese fortunes ebb, Soviet-U.S. or Soviet-European relations are brightened by a shiny Soviet initiative.[14] The reverse also seems true. Although this was not brought out in the case studies, it is believed to be demonstrable that when the Sino-Soviet situation began to look-up ever so slightly in 1970, Moscow's attitude toward Washington began to harden. In 1971, as Sino-Soviet relations seemed to be turning downward, Moscow seemed to relax somewhat toward Washington.

During the 1964-1967 period Washington's posture toward Peking evolved to a considerable degree from the traditional hard-line anti-Chinese U.S. attitude. This evolution has continued, and now shows little tendency toward reversal barring an unexpected hostile act by Peking. The Administration has perceived that it would not be in the U.S. best interest to treat one center of a polycentric Communism differently than another. Washington has moved slowly to equalize trade regulations applica-

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[14] In 1970, the Soviet Westpolitik, presumably given impetus in part by the Chinese problem, coincided with Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. Result: a Soviet-West German renunciation-of-force agreement that profoundly affected the long-stalemated European political climate.

ble to Communist-governed nations. It has become official U.S. policy to not take sides in any Sino-Soviet conflict.

These moves by each of the three capitals indicate that they are seeking a balancing role, hoping thereby to be able to protect their interests without resort to force.

How successful might they be? Each of the three nations has had some historic experience at manipulating a balance of power situation and some have done better than others, a subject we cannot address here. Besides, times have changed. The cast of characters if different, as are their costumes and their ideologies. We must postulate at least a finite possibility that the three mutually could achieve a balance and avoid the abyss of war.

The three powers may be viewed as aerialists balanced on a frame mounted atop a great tower--they must interact in a very coordinated manner or their frame will become destabilized, and, in company with the aerialists, fall to the ground. But aerialists can see and communicate and feel the results of the others' moves immediately, and therefore respond rapidly and accurately to adjust their collective balance. International diplomacy unfortunately exhibits many of the opposite characteristics: nations keep secrets from each other, they often refuse to speak to each other, and their perceptions of moves by the others have been regularly in error. Aerialists must perform successfully in order to earn their living. National decisionmakers, on the other hand, may deem it advantageous, within limits, to upset an existing equilibrium.

Once this is done, for however limited an aim, the prevalence of misperception and over or under reaction in the past record of international



political performance indicates that there is a fairly high probability that the other states concerned may act so as to further destabilize the equilibrium rather than restore it.

Therefore, if international relaxation as a result of superpower abstention or of attempts to achieve a new international balance is not entirely a hopeful prospect, continued turmoil involving dispute, if not conflict, must be expected. What issues do the case studies raise regarding superpower conflict?

C. Issues Regarding Superpower Conflict

Patterns and Future Prospects

A recent analysis of international conflict, addressed to the interaction of developing nations, has modelled the experience of local conflict in six phases: Phases One through Five describe a dispute; Phase Six denotes settlement. Within the first five phases, Phases Two through Four are considered conflict phases, and within these three phases, Phase Three alone is characterized by open hostilities.[15]

This model clearly is applicable to superpower conflict. The authors have intimated its applicability across the spectrum of international conflict, regardless of the national characteristics (e.g., size, population, technology) of the principal disputants.[16]

The case studies of superpower politico-military interaction lend themselves to inclusion in a conflict model--and result in some unexpected patterns.

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[15] Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., pp. 12-31, Appendix A.

[16] Ibid., p. 15, the Bloomfield-Leiss Hypothesis (2): "All conflicts go through a preliminary dispute phase (Phase I) and one or more of three basic conflict phases."

In order to more precisely categorize the superpower conflictive experience, it is first necessary to establish strict limits on Phase Three, Hostilities. One criterion for Phase Three might be the requirement that hostilities must include at least several sequential occurrences of actual combat between armed units in which either or both sides experience more than thirty casualties. This requirement excludes occasional or sporadic aerial clashes and their resultant losses of aircraft and crews.

Of three bilateral sets of superpower interaction, according to this criterion, the U.S.-Soviet set has never proceeded from Phase Two, (pre-hostilities, but dispute seen in military terms) into Phase Three (hostilities), while both the Chinese-American set (in 1950) and the Chinese-Soviet set (in 1969) did move into Phase Three.

Changing the criterion for Phase Three to one of, at a minimum, one aerial interception and shoot-down, changes the pattern. Under this criterion each of the three superpower sets has proceeded into Phase Three. However, note the dates of entry into Phase Three under the criterion:

U.S.-Soviet hostilities: latest instance 1960

U.S.-Chinese hostilities: latest instance 1968

Chinese-Soviet hostilities: latest instance 1969

Under either criterion, the patterns for entering Phase Three seem to indicate that the senior superpower set, the United States and the Soviet Union, have achieved a somewhat higher degree of stability in their relationship than have either of them in their relationship with China.

Therefore, we might expect that as Chinese nuclear strength continues to develop, the degree of stability exhibited in the Sino-Soviet and Chinese-American relationships will be improved.

It may be argued that either Soviet or American nuclear developments will always be able to outpace the growth of the Chinese nuclear force unless the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. perceive that they have reached a saturation point. In succeeding years, therefore, while Chinese nuclear growth may be absolute, China might fall further behind the senior superpowers by comparative measure. Yet as more Chinese MRBMs and IRBMs come into service, and, more importantly, as Chinese hardened-ICBM and SLBM systems are deployed, Moscow and Washington decisionmakers will have to reckon with the finite probabilities of a Chinese second strike deterrent. It is submitted that the caution imposed on them thereby also may enhance stability in Chinese-Soviet and Chinese-American interaction.[17]

Superpower Involvement in Local Conflict

A final issue concerns superpower involvement in local conflict. The studies of local conflict have illustrated that these conflicts often do not proceed through all six dispute-conflict phases. Many local conflicts remain in Phases Four (post-hostilities, but conflict [military option] remains) or Five (post-conflict, but dispute remains)--they have not proceeded to Settlement.

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[17] Cf., Hypotheses V, VI, and VIII above.

When local conflicts have proceeded sequentially through the phases from One to Settlement, the transition from one phase to another has been hastened or slowed by the intervention of one or more superpowers.[18]

Opposed to this observation on local conflicts, superpower disputes or conflicts are far from achieving Settlement and, in fact, are stalled somewhere in the area of Phases Two, Three, or Four. This applies regardless of which superpower set is examined. The obvious reason for this inertia is that the superpowers themselves operate under no superior influences spurring them toward Settlement. If there is to be a Settlement, they must arrange it among themselves. They have not been especially efficient in so doing in the paired conflict situations encountered heretofore.

Moreover, the superpower task of achieving settlement or self-regulation is immeasurably complicated by situations in which the interests of more than two superpowers are involved. The case in point, of

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[18]Bloomfield and Leiss, op. cit., pp. 28-29, Factor 13. It should be noted that out of fifty-four local conflict situations since World War II involving actual or potential application of force that were studied, forty-three were not primarily U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Chinese confrontations. Ibid., p. 405. Cf. the analytical approach by Morton A. Kaplan proceeding from the systemic level through the superpower level to the local conflict level in his essay "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources" in James N. Rosenau, (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp. 92-121.

course, is Vietnam, or, in the broader sense, Indochina. The case studies of superpower conflictive interaction have featured Vietnam as an important continuing thread.

The Vietnam conflict can be considered as being caught up in a three-way superpower dispute. The superpowers in dispute, having fastened on Vietnam, have proven unable to find a way to move toward Settlement and therefore have doomed that conflict to remain in Phase Three.

It is unquestionable that the Vietnamese nations, if not all of Indochina, have been victimized by a three-way superpower unwillingness and inability to move their own complex disputes/conflicts toward Settlement. Vietnam's population and terrain have been hostages to superpower intransigence.

How could Vietnam conflict have been moved toward Settlement by the superpowers? A number of options come to mind:

1. By a trilateral superpower arrangement on Indochina imposed either politically or economically, or both, on Hanoi and Saigon. This arrangement might be either overtly or tacitly achieved.

2. By a Peking-Washington arrangement to terminate aid to their clients, forcing the burden for supporting the war on Moscow, which might not be willing to bear sole responsibility for its continuation.

3. By a Washington-Moscow arrangement to the same ends vis à vis Peking.

4. By a Sino-Soviet agreement to terminate aid to Hanoi, increasing the latter's burden to a point where a search for an armistice would be essential.

5. By a Sino-Soviet agreement to provide all-out aid to Hanoi, including advisors and troops, thus presenting Washington with a situation in which Saigon necessarily would have to acquiesce in Hanoi's demands unless superpower hostilities over Indochina were deemed an acceptable alternative.

However, none of these alternatives has been feasible as yet;[19] there seems to be little prospect of future feasibility. In this regard, it should be noted that the current U.S. program of Vietnamizing the Indochina conflict does not move it toward Settlement. While removing U.S. troops from combat, Vietnamization is as likely to mean an indefinite extension of conflict as it is a lessening of it.

On the other hand, if a reduction of the U.S. military presence in Asia, which presumably is supposed to follow from the Nixon Doctrine, results in improved relations between Washington and Peking, and if the Peking talks result in improved Sino-Soviet relations (lessened competition) between those two poles of power, there may be some possibility for realization of the first alternative.

If the superpowers ultimately sponsor or otherwise permit an Indochina settlement, does it follow that the cessation of conflict in this historic battleground will be the end of war in our time? President Nixon

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[19] For example, it can be deduced that one of Peking's objectives in Vietnam has been to keep the U.S. involved, draining its energies, morale, and resources without endangering China. See David P. Mozingo, "China's Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution," Conference Papers, Seventh International Conference on World Politics, Vol. 2, August, 1969, pp. 1-46.

hopefully predicts that this may be so.[20]

An appreciation of the analysis of superpower interaction hardly affords much optimism over this type of prediction. While the evidence and analysis has indicated that the apocalypse of a nuclear exchange may be avoided by the superpowers, given a measure of prudence, reflection, and restraint, the contending nature of their goals and the disparate nature of their behavior in trying to achieve them indicate that occasional conflict, probably by proxy forces, is likely.

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[20]President Nixon, interview with C.L. Sulzberger on March 9, 1971, carried in The New York Times, March 10, 1971.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Captain William A. Platte, U.S. Navy, is a native of Burlington, Iowa. After graduating from Burlington High School in 1946 and Burlington Junior College in 1948, he entered the U.S. Navy flight training program. He was designated a Naval Aviator in October, 1949, and was commissioned Ensign in June, 1950. Subsequently he has served in aviation patrol, transport, and training squadrons, and the U.S.S. Greenwich Bay, a seaplane tender. From 1961-64 he was assigned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Politico-Military Policy Division. In 1964-66 he served as Operations Officer for Fleet Air Wing Ten deployed in the Southeast Asian area. In 1967-68 he commanded Training Squadron Twenty-Nine in the Naval Air Training Command.

Captain Platte received the Master's Degree in International Relations at Stanford University in 1958. He has written a number of articles concerning the U.S. foreign policy planning process, on the value of personal contact in international relations, and, recently, on events in the Sino-Soviet dispute. These articles have appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings and the Naval War College Review. He has been at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1968 as a regular graduate student sponsored by the Navy's Doctoral Studies Program. His fields of concentration have been international politics, defense policy, and communist studies.

Captain Platte, his wife, the former Joan Ann McGivney of Staten Island, New York, and their five children have resided in Acton, Massachusetts during his course of study.